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Japanese Intellectual Community and Its Response to the Cold War Polarization, 1945–1952

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Introduction

When Japan lost World War II and started preparing for the American military occupation, a general feeling of hopelessness permeated the nation, as political elites and society at large both found themselves uncertain of the future. But there was at least one group that felt relieved at their country's defeat and looked at the upcoming U.S. control with hope. It was the Japanese intellectuals: liberals, progressives, and Marxists alike. In the cultural landscape of early postwar Japan, they formed a community dedicated to fostering an idea of new Japan and freeing it from the perceived threats of nationalism and militarism. They cooperated closely with the Americans, whom they saw as representing democracy, liberty, and the community of nations—rather than simply U.S. interests. But when the global Cold War brought a bipolar framework along with an ideological polarization to Japan, the intellectual community found itself under strong pressure to reorient politically and struggled to maintain unity. The Japanese intellectual community, constituted right after World War II, and its response to the Cold War polarization during the period of American occupation (1945-1952), is the main topic of this dissertation.

The very existence of such a community of intellectuals during the first postwar years is generally well-established and has been a subject of attention ever since Maruyama Masao, himself a key member of that community, retrospectively dubbed it the "community of remorse" (*kaikon kyōdōtai* 悔恨共同体).[1] The term referred to the shared experience of most Japanese intellectuals during the war and their inability to effectively oppose Japan's government and its policies. After the surrender, many of them united under a general idea of democratization and actively supported the reforms initiated by the American occupation authorities. While scholars generally do not contest that this community emerged right after the war, so far there have been no major studies, be it in Japanese, English, or Polish, that would trace its history over the years of the occupation.

In Japan, at least since the middle of the twentieth century, the studies on intellectuals and their ideas have been quite popular and referred to collectively as *shisō-shi* 思想史, or the "history of thought."[2] Many of these works naturally also dealt with the early postwar period.

[1] Maruyama Masao, "Kindai Nihon no chishikijin" [Intellectuals of modern Japan], 10 June 1977, Gakushikai ākaibusu, www.gakushikai.or.jp /magazine/article/archives/archives_maruyama. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[2] The "history of thought" (*shisō-shi* 思想史) is not identical to the history of ideas, despite a very similar name. This similarity results in a frequent identification of Japanese *shisō-shi* with the Western history of ideas. The latter

However, the relative proximity of these times meant that for a long time those writing on Japan's broadly understood intellectual history were the same figures who shaped it between the late 1940s and 1960s. Their works, while often very informative, mostly reflected their personal convictions tied to the events they themselves had participated in and often lacked a more generalized, distanced view of the topic.[3]

This started to change in the 1990s, when the new generation of Japanese historians emerged and, simultaneously, the topic of intellectual history of postwar Japan became more popular among the English-speaking scholars. In 1996, two excellent studies in English appeared. The first one, written by J. Victor Koschmann and titled *Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan*, explored intellectual debates on the Japanese left, while the second one, *Democracy in Japan* by Rikki Kersten, focused specifically on the debates involving Maruyama Masao, who is perhaps the single most famous thinker of the postwar era.[4] Maruyama was similarly the focus of another major work, *Intellectuals of Postwar Japan* (*Sengo Nihon no chishikijin* 戦後日本の知識人), published in 1995 by Tsuzuki Tsutomu, a Japanese scholar belonging to the generation born in the 1950s.[5] The prominence of Maruyama in contemporary Japan is evidenced by a large body of research dedicated solely to him and his ideas, often referred to as "Maruyama studies" (*Maruyama-ron* 丸山論).[6] This abundance does not always translate into greater knowledge about the broader intellectual history of the period since much of this research focuses on biography and individual ideas of Maruyama rather than the environment and community in which he operated. However, the aforementioned books by Kersten and Tsuzuki are profound in the way in which they connect Maruyama's ideas to general history of intellectuals in postwar Japan.

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was created in the early twentieth century by American scholar Arthur O. Lovejoy and possesses distinct characteristics, which are typically absent from works categorized as *shisō-shi*. The history of ideas is properly translated into Japanese as *kannen no rekishi* 観念の歴史 or *kannen-shi* 観念史.

[3] For example: Kuno Osamu, Tsurumi Shunsuke, Fujita Shōzō, *Sengo Nihon no shisō* [Intellectual thought of postwar Japan] (Keisō Shobō, 1966); Tōyama Shigeki, *Sengo no rekishigaku to rekishi ishiki* [Postwar historiography and historical consciousness] (Iwanami Shoten, 2001); Tsurumi Kazuko, *Social Change and the Individual: Japan Before and After Defeat in World War II* (Princeton University Press, 1970). Many more examples can be given.

[4] J. Victor Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan* (The University of Chicago Press, 1996); Rikki Kersten, *Democracy in Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy* (Routledge, 1996).

[5] Tsuzuki Tsutomu, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin: Maruyama Masao to sono jidai* [Intellectuals of postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and his times] (Seori Shobō, 1995).

[6] Tsuzuki, "Maruyama Masao-ron no genzai" [The current state of Maruyama Masao studies], *Seiji Shisō Kenkyū* V, 0 [Inaugural] (2000), p. 23.

One of the most informative works on Japan's postwar discourse was published in 2002 by Japanese historian Oguma Eiji under the title *"Democracy" and "Patriotism"* (*"Minshu" to "aikoku"* 〈民主〉と〈愛国〉).[7] The author undertook an ambitious task of uncovering how these two concepts influenced each other and evolved in meaning in post-1945 Japan, reflecting broader social sentiments represented by a number of intellectuals. An equally essential contribution has been made by Takeuchi Yō, a social scientist, who shed light on Japanese intellectuals as a social group in his 2011 study titled the *Postwar History of the Illusion of Reformism* (*Kakushin gensō no sengo shi* 革新幻想の戦後史) and, to some extent, also in his 2012 biography of Shimizu Ikutarō, another prominent figure of the postwar era.[8] In 2016, historian Adam Bronson published an extensive study under the title *One Hundred Million Philosophers*, in which he chose one of the intellectual groups active in early postwar Japan—Institute for the Science of Thought (Shisō Kagaku no Kenkyūkai 思想化学の研究会)—and traced its members along with their ideas.[9] Aside from these monographs, an article by Matsuno Yasuko from 2023 is an example of research on the topic of Japan's postwar intellectuals which analyzes them as a broader community rather than simply a collection of individuals.[10]

Furthermore, there are several studies which do not belong to the realm of intellectual history, but nevertheless devote some attention to Japanese intellectuals during the postwar period. James J. Orr combines cultural history with aspects of the history of mentalities in his examination of how a sense of victimhood has gradually developed in postwar Japan's society.[11] Nick Kapur's 2018 book, *Japan at the Crossroads*, highlights the role of intellectuals during the wave of protests in Japan which occurred in 1959–1960.[12] Problems related to intellectual history are also addressed in the work of Olga Barbasiewicz, a Polish political scientist

[7] Oguma Eiji, *"Minshu" to "aikoku:" Sengo Nihon no nashonarizumu to kōkyōsei* ["Democracy" and "patriotism:" Nationalism and public sphere in postwar Japan] (Senyōsha, 2002).
[8] Takeuchi Yō, *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi* [Postwar history of the illusion of reformism] (Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2011); Takeuchi Yō, *Shimizu Ikutarō no haken to bōkyaku: Media to chishikijin* [Hegemony and fall into oblivion of Shimizu Ikutarō: Media and intellectuals] (Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2018) (e-book).
[9] Adam Bronson, *One Hundred Million Philosophers. Science of Thought and the Culture of Democracy in Postwar Japan* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2016).
[10] Matsuno Yasuko, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai': Zaidan hōjin 'Nijū seiki kenkyūjo' to Shimizu Ikutarō, Maruyama Masao, Fukuda Tsuneari, Hayashi Kentarō" [Postwar intellectuals and "community of remorse:" Institute of the Twentieth Century and Shimizu Ikutarō, Maruyama Masao, Fukuda Tsuneari, Hayashi Kentarō], *Shakaigaku Zasshi* 40 (2023).
[11] James J. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2001).
[12] Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo* (Harvard University Press, 2018).

specializing in the relationship between Japan's public memory and foreign relations.[13] Japanese postwar intellectual life was strongly tied to opinion magazines. For this reason, it remains in the scope of interest of historians of journalism, such as Oku Takenori. His 2007 book *Postwar History of the Critical Discourse* (*Rondan no sengo shi* 論壇の戦後史) serves as a good example.[14]

Despite the deep significance of all the aforementioned works, none of them has devoted any greater attention to the problem of Cold War and its impact on Japan's intellectual community—the community of remorse—despite that conflict being the single greatest development in global affairs since the end of World War II. There has been extensive research on the influence of the global Cold War on Japan's domestic affairs. A good example of such research is the work of Kōda Naoko, who analyzed the effect of America's Cold War-era policy on the history of Japan's student movement.[15] Similarly, Ann Sherif looked at different aspects of Japanese cultural and social life through the Cold War lens.[16] However, the link between Cold War and the history of Japan's intellectual community in the early postwar period has yet to be explored.

The lack of studies dedicated either to the postwar intellectual community, or to the relationship between Japanese intellectuals and Cold War, is not simply a problem of a gap in research. In the late 1945 Japan, at the outset of the American occupation, the community of remorse emerged as a result of shared wartime experience and political commitment to postwar democratization. However, already by the end of the occupation period, in 1952, Japanese intellectuals were in a state of internal conflict and remained visibly divided into the anti-American left and pro-American right. What happened to the unified intellectual community? My initial hypothesis linked this historical phenomenon to the impact of Cold War on Japan. However, what I set out to do was not to simply prove this hypothesis true, but rather—to trace the intellectual community through the entire occupation period, that is, from August 1945 to April 1952, examining how it operated under the increasing influence of Cold War in Japan's internal affairs. This links us to the series of research questions behind this project: How did

[13] Olga Barbasiewicz, *Pomniki i miejsca pamięci w relacjach międzynarodowych: Wpływ pamięci na stosunki japońsko-amerykańskie z perspektywy Japonii* [Monuments and memorials in international relations: The impact of memory on Japan-American relations from a Japanese perspective] (Wydawnictwo Instytutu Kultur Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2016).
[14] Oku Takenori, *Rondan no sengo shi* [Postwar history of critical discourse] (Heibonsha, 2007).
[15] Kōda Naoko, *The United States and the Japanese Student Movement, 1948-1973: Managing a Free World*, (Lexington Books, 2020).
[16] Ann Sherif, *Japan's Cold War: Media, Literature, and the Law* (Columbia University Press, 2009).

the intellectual community of occupied Japan constitute itself and respond to the Cold War polarization? Why did it ultimately break down? When did that happen?

This dissertation adjusts the spotlight to the commonly neglected actor in historical debates related to the American occupation of Japan. It reconstructs the diverse voices of intellectuals in order to provide a more nuanced narrative on postwar Japan, and thus adds to the existing historiography. By linking the intellectual history of Japan with the history of global Cold War it provides a novel way of looking at both.

This undertaking was inspired by several works, but primarily by the 2015 book *Europe's Intellectuals and the Cold War*.[17] Written by Nancy Jachec, it examines the efforts of the European Society of Culture (Société Européenne de Culture), founded in 1950 in Italy, to oppose the Cold War polarization by uniting intellectuals across Europe, both West and East. The book served as a source of inspiration for attempting something similar regarding postwar Japan. But Jachec's book is not the only work exploring the relationship between intellectuals and Cold War. In two separate studies, Pierre Grémion and Jan Tokarski examined this relationship through the case of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), a cultural organization founded in 1950 in West Berlin. Both authors showed how the Congress's members navigated the tensions between what they themselves attempted to express as intellectuals and what their sponsor, the United States, wished them to represent as agents of anti-Soviet psychological warfare.[18] Their struggles mirrored similar experiences on the part of Japanese intellectuals during the same period. Furthermore, in the classic study *Who Paid the Piper? CIA and the Cultural Cold War*, published in 1999, Frances Stonor Saunders presents an even broader picture of how the U.S. intelligence attempted to infiltrate artistic and intellectuals movements and co-opt them for the their own objectives through various organizations, including CCF but also the Ford Foundation.[19] The books by Jachec, Grémion, Tokarski, and Saunders not only provide a valuable context for my own project, but also enable

[17] Nancy Jachec, *Europe's Intellectuals and the Cold War: The Society of European Culture, Post-War Politics and International Relations* (I.B. Tauris, 2015).
[18] Pierre Grémion, *Konspiracja wolności: Kongres Wolności Kultury w Paryżu (1950-1975)* [Freedom conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom in Paris (1950-1975)], trans. Jan Maria Kłoczowski (Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2004) (original French edition released in 1995); Jan Tokarski, *W cieniu katastrofy: „Encounter," Kongres Wolności Kultury i pamięć XX wieku* [In the shadow of a catastrophe: *Encounter*, The Congress for Cultural Freedom, and memory of the twentieth century] (Wydawnictwo Znak, 2023).
[19] Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (Granta Books, 1999).

a search for analogies in regards to universal patterns in how intellectuals around the world grappled with the Cold War bipolar framework.

Bronson's aforementioned *One Hundred Million Philosophers* was likewise an inspiration, in this case in regards to the holistic approach to intellectual history. Such an approach simultaneously gives attention to the ideas developed by intellectuals, their social functioning, media ecosystem, and the external sources of influence. Finally, the *Unwanted Peace* by Tamamoto Masaru, submitted in 1988 as a doctoral thesis at the Johns Hopkins University, provided me with an important point of reference.[20] Although ultimately unpublished, the work was original in its attempt to explore some of the internal strife that characterized postwar Japan's intellectual community. Finding myself in strong disagreement with many of the author's observations regarding the role of different historical actors, I nevertheless benefited from his analysis, which helped me form my own perspective on the matter.

While this work is based on original analysis of several types of primary sources, including personal records (such as diaries), official records (such as policy documents), and periodicals (such as monthly magazines), the last category constitutes by far the largest part of the source material, as well as its thematic core. The reason behind this ties back to how the Japanese intellectual community functioned under the American occupation. From the early twentieth century until the mid-1960s, monthly magazines constituted the single most important medium of communication: both among the intellectuals themselves and between them and the larger public.[21] The magazines in question were a unique, specifically Japanese kind of periodicals, referred to as *sōgō zasshi* 総合雑誌 ("general opinion magazines").[22] While their emergence and subsequent history will be covered in Chapter 1, as part of a broader history of Japanese intellectuals, I will here provide an examination of the *sōgō zasshi* as a source.

According to a classic definition by Sugiyama Heisuke, the *sōgō zasshi* were a medium which "integrated (*sōgō* 総合) high-level research papers (*kenkyū ronbun* 研究論文), teaching papers (*shidō ronbun* 指導論文), entertainment, literature and arts, etc., [looked at] from

[20] Tamamoto Masaru, *Unwanted Peace: Japanese Intellectual Thought in American Occupied Japan, 1948-1952*, PhD diss. (John Hopkins University, 1988).
[21] Bronson, *One Hundred Million Philosophers*, pp. 4-5.
[22] While the term is usually rendered in Japanese characters as 総合雑誌, an alternative writing, 綜合雑誌, can also be seen occasionally. Some authors seem to prefer this form, e.g. Ōsawa Satoshi.

various perspectives."[23] The term *sōgō* 総合 in the medium's name can mean both "general" and "integrated." Published monthly, these magazines provided commentary on a vast array of political, social, economic, and cultural subjects, mostly tied to current events, along with polemical discussions between different authors. True to Sugiyama's definition, they also included entertainment (for example, in the form of episodically-published book chapters), although the size of this segment in relation to sociopolitical commentary varied by magazine. A typical layout was structured around a split between opinion articles/editorials (*ronsetsu* 論説) and literary works (*sōsaku* 創作). A key feature of major opinion monthlies was debates (*tōgi* 討議) on political or social issues. Some of them took the form of *zadankai* 座談会, or "round-table discussions" between intellectuals, organized by a magazine and then published in the form of a transcript. This became characteristic especially of the early postwar period.[24]

The length of an issue varied. Difficult economic situation and a shortage of paper made early issues from 1945–1949 differ by length, often quite considerably, as they oscillated between 60 and 180 pages. From 1950 onward, their size became more stable and started to grow. By 1951, a single issue of a major *sōgō zasshi* could have as many as 280 pages. But many aspects of the magazines stayed the same, regardless of economic conditions. The covers could be regarded as plain, featuring only the title, date, number, and the name of the publisher—along with short "highlights" of articles to be found inside. Everything was monochrome aside from the magazine's title on the front page and, since around 1950, the table of contents. During the researched period, there were no illustrations aside from advertisements and very simple sketches which sometimes accompanied the beginning of an article. Although this was subject to change, the colophon was usually placed on the inside front cover, while the inside back cover often featured a closing editorial (*henshū kōki* 編輯後記).[25]

Sōgō zasshi varied by profile, popularity, and publication span. In my research, I read through and utilized eleven different magazines. I focused, however, on the following titles: *Sekai* 世界, *Chūō Kōron* 中央公論, and *Tenbō* 展望. This is a conscious choice as these three reflected the dominant sentiments and views among Japan's intellectuals at the time and continuously enjoyed a high level of relevance throughout the entirety of the occupation period,

[23] Sugiyama Heisuke, "'Gendai no zasshi' sōhyō" [General comment on "contemporary magazines"], *Shinchō* 30, 10 (October 1933), p. 59.
[24] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 6.
[25] This description reflects my personal experience with the *sōgō zasshi* in the course of this research (for the full list of consulted magazines see the bibliography at the end). Some details were, of course, subject to change and could vary across different magazines and years.

as per the opinions of Takeuchi Yō and Oku Takenori, the foremost authorities on the history of *sōgō zasshi* in postwar Japan.[26] During the occupation, there were no major conservative magazines and the market was saturated by a wide array of left-wing titles, often very short-lived and unstable. *Chūō Kōron*, the oldest *sōgō zasshi*, occupied a position that could be described as moderate. On the other hand, *Sekai* and *Tenbō* occupied a center-to-left position, which meant that while allowing for opinions from various parts of the left-right spectrum, their editorial offices tended to gravitate to the left. Furthermore, *Sekai* itself was the single most influential platform for the community of remorse and its agenda, with all major topics and ideas of the occupation period featured and extensively discussed on its pages. This fact is agreed upon by most scholars in the field.[27]

In the analyzed period, major magazines like *Sekai* and *Chūō Kōron* typically boasted circulations of over 100,000 copies each month (with particular issues often achieving much higher numbers).[28] The *sōgō zasshi* were able to reach a general audience even though their primary contributors were university professors. Many of them, like Shimizu Ikutarō or Rōyama Masamichi, worked as editors for various newspapers or magazines simultaneously with holding their university positions—others, like Fukuda Tsuneari, combined opinion journalism with other intellectual professions (in Fukuda's case it was literary criticism and the translation of theater plays). This made their ability to communicate with non-academics much easier.

The decision to focus on the magazines directly is a methodological choice. Intellectual historians of Japan often, if not most of the time, prefer to read the sources from one of two types of publication. One is collected works (*zenshū* 全集 or *chosakushū* 著作集), a multi-volume edition containing the complete intellectual production of a single individual, including their articles from the *sōgō zasshi*.[29] Most well-known figures of Japanese intellectual history have their own editions of collected works. Another is anthologies (*senshū* 選集) of texts by various authors pertaining to a certain issue or published by a single magazine. Many postwar

[26] During the occupation period, *Sekai* and *Chūō Kōron* were by far the two most influential magazines, as noted by Takeuchi Yō (*Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, pp.79-80). However, Oku Takenori also lists the smaller Tenbō as "important intellectually"—Oku, *Rondan no sengo shi*, p. 60.
[27] Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin*, p. 10; Takeuchi, *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, p. 59; Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 170; Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 13; Matsuno, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai,'" p. 70.
[28] J. Victor Koschmann, "Intellectuals and Politics." In *Postwar Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (University of California Press, 1993), p. 396.
[29] For example: *Fukuda Tsuneari zenshū* [Collected works of Fukuda Tsuneari], 8 volumes (Bungei Shunjū, 1987-1988); *Watsuji Tetsurō zenshū* [Collected works of Watsuji Tetsurō], 27 volumes (Iwanami Shoten. 1961-1992).

essays from the *sōgō zasshi* were later republished in this format.[30] Both types of publications are extremely valuable for anybody interested in intellectual history, since they make old articles much more accessible, often completely eliminating the need to personally visit a library or archive and go through aged, sometimes dilapidated issues of magazines.

For the old issues of magazines, such as *Sekai*, *Chūō Kōron*, *Tenbō*, and others, I used the archival holdings of the Sophia University Central Library (Jōchi Daigaku Chūō Toshokan 上智大学中央図書館) and the National Diet Library (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan 国立国会図書館), both in Tokyo. Furthermore, I consulted several documents related to Japan's political history from the Administrative Records (Gyōsei Bunsho 行政文書) collection of the National Archives of Japan (Kokuritsu Kōbun Shokan 国立公文書館). I also queried the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow, New York, for the documents pertaining to the Rockefeller Foundation's activities in Japan, which are part of the Rockefeller Foundation Records. Regarding the foreign policy of Japan and the United States, I used two series of officially published documents: the *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy* (*Nihon gaikō bunsho* 日本外交文書) and the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS). Another collection of documents, the *Political Reorientation of Japan: Report of Government Section, SCAP*, proved helpful when looking at the American occupation policy.

How numerous was the intellectual community of early postwar Japan? Since this is a very broad term, it would be impossible to calculate any precise number. However, taking into account both one-time and regular contributors, as well as international correspondents, the combined number of people writing for *Sekai*, *Chūō Kōron*, and *Tenbō* during the entire occupation period was approximately 1,170.[31] Less than five percent of them were women, although some female authors contributed very frequently to many different magazines. Examples include philosopher Takeda Kiyoko, feminist social activist Yamakawa Kikue, and writer Miyamoto Yuriko. The fact that many intellectuals wrote for more than one magazine (e.g. Shimizu Ikutarō), as well as frequent polemics between the authors of *Sekai*, *Chūō Kōron*, and *Tenbō*, (and occasionally others) made the three publications part of a single discourse on

[30] *"Sekai" shuyō ronbun-sen 1946-1995: Sengo 50 nen no genjitsu to Nihon no sentaku* [Selection of essential essays from *Sekai*, 1946-1955: The reality of 50 years after the war and Japan's choices], ed. "Sekai" Shuyō Ronbun-sen Henshū Iinkai (Iwanami Shoten, 1995); *Sengo shisō no shuppatsu* [The beginning of postwar thought], ed. Hidaka Rokurō (Chikuma Shobō, 1968); *Kindai Nihon shisō ronsō* [Intellectual debates of modern Japan], eds. Miyakawa Tōru, Nakamura Yūjirō, and Furuta Hikaru (Aoki Shoten, 1971).

[31] This number is, of course, prone to small miscalculations, since some articles were written by authors under pseudonyms.

public affairs and the future of Japan. The discourse was characterized by ideological diversity. For example, each magazine featured contributions by Ōtsuka Hisao, a noted historian and founder of the "Ōtsuka Historical School" (*Ōtsuka shigaku* 大塚史学), which combined Weberian and Marxist approaches. Those who regularly wrote for at least two out of the three are too numerous to list. The strongest overlap occurred between *Sekai* and *Tenbō*, whose profiles were quite similar and both of which began publication in early 1946. Still, *Sekai* held primacy in terms of attracting prominent authors, both established and emerging. *Chūō Kōron*, more venerable and moderate in tone, maintained a larger number of exclusive contributors, yet even there one could find a wide range of liberal and progressive intellectuals—including far left figures such as Hani Gorō, who published in Japan's oldest *sōgō zasshi* several times throughout 1946.

The intellectual community of postwar Japan was not limited to those authors associated with the three *sōgō zasshi* mentioned above. Other important opinion monthlies—such as *Kaizō* 改造, *Bungei Shunjū* 文芸春秋, *Kindai Bungaku* 近代文学, or *Shin-Nihon Bungaku* 新日本文学—were also active on the market. However, a survey of these magazines reveals that many of their key authors regularly contributed to one or more of the three "central" journals . The renowned economist Tsuru Shigeto, for instance, though primarily associated with *Kaizō*, also frequently published in *Sekai*.[32] Matsumura Kazuto, a prominent communist thinker connected to left-wing literary magazines, appeared in *Tenbō*.[33] Individual *sōgō zasshi* did not constitute closed environments with exclusive contributors. Instead, most authors participated in a single community, even if that community possessed its own internal frictions and differences. While it did not mean that all of them ever presented a fully unified position on any issue, what it signified was that the issues they discussed and considered important, along with their sense of the direction in which Japan ought to progress, were, to a large degree, the same.

A major factor shaping the intellectual discourse of the occupation era was censorship imposed by the American authorities, the details of which will be a matter of analysis in Chapter 2. The question regarding the influence of occupation censorship on the opinions of intellectuals expressed in monthly magazines is a difficult, perhaps even insurmountable problem when

[32] Tsuru Shigeto, "Dai-niji sekai sensō no sūteki kōsatsu" [A statistical analysis of World War II], *Sekai* 6 (June 1946), pp. 29-39; Tsuru, "Keizaigaku no atarashii kadai" [The new problems of economy], *Sekai* 11 (November 1946), pp. 2-17; Tsuru, "Nihon keizai kiki no ichi bunseki" [An analysis of critical state of Japan's economy], *Kaizō* 28, 1 (January 1947), pp. 34-43.
[33] Matsumura Kazuto, "Hatten to tairitsu no tōitsu ni tsuite" [On the unity of progress and conflict], *Tenbō* 9 (September 1946), pp. 29-41.

dealing with intellectual history of early postwar Japan. So far, no scholar has been able to adequately solve this problem which undoubtedly hampers our understanding of the degree to which the intellectual output was kept in check by the occupation authorities. However, this does not render the postwar discourse in Japan any less relevant or "true." The only intellectual discourse to exist was the one affected by American censorship and this was the reality available to people in Japan. This discourse served as a focal point for all public scholars, journalists, and educated readers. Possible interferences on part of censors as well as the pressure to self-censor were just some of the many factors which contributed to the discourse's character. These factors should all be taken into account but none of them, including censorship, should be used to negate the historical significance of public debate in Japan.

For example, when the articles written by Fukuda Tsuneari in various *sōgō zasshi* during the occupation are compared with these same texts released many years later as part of his collected works, there are hardly any differences outside of small corrections related to orthography.[34] These collected works were released while Fukuda was still alive. Had censorship truly forced him to alter his writings in any meaningful way, would he not have corrected them after the occupation—or at least indicated to readers that he had been unable to express his views fully at the time? The case is similar when looking at intellectuals who aside from commenting on contemporary issues also developed their own theory. While Maruyama Masao's collected works were mostly released after his death (so the Fukuda argument would not be relevant here), authoritative specialists on Maruyama's thought, such as Karube Tadashi or Yamabe Haruhiko, do not make the occupation-era censorship a prominent issue in their works on Maruyama.[35]

Intellectuals of early postwar Japan can, for heuristic purposes, be divided into three categories. The first category encompasses those who were members of the community of remorse, and whose activity occupies most of this work. They could be described either as progressive, liberal, Marxist, or operating between these ideologies. Right-wing (nationalist, traditional conservative) intellectuals who were sidelined due to purges and ostracism form the second category. The third category is the most ambivalent and includes those intellectuals who

[34] Compare for example: Fukuda Tsuneari, "Minshū no kokoro" [The heart of the masses], *Tenbō* 3 (March 1946); Fukuda, "Minshū no kokoro." In *Fukuda Tsuneari zenshū*, Vol. 1, 1987.

[35] These works are: Karube Tadashi, *Maruyama Masao and the Fate of Liberalism in Twentieth Century Japan*, trans. David Noble (International House of Japan, 2008); Yamabe Haruhiko, Washizu Tsutomu, *Maruyama Masao to Katō Shūichi: Chishikijin no jiko keisei* [Maruyama Masao and Katō Shūichi: Self-formation of an intellectual], ed. Tōkyō Joshi Daigaku Maruyama Masao Kinen Hikaku Shisō Kenkyū Sentā (Chikuma Shobō, 2023).

exerted some influence on the public debate but differed from most members of the community of remorse. Many of them were associated with the far left (communist or otherwise) but some were conservative or presented original, often idiosyncratic views. However, it was not their opinions that made them stand out but their choice to distance themselves from other intellectuals. This did not mean isolation, like in the case of the second category; rather, while interacting with the larger community, they could be said to have existed close to its fringes or boundaries, at times taking part in common initiatives but often harshly criticizing other intellectuals.

Most intellectuals worked at major universities and in editorial offices of big press companies in the regions of Kantō and Kansai, around such cities as Tokyo, Yokohama, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe, where most of Japan's urban population was concentrated.[36] In Japanese, the term "intellectual community" is rendered as *chiteki kyōdōtai* 知的共同体, which means essentially the same as in English, though more often it is referred to as *rondan* 論壇 ("critical realm"). These terms are mostly used interchangeably in Japanese, and they largely correspond to the notion of an "intellectual field" as part of Pierre Bourdieu's social field theory.[37] Although applying this theory lies more inside the sphere of social sciences than history, it may be prudent to briefly explore it insofar as it refers to postwar Japanese intellectuals, since it may help understand what an intellectual community means within society and how it can be approached.

The theory, which in its initial form was developed from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, views society as a set of semi-autonomous, specialized spheres, referred to as "fields."[38] Each of them possesses its own distinct characteristic, along with rules which govern the power structure within it. In the words of Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, social field theory "give[s] primacy to (…) [a] system of objective relations over the particles themselves."[39] In the case of intellectual history, these "particles" would of course be intellectuals. By being part of the field, they cease to exist as fully self-determining agents, but, at the same time, their impact becomes magnified as part of the wider influence exerted by the entire field. Since the "field of power," which is a metafield that sits at the top of society's structure, is balanced between its economic

[36] Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* p. 190.
[37] Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin*, p. 8.
[38] Among Bourdieu's early works on social field theory, arguably the most influential articles (and the only one translated into English) is Pierre Bourdieu, "Intellectual Field and Creative Project," *Social Science Information* 8, 2 (1969), pp. 89-119 (originally published in 1968 in French).
[39] Bourdieu, Loïc J.D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 82.

and cultural poles, the intellectuals' close link to the so-called "cultural capital" provides them with a unique ability to influence this field of power and, by extension, the society as a whole.[40]

Despite field theory being one of the key approaches in modern social sciences, it is often applied as a method rather than as a holistic theory. Takeuchi Yō can serve as an example of a scholar who conducted an extensive analysis of postwar Japan's intellectual community as a social field in Bourdieu's sense of the term.[41] My methodology coincides with the social field theory in that it does not seek to grasp any particular idea in itself. Neither does it attempt to retrace the biographies of individual intellectuals, but only includes some elements in a secondary role. Since the epistemological assumption behind the social field theory is that social reality is conceived as fundamentally relational, only a multipolar analysis, which focuses on a plurality of intellectuals across the spectrum of three different, although connected, magazines, can hope to achieve the intended objectives.

Intellectual history is not a standalone field, but rather a subfield of history. It retains strong links to other disciplines within the humanities and social sciences, yet its interdisciplinary character applies to methods rather than objectives. The objectives are typically historical: to investigate a given phenomenon of the human past and understand its meaning as part of a larger historical process. Since its inception as a modern scientific field in the eighteenth century, history has always utilized knowledge, tools, and theories from other disciplines in the realm of the humanities as well as the social sciences. It is in this spirit that I perceive my research.

In Europe and America, intellectual history developed as a response to, or an attempt to correct, the traditional history of ideas. Whereas the latter treats ideas as independent, timeless concepts and the sole object of research, the area of interest of intellectual history is much broader, including both ideas and those who formulate and propagate them. These ideas are not detached from their environment, instead being grasped in a wider historical context, including politics, society, and culture.[42] Despite the fact that intellectual history began around the middle of the twentieth century, the field has undergone several developments as well as both spikes and slumps in popularity among scholars. While by the early 1980s it was considered to be

[40] Mathieu Hilgers, Eric Mangez, "Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social fields." In *Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields: Concepts and applications*, eds. Hilgers, Mangez (Routledge, 2015), p. 8.
[41] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "'Kai.'"
[42] Donald R. Kelley, *The Descent of Ideas: The History of Intellectual History* (Routledge, 2017), pp. 2-6. The entirety of the book serves as an elaboration on the definition of intellectual history.

deeply in crisis, recent decades have again brought it to the forefront of the historical discipline.[43] As evidence of this, in 2015, Peter E. Gordon wrote that Harvard University boasted as many as ten scholars (including himself) who could be considered intellectual historians.[44]

There does not exist a single, universally accepted approach to intellectual history. Over time, historians have developed several alternative (but often partially overlapping) approaches and toolsets. The one which I utilize over the course of my research is phenomenology. Initially developed by Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the twentieth century as a distinct school of philosophy, its methodology was subsequently adopted by scholars in different fields, most notably religious studies, psychology, and literature studies.[45] While not very prominent in history at large, it is a foundational approach found within the subfield of intellectual history. Among more recent figures, David Carr can be credited as perhaps the most significant figure responsible for providing a theoretical basis for phenomenology of history.[46]

Whereas historical inquiry typically seeks to reconstruct past reality, phenomenology investigates how that reality appears in consciousness. Thus the primary object of investigation is that which is given in experience.[47] The phenomenological approach is descriptive, seeking to grasp the lived experience of social actors—in this case intellectuals—through their own creative output, such as essays, diaries, contributions to public discussions, etc.[48] It utilizes the epoché method, which brackets the interpreter's own cultural assumptions and withholds judgment on whether the reality contained in the text is objectively true. Rather than attempting to reconstruct the author's inaccessible private mental states, phenomenology focuses on the meanings articulated in the text itself as an intentional object of interpretation.[49] For this reason,

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[43] Dominic LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts," *History and Theory* 19, 3 (1980), p. 245.
[44] Peter E. Gordon, "What Is Intellectual History?," 2012, www.harvardcolloquium.hsites.harvard.edu/pages/what-intellectual-history. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[45] David Woodruff Smith, "Phenomenology." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Summer 2018 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta, www.plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/phenomenology. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[46] Earlier attempts at applying phenomenological method to history include: Fritz Kaufmann, "The Phenomenological Approach to History," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2, 2 (1941)
[47] David Carr, *Experience and History: Phenomenological Perspectives on the Historical World* (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 1.
[48] Joanne Mayoh, Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie, "Toward a Conceptualization of Mixed Methods Phenomenological Research," *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 9, 1 (2015), pp. 97-98.
[49] Carr, *Experience and History*, pp. 149-151.

it necessitates a strongly hermeneutical approach to the primary sources, leading to prioritizing the qualitative methods.

These methods begin with textual analysis, dealing with individual units of intellectual production, in this case essays and discussions. Phenomenology then proceeds to apply the discourse analysis, which combines results of the previous method inside a single cultural, temporal, and linguistic framework, attempting to understand them as parts of a single whole. Both of these methods constantly employ the analysis of lived experience to understand the subjective standpoints of historical agents, both individual and collective. Since intellectual discourse is mediated by the press, this methodology has to also utilize tools belonging to the field of media studies. Such tools allow for proper understanding of the magazines, in which the analyzed articles and discussions are featured. What is more, media ecosystems are impossible to remove from broader cultural and institutional background; for this reason, a proper phenomenological method must continuously account for both of these factors.

What Carr also underlines as part of the phenomenology of history, is the centrality of experience. In order to understand the object that is given, a historian must attempt to connect to the experience that underlies the occurrence of that object.[50] If the object is an essay, then the experience of the author constitutes an important factor in the hermeneutical process. That is why a key aspect of this dissertation is the collective experience of Japan's community of intellectuals: primarily the experience of World War II, followed by that of the American occupation, postwar democratization, reforms, and Cold War.

Because it is generally rare for historians to openly identify with any specific school of methodology, many studies in intellectual history are only implicitly phenomenological. A core characteristic of the phenomenology of history is that it easily lends itself to being used alongside other tools, as part of a mixed-method approach.[51] Among the major studies consulted in this dissertation, Oguma's *"Democracy" and "Patriotism"* encapsulates how a mixed-method approach based on implicit phenomenology can be successfully employed in intellectual history. Oguma, a historian, ostensibly analyzes discourse, exploring how words with seemingly established meanings change their actual meaning to reflect deeper changes in social consciousness (which he considers relatively short-term and labels as "sentiments," or *shinjō* 心情—to differentiate them from long-term "mentalities," rendered in Japanese as

[50] Ibid., pp. 65-67.
[51] Mayoh, Onwuegbuzie, "Toward a Conceptualization," p. 93.

shinsei 心性 or *mentaritī* メンタリティー).[52] He argues that these collective sentiments find their way into public discourse through the mediational role of intellectuals, who, by their profession and education, are able to overcome the established linguistic regime and infuse old concepts with new meaning.[53] He treats intellectuals both as a collective actor—a community (regardless of possible internal strife)—and as individuals who, through their own experience, participate in broader social sentiments and express them through their work, primarily in magazines, public discussions, and sometimes diaries. In this way, Oguma utilizes methods associated with both literary criticism and phenomenology to establish a framework of intellectual history. His approach serves as an exemplary case of how a historian can employ various methods suitable for his object of analysis—and, specifically, how this can be done in relation to early postwar Japan.

There are several concepts in history and social sciences that could be seen as potentially similar to the community of remorse. Perhaps the closest among them is "emotional community," a term coined by Barbara Rosenwein in her research on past European notions of emotion. According to Rosenwein, emotional communities are "groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value or devalue the same or related emotions. More than one community may exist (…) contemporaneously and these communities may change over time." The concept partially builds upon earlier excursions into these topics, such as William S. Reddy's research on "emotional regimes." However, Rosenwein's concept is tied to different subfields of history, namely social history and the history of emotions, whose research objectives differ significantly from those of intellectual history. For this reason, the hypothetical positioning of postwar Japanese intellectuals as an emotional community, while tempting to explore further, will be left for future research and not pursued in this work.

This monograph utilizes a system of footnotes rather than endnotes or in-text citations. In writing and citing both primary and secondary sources, I generally made use of the current, eighteenth edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Whenever non-English terms, titles, or organization names appear, I always give an approximate English translation in brackets, be it in footnotes or the main body of the text. When writing names of Japanese persons, I always do so in accordance with the Japanese custom of putting the surname first—similarly with Chinese and Korean names, which also occasionally appear in this work. All Japanese words are

[52] Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* pp. 19-20.
[53] Ibid., pp. 20-22.

rendered in the Latin alphabet using the most common transliteration system, which is the revised Hepburn romanization. The only exceptions are words that possess an already accepted transliteration style in English, like "Asahi Shimbun" or "Kempeitai." Specific Japanese terms, names of institutions, and titles are given also in Japanese characters. However, since so many Japanese names appear throughout the text, I decided to move their original Japanese form to the Index of names at the very end of the dissertation.

This dissertation is organized into four chapters. Chapter 1 explains processes which led to the emergence of postwar Japan's intellectual community. To this end, it deals with history of Japanese intellectuals as a distinct social category by exploring both their roots in Japanese society as well as the meaning behind the European notion of "intellectuals," or "intelligentsia," which was imported to Japan in the late nineteenth century. What follows is an attempt to construct a definition of "intellectuals" suitable for the context of early postwar Japan. The chapter also gives an overview of the political and social ecosystem, in which Japanese intellectuals formulated and discussed their ideas.

Chapters 2 through 4 each cover a stage in the history of Japan's intellectual community in relation to the emerging political and ideological conflict. Chapter 2 analyzes the first phase, starting with Japan's surrender in August 1945, which led to the Allied occupation, and ended in January 1947, just before the emergence of Cold War in Japan. This period saw the community's formation around shared objectives and values, as well as its early activity under the new conditions created by American occupation authorities. Key aspects include the founding of *Sekai*, intellectual discourse surrounding key reforms (such as constitutional change or the emperor's status), and the problem of war responsibility.

Chapter 3 showcases how the intellectual community reacted to the emergence of political and ideological pressure linked to Cold War. It starts with General Douglas MacArthur's decision to ban the general strike planned on 1 February 1947—a decision which signified a major shift in American occupation policy, the priorities of which were gradually changed from democratization to economic rehabilitation and anticommunism. Unwillingness to accept this new political reality and efforts to resist it on the part of Japanese intellectuals form the main topic of the chapter. Its objective is twofold: to explore how the global Cold War manifested itself in Japan's public life and to analyze how the intellectuals' own struggle for maintaining unity by launching common initiatives related to international peace fared against

the increasing polarization. The chapter ends in March 1949, just before the start of the Red Purge in Japan, which constituted a significant escalation of that polarization.

Chapter 4 begins with April 1949 and oscillates around a series of momentous events, which brough the Cold War logic and tensions in Japan to its apex. Followed chronologically, these are the Red Purge, communist victory in China, outbreak of the Korean War, and San Francisco Peace Treaty. The last one directly led to the end of the occupation in April 1952. The chapter analyzes the final stage of the community of remorse, characterized by a failure to maintain its unity, and analyzes the reasons behind its eventual disintegration.

The four chapters are followed by the Conclusion, which gives a summary of the work's main points and addresses the research problem introduced at the beginning. It also provides a narrative link to the events that followed.

All translations from Japanese to English were done solely by myself. Likewise, all research, analysis, and creative work in this dissertation—its theses, ideas, narrative, summaries, etc.—is originally mine. Since I am not a native English speaker, I utilized a large language model (ChatGPT-5) to check grammar in some parts of the text. However, not a single sentence has been written (or significantly altered) by any sort of artificial intelligence or similar machine learning models.

Of course this project could not have been completed if not for the immense help and advice of many kind people. Scholars in and outside Japan that I consulted in regards to my work include: Professors Komiya Hitoshi and Yamabe Haruhiko (Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo), Professor Beata Bochorodycz (Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań), Professor Sven Saaler (Sophia University in Tokyo), Professor Takeuchi Kei (Tokiwa University in Mito), Professor Frank Roevekamp (Ludwigshafen University of Business and Society), and Professor Yoshikawa Hiroaki (Meisei University in Tokyo). I also received many valuable suggestions from the team behind the European Association for Japanese Studies's (EAJS) 20th Workshop for Doctoral Students, held in June 2024 at St. Kliment Ohridski University in Sofia. Finally, fellow doctoral students from the University of Gdańsk's doctoral school and the EAJS PhD Workshop who have read parts of my work gave me many tips and opinions, which all contributed to making this project better.

Chapter 1. Defining intellectuals in the context of postwar Japan

Cultural identity of Japanese intellectuals remains a controversial issue, even to the members of this group themselves. In July 1941, a number of Japanese thinkers and writers held a symposium under the name *Overcoming Modernity* (*Kindai no chōkoku* 近代の超克), in which they attempted to come up with a solution to the problem of identity (both of the Japanese and of the intellectuals themselves) in the face of a "great historical conflict between the Pan-Asian forces and the colonial West."[54] Since intellectuals, as a social category, are a product of modernization, and modernity itself is essentially a creation of the "West," how could the intellectuals in wartime Japan hope to effectively oppose Western culture and civilization in the name of Pan-Asianism and anticolonialism without shedding their group's identity?[55]

This dilemma was not reserved to the wartime era. During the 1950s, Takeuchi Yoshimi, one of postwar Japan's most original and influential intellectuals, brought the symposium back into the open debate with an essay under the same title.[56] This move might have been initially surprising. A dedicated though unorthodox Marxist, Takeuchi was known for his strong appreciation for Chinese philosophy and culture, including the thought of Mao Zedong, and enjoyed considerable authority among many leftwing Japanese intellectuals.[57] The main reason for Takeuchi's interest in the symposium lied in the themes of anti-capitalism and anti-modernism which were both heavily present in its discussions. Like many other left-wing Japanese intellectuals during the 1950s, Takeuchi felt that modernity—which was forced upon the "East" by the technologically and economically dominant Western powers—is fundamentally alien to the East Asian peoples and their national cultures. However, the key problem in rejecting modernity lied in the fact that most Japanese political, social, and economic institutions were brought into existence by the process of modernization harking back to the late nineteenth century. The universities, the press, and the very intellectuals as a distinct group arose as results of Western modernity being imported into Japan. Thus for a twentieth century Japanese intellectual to reject modernity meant, in some way, to reject their own self-conception.

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[54] Christopher S. Goto-Jones, *Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity* (Routledge, 2005), pp. 125-126.

[55] The very concept of the "West" is, of course, very dubious and ambivalent. In this study it will be employed with the meaning of Europe and North America, similarly to how the Japanese understand the term (using such words as *seiyō* and *yōbei*).

[56] Both the discussions at the symposium as well as Takeuchi's essay can be found in: Takeuchi Yoshimi et al., *Kindai no chōkoku* [Overcoming modernity] (Fuzanbō, 1979).

[57] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 225.

This brings us to the fundamental problem of the research into Japan's intellectual history that is the ambivalence surrounding most modern concepts due to their double origin in the West (as general ideas) and Japan (as idiosyncratic variants of these general ideas).

The problem of cultural identity of intellectuals, highlighted by Takeuchi, shows why any effort to understand who the members of this group actually were, must include these two distinct threads. The origins of Japanese intellectuals along with the historical and cultural background out of which this group has emerged in the late nineteenth century relates to the origins, identity, and social role of intellectuals in Europe. Both of these threads will be examined in this chapter as necessary prerequisites before the working definition of "intellectuals" can be decided on.

1.1. Historical origins of intellectuals in Japan

Early modern Japan of the Edo period (1603-1868) knew several types of intellectual workers: Confucian scholars, physicians, calligraphers, artists, translators. Their number was relatively high and they performed their craft based on heritage, with particular families tied to different occupations.[58] But even if their existence serves as a proof of ample intellectual life in preindustrial Japan, the narrowness of their specializations made them very different from intellectuals in the modern sense of the term. Among them, only the scholars (*gakusha* 学者 or *jusha* 儒者) concerned themselves with broader affairs of society. Under realities of Japan ruled by the Tokugawa shoguns, they either represented one of the popular branches of Neo-Confucianism (*shushigaku* 朱子学) or the indigenous *kokugaku* 国学 ("national learning") studies.[59]

Their concern with public affairs began to bud in the late Edo period, when the threat of Western colonization became an increasingly tangible prospect. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the number of incidents involving foreign vessels initiating contact with Japanese Islands grew rapidly, threatening the country's long tradition of isolating itself from

[58] Herbert Passin, "Modernization and the Japanese Intellectual: Some Comparative Observations." In *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 457-458.
[59] *Kokugaku*—sometimes translated as "nativism"—is a name given to a specific branch of learning developed in seventeenth/eighteenth century Japan on the basis of indigenous traditions, particularly Shintō. In the late Edo period, *kokugaku* scholars often supported returning political power to the emperor. The idea of Meiji Restoration was partially derived from *kokugaku* philosophy. Ōkubo Tadashi, *Edo jidai no kokugaku* [Kokugaku of the Edo period] (Shibundō, 1963), pp. 1-13; Susan L. Burns, *Before the Nation: Kokugaku and the Imagining of Community in Early Modern Japan* (Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 187-190.

Western powers.[60] The sense of crisis born from this situation fostered the need for a significant change, far wider than political reforms initiated by the shogunal administration. When Japan finally agreed to open up for trade with the West in 1854 (under military threat from American navy), a tumultuous period of over thirteen years occurred. It was characterized by internal strife, rebellions, and various intellectual currents contending for influence over the direction, in which the country began to change. Eventually, the rule of the shoguns came to an end in 1868, supplanted by a new "Imperial government," determined to strengthen the country through deep reforms and modernization in order to make it able to withstand the threat of Western colonization.[61]

Thus began the Meiji period (1868-1912), which marked the dawn of modern Japan. It was signified by a phenomenon known as the "opening of the country" (*kaikoku* 開国), which meant both the end of isolation from the West as well as the advent of new intellectual currents. The idea of *kaikoku* became a recurring theme in modern Japanese history.[62] The traditional scholars of the Edo period did not last through the great social change of the 1870s and 1880s, when rapid modernization brought by *kaikoku* swept away the traditional understanding of science and knowledge, based on Confucianism. In the realities of the Meiji period, such discarded notions never left any sort of ideological vacuum behind them, being immediately supplanted with European categories.[63]

The advent of Western science in Japan made it necessary to develop completely new Japanese words corresponding to concrete terms in the European languages. Very often they were invented ad hoc by specialists in relevant fields. For example, Mori Arinori, the father of modern education system in Japan, invented the word *shakai* 社会 for "society," and Nishi Amane, one of Japan's first European-type philosophers, coined *tetsugaku* 哲学 for

[60] W.G. Beasley, "The foreign threat and the opening of the ports." In *The Cambridge History of Japan*, eds. John W. Hall et al., Vol. 5, *The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 261-263.
[61] Interpretations of this event, known as the Meiji Restoration (*Meiji ishin* 明治維新), are a subject of debate between historians. A slightly dated, but nevertheless good overview of different interpretations can be found in: Jansen, "The Meiji Restoration." In ibid., pp. 360-366.
[62] It will be explained in detail in Chapter 2 when discussing the idea of *kaikoku* in relation to postwar Japan.
[63] After the Restoration, Confucianists and *kokugaku* scholars tried to resist this change and strongly lobbied for the government's patronage over their own notions of science. While some of these attempts were even successful initially, they ultimately fell during the first years of the Meiji period. See Byron K. Marshall, *Academic Freedom and the Japanese Imperial University, 1868-1939* (University of California Press, 1992), pp. 22-25.

"philosophy."[64] Both of them felt that older Japanese words were insufficient as they carried a strong connotation tied to the traditional understanding of the world.[65]

To clarify why older terms, especially those related to education and scholarship, were perceived as insufficient, it is useful to refer to the work of Matsuzaki Tetsuyuki, a historian of Edo-period Confucianism. Matsuzaki notes that the fundamental notion of learning at the time was signified by the term *gakushū* 学習. Originally a loanword from Classical Chinese, *gakushū* was understood by Edo-period scholars as corresponding to two native Japanese verbs: *manabu* 学ぶ and *narau* 習う. Although both these verbs are commonly rendered as "to learn" in English and are often treated as near synonyms, their meanings were historically grounded in their etymological origins: *maneru* まねる, "to mimic/imitate," and *nareru* なれる, "to become accustomed." Learning was thus conceived primarily as the imitation and habituation of already established knowledge, rather than as an active pursuit of fundamentally new concepts.[66] This clearly retroactive orientation helps explain why such notions were later judged inadequate by the architects of the Meiji-era modernization.

The first European-type scholars in Japan constituted a very small group. The shogunal administration imposed strict regulations on the import of foreign knowledge. The only available channel, through which this knowledge could enter Japan, was the port city of Nagasaki, where Dutch merchants had been allowed to operate a trading post (located on an artificial island of Dejima). On explicit permission of a shogunal official overseeing Dejima, certain scientific books brought by the Dutch were accepted (often as a result of an earlier request), mostly dealing with Western technology or medicine.[67] Since all the books were in Dutch, an entire school of learning, referred to as *rangaku* 蘭学 ("Dutch learning"), arose around the knowledge based on these materials. What resulted was a situation in which a small group of Japanese scholars with proficiency in Dutch studied and practiced parts of European technical and medical knowledge. This arrangement began during the seventeenth century and lasted for the next two hundred years.[68]

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[64] On the problem of translating Western concepts into new Japanese vocabulary see Christopher L. Hill, "Conceptual Universalization in the Transnational Nineteenth Century" in *Global Intellectual History*, eds. Samuel Moyn, Andrew Sartori (Columbia University Press, 2013), pp. 142-147.
[65] This problem is, more generally, in: Ivan Parker Hall, *Mori Arinori* (Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 259-260.
[66] Matsuzaki Tetsuyuki, *Mitogaku kotohajime* [The emergence of Mitogaku] (Mineruva Shobō, 2023), pp. 19-20.
[67] Ronald P. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu*, (Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 12-14, 95-96.
[68] Marius B. Jansen, "*Rangaku* and Westernization," *Modern Asian Studies* 18, 4 (1984), pp. 541-542.

In the late Edo period, an increasing awareness of global affairs led many Japanese scholars to broaden their scope of interest outside the knowledge provided by the Dutch and learn other European languages, such as French, English, or German. Despite still being rooted in *rangaku*, this new sphere of interest became to be known as *yōgaku* 洋学 ("Western sciences").[69] It the closing years of the Edo period, it was studied by an increasing number of men, either illegally or through the Institute for the Study of Barbarian Books (Bansho Shirabesho 蕃書調所), originally a translation office, established in 1856. The latter was an elite institution under the auspices of shogun's government, available to those scholars who had received a special permission.[70] Fukuzawa Yukichi, the most famous thinker of Meiji Japan, gained his knowledge of the West through this institute—as did many other prominent figures.[71]

Specialists in *yōgaku* could be considered a direct link between traditional Japanese *gakusha* and modern, Western-type scholars. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, they received the state's patronage and started to spread their knowledge through books aimed at Japanese readers and through the founding of new educational institutions, first of which was Keiō Academy. Started by Fukuzawa himself in 1858 as a private school, after the Restoration it became part of the university system and a model for new institutions of higher learning.[72] The government also took active part in promoting Western science by sponsoring study trips to Europe and North America for students and by founding modern public universities, first of which was Tokyo Imperial University, formally established in 1877.[73] As a result, the number of scholars and practical specialists in Western fields of science (such as medicine, engineering, chemistry, or physics) grew very quickly, accounting for the needs of an industrializing and modernizing society. Both the public as well as the private sector were in dire need of highly trained specialists. This fact made people with higher education not only well-respected but also generously paid. From the late nineteenth century onward, most intellectuals were thus considered members of upper class, both by social and economic indicators.[74] Yet during the 1870s, the specialists in Western sciences were still a relatively small community, scattered

[69] Alistair Swale, "Meiji Intelligentsia's Riposte." In *Western Political Thought in Dialogue with Asia*, eds. Takashi Shogimen, Cary J. Nederman (Lexington Books, 2009), p. 304.
[70] R.P. Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan* (Routledge, 2011), pp. 168-169.
[71] *The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi*, trans. Kiyo'oka Ei'ichi (Hokuseido Press, 1960), p. 100.
[72] Hwang Minhyuk, *Fukuzawa Yukichi's Bourgeois Liberalism: The Betrayal of the East Asian Enlightenment* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 39, 121.
[73] Initially, its official name was "University of Tokyo" (Tōkyō Daigaku 東京大学). It received the status of an imperial university in 1886.
[74] Yoshino Genzaburō, "Chishikijin no chi'i ni tsuite" [On the status of intellectuals], *Shinchō* 44, 12 (December 1947), p. 7.

around the country and employed in local schools and institutes, reflecting the decentralized character of Japan's polity during the Edo period. The emergence of a national system of public universities tied this group to Tokyo and later to other major urban centers where its size would steadily grow.[75]

From the very beginning, early Meiji scholars were strongly interested in the affairs of the state, commenting on public matters and not hesitating to enter the realm of politics. In fact, many of the well-known Meiji scholars at some stages of their careers were also bureaucrats (officials in government agencies, ministers) or at least public servants. This was especially true in regards to scholars in humanities and social sciences.[76] As it is often the case, praxis of early intellectuals became a standard for later generations. When it came to learned societies and magazines, the greatest source of influence on the affairs of society and opinions of the political elite was the Meiji Six Society (Meirokusha 明六社) and its press organ, *Meiroku Zasshi* 明六雑誌 (*Journal of the Meiji Six*), known as an epitome of the *bunmei kaika* 文明開化 ("civilization and enlightenment") movement. Its name came from the date of establishment, 1873, the sixth year of the Meiji era. Even though the influence of both the journal and the society proved to be short-lived, it became a model gathering of educated men, concerned with public affairs and advancement of society based on a shared set of values.[77] At the time, this focus on "advancement" of society was based on ideas related to cultural evolutionism. which had become an influential intellectual current during nineteenth century. Evolutionary view of culture was popularized in Japan by figures like Fukuzawa Yukichi, who posited all nations and civilizations on a ladder of linear social progress, on which Western Europe and America stood far ahead of Japan.[78]

The origin of modern Japanese intellectuals is not limited to the history of scholars, but also includes broad social foundations, from which they could emerge as a broader group in Japanese society. Before the Meiji Restoration, the occupational division of society, even though certainly important, held less significance than the official division between legally

[75] Marshall, *Academic Freedom*, pp. 28-29.
[76] Matsuda Kōichirō, "From Feudalism to Meritocracy? Growing demand for competent and efficient government in the late Tokugawa period." In *The Tokugawa World*, eds. Gary P. Leupp, De-min Tao (Routledge, 2022), pp. 1083-1084; Thomas R.H. Havens, "Scholars and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Case of Nishi Amane," *Modern Asian Studies* 2, 4 (1968), pp. 318-324.
[77] David J. Huish, "The Meirokusha: Some Grounds for Reassessment," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 32 (1972), pp. 208-211; Swale, "Meiji Intelligentsia's Riposte," pp. 304-305.
[78] Jacek Splisgart, "Przemiany ery Meiji (1868-1912). Modernizacja i formowanie się 'nowej' tożsamości w Japonii" [The transformation of the Meiji Era (1868-1912): Modernization and the formation of a "new" identity in Japan], *Gdańskie Studia Azji Wschodniej* 10 (2016), pp. 46-47.

recognized estates: samurai, peasants, artisans, and merchants. The samurai, who mostly held administrative positions, had access to the broadest educational opportunities—an education focused not on occupational training or practical skills, but on a broad understanding of the liberal arts along with literary, poetic, and calligraphic skills.[79] During the late Edo period, many of the lower or middle rank samurai became *shishi* 志士, or "men of high purpose," zealous reformers or revolutionaries who advocated for granting the full political power to the emperor in order to transform Japan into a strong country capable of defending herself from foreign threats.[80]

After the Meiji Restoration, social estates were abolished and former samurai had to look for new roles in the modernizing society. Most of them joined one of the four professions considered honorable for people of warrior background: police officers, military men, public officials, and teachers. Many of those who initially resisted social change and did not immediately find a place in the new society, in time became journalists, bringing into this profession a worldview strongly critical of the government.[81] Both school teachers and journalists are especially important for the origins of intellectuals in Japan due to the character of these two occupations. Japanese journalists took interest in public matters through their job and often engaged in opinionated commentary. Teachers at all school levels, though not necessarily politically involved, often regarded themselves as entitled to a strong voice on national affairs due to the highly responsible character of their work.[82] Thus, Meiji intellectual life was dominated by former samurai and their descendants.

While the scholars (coming from different social backgrounds) laid the foundations for the modern understanding of the world in post-Restoration Japan, the samurai served as the social basis out of which the modern Japanese intellectuals of different occupations could grow, providing the source of students for newly established universities. This process occurred spontaneously, without any state intervention. Even though the concepts of an "intellectual" and a "scientist" were adopted from Europe, the cadres grew naturally and as a result the

[79] Passin, "Modernization and the Japanese Intellectual," p. 459; Constantine Vaporis, "The samurai in Tokugawa Japan." In *The Tokugawa World*, p. 140.
[80] Jansen, *Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration*, (Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 95-104. On the supposed intelligentsia-like character of the *shishi* see Thomas M. Huber, *The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan* (Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 211-220.
[81] Passin, "Modernization and the Japanese Intellectual," pp. 463, 465.
[82] There were of course many former samurai who found employment outside the mentioned professions, entering agriculture or starting new Western-style private companies. These two directions were directly supported by the Meiji government. See Harry D. Harootunian, "The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 19, 4 (1960), pp. 433-444.

intellectuals as a social group became an organic part of the Japanese society at the beginning of the twentieth century.[83]

With time, the early domination of former samurai among intellectuals gradually eroded. In the 1910s and 1920s, the intellectuals' social background began to be much more diverse as a result of an efficient public education system.[84] The new Japanese middle class, made up of former samurai and commoners alike, became the core social stratum providing cadres for state bureaucracy, universities, and other positions highly dependent on education.[85] Owing to this process, intellectuals of the interwar Japan grew more similar to their European counterparts.

If education and social background indicated who could become an intellectual, the public sphere dictated how intellectuals could function as a collective actor. In analyzing the emergence of Japanese intellectuals, Tsuzuki Tsutomu, a leading scholar of this field, argues that the conditions necessary for this process in Japan were similar to those in France. They mainly rested on the appearance of two key factors: "public masses" (*kōshū* 公衆) and the community of scholars. Emergence of the public masses was engendered by widespread popularity of the press which constituted a source of income for the intellectuals, while simultaneously supplying them with a sense of "intellectual accomplishment" (*seishinteki hōshū* 精神的報酬). The second factor consisted of shared values and opinions forming the foundations of the new community.[86] Although not discussed by Tsuzuki, one more factor could be added to this analysis. By the beginning of the Meiji period, in the 1870s, Japan possessed a relatively high literacy rate, which compared favorably not only to other preindustrial societies, but also to some European countries of that time. This made it possible to introduce and popularize the press relatively easily, providing the intellectuals with a large market of educated readers who could absorb and respond to their work.[87]

Tsuzuki characterizes the press not exclusively as popular daily papers like *Asahi Shimbun* 朝日新聞 (*Morning Sun Newspaper*), *Yomiuri Shimbun* 読売新聞 (*Read-Sell Newspaper*), or *Mainichi Shimbun* 毎日新聞 (*Daily Newspaper*), founded in the 1870s and

[83] Passin, "Modernization and the Japanese Intellectual," p. 462.
[84] Marshall, *Academic Freedom*, pp. 39-40.
[85] Sheldon Garon, "Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State-Society Relations," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 53, 2 (1994), pp. 350-351.
[86] Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin*, pp. 8-9.
[87] Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan*, pp. 291-295.

1880s, all of which still exist today.[88] Instead, he assigns greater significance to the *sōgō zasshi*, general opinion magazines.[89] Their modern character, along with the term itself, originated during the Taishō era. As a relatively short period of Japan's history, which lasted from 1912 to 1926 and was associated with the reign of Emperor Taishō, it saw the rising influence of political parties and parliamentarism along with the birth of a mass society. The oldest among the *sōgō zasshi*—and still prominent today—*Chūō Kōron* (*Central Review*), dates back to 1887.[90] During the 1920s, it emerged as the foremost medium of the "Taishō democracy," embracing its liberal values.[91] On the other hand, more left-wing elements of mainstream political culture gathered around a rival magazine of the same type, *Kaizō* (*Reconstruction*), founded in 1919 by Japanese socialists.[92] Despite *Kaizō* being left-wing, and centrist *Chūō Kōron* beginning to feature many political commentaries by socialist authors from the late 1920s onwards, both of them were considered "bourgeois" by radical writers associated with the so-called "proletarian literature" (*puroretaria bungaku* プロレタリア文学) movement and the magazine *Senki* 戦旗 (*Battle Flag*).[93] Both *Senki* along with more moderate, and long-lived, *Bungei Shunjū* (*Spring and Autumn of Literature and Arts*), established in 1923, constituted a different kind of *sōgō zasshi*: one which was mostly focused on literature and arts, but supplemented these themes with a commentary on society and culture. This variant of monthly magazines came to be referred to as *bungei zasshi* 文芸雑誌 ("literary magazine") or simply *bunka zasshi* 文化雑誌 ("cultural magazine").[94]

With the emergence of modern press came the development of censorship, which, in some forms, had existed in Japan at least since the Edo period. In modern Japan, it was based on several Meiji-era government ordinances from the 1870s to 1890s, which remained in place until the postwar occupation. These ordinances allowed the government to shut down any newspaper or magazine deemed subversive and to punish individual authors. Even though their

[88] On the origins of these three newspapers see Haruhara Akihiko, *Nihon shinbun tsūshi* [Overview of the history of Japanese newspapers] (Gendai Jānarizumu Shuppankai, 1969), pp. 26-39.
[89] Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin*, pp. 9-10.
[90] Even though *Chūō Kōron* was founded in 1887, until 1899 its name was *Hanseikai Zasshi* and it was published by a group of young, pro-Western Buddhist intellectuals.
[91] Kondō Motohiro, "The Development of Monthly Magazines in Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Society for Global Social and Cultural Studies* 1, 1 (2004), pp. 5-6.
[92] Ibid., p. 6.
[93] Arima Tatsuo, *The Failure of Freedom: A Portrait of Modern Japanese Intellectuals* (Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 200.
[94] Ōsawa Satoshi, "Sengo paradaimu to zasshi" [Postwar paradigm and magazines]. In *Zasshi media no bunka-shi: Henbō suru sengo paradaimu* [Cultural history of magazine media: The changing postwar paradigm], eds. Yoshida Noriaki, Okada Akiko (Shinwasha, 2017), pp. 57-59.

enforcement was relatively rare, during the 1910s and 1920s censorship became an increasingly common tool to suppress "dangerous ideas" related to communism and anarchism.[95] Willingness to combat these ideas on the part of Japanese government became an essential element of the Peace Preservation Law (*Chian Iji Hō* 治安維持法) of 1925, which granted police vast authority to suppress political dissent. A deeply seated hatred against this law (which began to be frequently used especially since the 1930s) became an important sentiment among many Japanese intellectuals after the war.[96]

The intellectual community had grown sufficiently large and institutionalized for internal divisions to become a defining feature of its structure by the early Shōwa period. The era began in 1926, with the ascension of young Crown Prince Hirohito to the Chrysanthemum Throne as Emperor (posthumously known by the name "Shōwa"). It became the longest period of modern Japanese history, lasting until 1989. During the late 1920s and 1930s, considered the early Shōwa, a fundamental social divide between intellectuals became increasingly important, making that group even more heterogenous than before. The main line of division now ran between those who were employed in public (imperial) universities, and those who were not. In Japan of that time (and, to some extent, even today) the difference between working at a private and at an imperial university was significant and did not arise only from a usually better academic level of public institutions. The most important reason was the high prestige of imperial universities, making every scholar employed at such an institution a member of national elite—combined with the fact that those scholars possessed the status of public servants. They also enjoyed much higher wages than professors at private universities, even surpassing many high-ranking officials.[97] Intellectuals belonging to that group were called "government-academic intellectuals" (*kangaku chishikijin* 官学知識人). The term *kangaku* 官学 in their name referred to scholarship sanctioned by the government. Even though many of them were skeptical toward government policies and some made these views known publicly, the majority preferred to avoid direct engagement in politics. Enjoying much bigger funds for scholarly activities, they tended to focus exclusively on research and often scorned those who did not

[95] Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present* (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 83-84, 178.
[96] Shimizu Ikutarō, *Sengo o utagau* [Doubting the postwar] (Kōdansha, 1985), pp. 61, 67-68.
[97] Ōsawa, "Sengo paradaimu to zasshi," p. 42; Ben-Ami Shillony, "Universities and Students in Wartime Japan," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 45, 4 (1986), p. 772.

keep their political opinions to themselves.[98] Tsuzuki describes the social atmosphere among them as "intellectual aristocratism" (*seishinteki kizokushugi* 精神的貴族主義).[99]

However, the privileged position enjoyed by the faculty members of Japan's imperial universities did not mean immunity. While in the late Meiji and Taishō the government was generally lenient with public universities, allowing them autonomy and even occasionally backing down from sporadic confrontations with their faculties,[100] the situation changed substantially in the 1930s. During that decade, the Ministry of Education fired or suspended several prominent professors from Tokyo Imperial University for various political reasons: mostly pro-communist sympathies or openly protesting the war with China, which Japan waged in 1931-1932 and again from 1937 onward.[101] Nevertheless, the state never exercised absolute control over public universities and their staff members and students did not see any significant repressions.[102]

On the other side stood those intellectuals who were either outside academia, or employed in smaller, private institutions. Takeuchi Yō refers to them as "media intellectuals" (*media chishikijin* メディア知識人). In general, they were much more inclined to discuss contemporary public issues and were strongly present in the press, occasionally providing commentary in big-selling newspapers and centering their activities around *sōgō zasshi*. They typically held liberal, progressive, or Marxist views and possessed a sense of responsibility for the public good. Both groups felt disdain for one another, which obviously had not only ideological, but also socioeconomic background. "Media intellectuals" were envious of the privileged position of imperial university professors and accused them of servility toward the state while *kangaku* intellectuals envied the popularity of those frequently present in the media. Many students entering the most prestigious schools, like imperial universities in Tokyo and Kyoto, to receive tutelage from the top *kangaku* intellectuals, at the same time deeply admired the media intellectuals.[103]

This division between the two types of intellectuals invokes strong connotations with the mid-twentieth century France, where publicly active figures such as Jean-Paule Sartre stood

[98] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 2, "Media chishikijin no haken."
[99] Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin*, pp. 10-11.
[100] Marshall, *Academic Freedom*, pp. 75-76, 86-87.
[101] Shillony, "Universities and Students in Wartime Japan," pp. 771-772.
[102] Ibid., p. 773.
[103] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 2, "Media chishikijin no haken."

in contrast to those who preferred to stick to the purely academic world.[104] Similarly to France, Japanese academic establishment survived the war without major disruptions. It was the Allied occupation that brought structural reforms to the university system, transforming it from an elite, German-influenced model into a more democratic, American-style model accessible to a broader public. The occupation authorities also conducted a purge of professors associated with militarism and nationalism. Of the original nine imperial universities (which dropped the epithet "imperial" from their names), only two were dissolved: Keijō Imperial University and Taihoku Imperial University. Both were located outside Japan proper; following the war, they became Seoul National University and National Taiwan University respectively.[105]

However, the basic elements of the Japanese university system, such as institutional hierarchy (supremacy of public, formerly "imperial," universities) or faculty governance, remained in place.[106] A similar situation occurred in the media with major daily and monthly titles coming from the war practically unscathed. Thus, per Bronson's observation, postwar Japan's intellectual life rested on a prewar ecosystem of media and communication, in which the *sōgō zasshi* played a major role, allowing intellectuals to communicate with a large body of readers.[107]

Prewar imperial universities—while egalitarian in their admission of students coming from different social backgrounds—were not oriented toward mass education. Instead, they focused on producing a relatively small intellectual elite, and their researchers were mostly the *kangaku* intellectuals. Although the lack of major structural reform after 1945 meant that their operation remained essentially the same, the postwar years did bring at least one important change: an increase in intellectual activity directed outside of academia. This outpouring occurred mostly, though not exclusively, in the field of social sciences, which had developed significantly in the preceding years, including during the war. Specialists on Weberism, Marxism, pragmatism, and the American school of social psychology, who had studied these subjects in earlier years despite an unfavorable political climate, now gained an opportunity to share their ideas with the general public.[108] The continuity of the academic world played a crucial role in shaping Japan's postwar intellectual life.

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[104] Ron Eyerman, *Between Culture and Politics: Intellectuals in Modern Society* (Polity Press, 1994), pp. 174-175.
[105] Jeremy Breaden, "From Showa to Heisei: The Formation of Japan's Contemporary Education System." In *Handbook of Higher Education in Japan*, ed. Paul Snowden (Amsterdam University Press, 2021), pp. 16-17.
[106] Ibid., pp. 13-14. On the details of the purge, see Chapter 2.
[107] Bronson, *One Hundred Million Philosophers*, pp. 4-5.
[108] Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin*, p. 11.

In many ways, the influence of the *sōgō zasshi* after the war seems to have gotten even stronger than before. The years from 1946 to, roughly, the second half of the 1950s, are considered the best period for the general opinion monthlies—before their popularity significantly dropped due to the rising popularity of weekly magazines, which also offered commentary, but in a more accessible and less academic way, combining it with entertainment. Since the late 1950s, and particularly during the 1960s, the weeklies managed to take over much of monthly magazines' popular readership.[109] However, in the time period analyzed in this study, 1945-1952, *sōgō zasshi* enjoyed unquestionable dominance in magazine readership, shaping popular discourse on important social and political matters.[110]

The rising influence could be attributed to a significant postwar trend of intellectual activity pouring outside of university walls and serious scientific theories gaining traction in the regular press. This trend could be most visibly seen in social sciences, particularly Weberian studies, Marxism, pragmatism, and American social psychology.[111] For example, Shimizu Ikutarō's *Lectures on Sociology* (*Shakaigaku kōgi* 社会学講義) from 1948, detailing current trends in American social science, enjoyed enormous popularity and readership among non-academics.[112] Shimizu's ascendancy in Japan's intellectual life right after the war could be, in part, attributed to the fact that as one of the very few Japanese scholars he was versed in American science, which had a scarce presence in prewar Japan.[113] But popular demand for knowledge was not limited to American science and extended even to more difficult philosophical works by prewar Japanese authors like Nishida Kitarō or Tanabe Hajime. In the rubble of post-surrender Japanese cities, crowds of young people stood in long lines to buy a new edition of Nishida's prewar book, while Tanabe's *Philosophy as a Way to Repent* (*Zange-dō to shite no tetsugaku* 懺悔道としての哲学) of 1946 was perpetually sold out.[114]

The end of the war brought a drastic change to the objective conditions shaping Japan's intellectual life. Even though the harsh economic environment of the late 1940s affected all parts of society, the public sector suffered the most. As a sector composed mostly of salaried workers, it was unable to adapt quickly to rising prices and the rapid erosion of purchasing

[109] Koschmann, "Intellectuals and Politics," p. 404.
[110] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 5.
[111] Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin*, p. 11.
[112] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Introduction, "Musabori yomareta 'Shakaigaku kōgi.'"
[113] Ibid.
[114] Tanabe Hajime, *Zange-dō to shite no tetsugaku* [Philosophy as a way to repent], (Iwanami Shoten, 1946); Bronson, *One Hundred Million Philosophers*, pp. 17-18; Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 88.

power. Thus, the postwar hyperinflation severely weakened economic standing of many highly educated workers, including the intellectuals employed at public universities, who, up to this point, had been considered a social elite.[115] This drastic fall in economic position relative to other parts of society was noticed almost immediately by the intellectuals themselves, many of whom became practically (and sometimes also psychologically) closer to "ordinary people" than before 1945.[116] This shift, however, did not weaken their self-identification as a distinct social group.

The prewar configuration of institutions, media, and internal divisions forms the immediate background for the postwar intellectual constellation examined in this study. As Tsuzuki argues, despite the field's origins in the interwar period, the Japanese intellectual community fully emerged only after the war, owing to the transformative experience brought by the conflict.[117] On the one hand, this experience obviously consisted of being subjected to harsh conditions of the war: air raids, atomic bombings, hunger, shortages, mobilization. On the other hand, however—perhaps even more profoundly—the period from 1937 (outbreak of the war with China) to 1945 forced Japanese intellectuals to confront their ideas and values with an authoritarian, militarist state. They could either obey it (by supporting the war or being complacent) or oppose it. This situation, regardless of the affected individual's eventual decision, proved to be a deeply dramatic, sometimes even traumatizing, experience. One of the foremost postwar intellectuals of the younger generation, Tsurumi Shunsuke, had been only twenty years old when he was mobilized into Imperial Japanese Navy and sent to the island of Java. Despite his will to resist, he was ultimately unable to openly oppose the draft and suffered a mental breakdown. A strong sense of guilt for "cowardice" and "weakness" as well as shame for not being able to live up to his own ideals, constituted a recurring theme throughout his postwar career.[118]

This was not an isolated case. Even a brief survey through the press articles and diaries published in the late 1940s and 1950s reveals how strong the impact of the war experience was. The specific question on how that experience shaped views of an individual will be addressed in later chapters. For now, what is important is the role played by this experience in fostering a sense of community among intellectuals and eliminating some of the group's internal tensions.

[115] Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* p. 191.
[116] Yoshino, "Chishikijin no chi'i ni tsuite," p. 7.
[117] Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin*, p. 9.
[118] Simon Andrew Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the Mythology of the Shimin in Postwar Japan* (University of California Press, 2010), pp. 24-26.

The split between *kangaku* and media intellectuals, so crucial for understanding the 1930s and early 1940s, seems to have been at least partially moderated after the war. Many of the most elite scholars employed at public universities engaged in media activity with great passion. People like Maruyama Masao, Kuwabara Takeo, Ōuchi Hyōe, or Tsurumi Shunsuke, along with many others, were all professors of former imperial universities while at the same time driving the postwar public debate forward. Their shared experience allowed them to connect with intellectuals of different social and university background.

Together, they constituted what Maruyama called the "community of remorse."[119] Vowing not to repeat the same mistakes ever again and atone for their perceived passivity or complacency during the war, they considered themselves responsible for leading the country toward a democratic, peaceful future.[120] In 1977, Shimizu recalled that remorse (*kaikon* 悔恨) was the one universal emotion that united him with other intellectuals.[121]

Fusing academism with journalism, *sōgō zasshi* were to serve as the foremost medium of their efforts, connecting them to a high number of educated, urban readers while also linking them to each other across all of Japan.[122] This was not the only way, however, in which Japanese intellectuals tried to influence society. Some of them held open lectures outside university and engaged in different educational initiatives,[123] some served as advisors to labor unions,[124] while others tried to connect with ordinary people through popular initiatives like amateur writing circles (*sākuru* サークル) and the "life-writing" movement (*seikatsu tsuzurikata undō* 生活綴方運動).[125] Finally, during the "Anpo protests" of 1960, directed against a new security treaty with the United States (abbreviated as "Anpo" in Japanese), many of them personally joined the anti-government demonstrations.[126]

1.2. European origins of "intellectuals" and the meaning of the term

The existence of a group dedicated to the pursuit of studies whose members base their values around knowledge has been known to many different cultures around the world and throughout

[119] Maruyama Masao, *Kōei no ichi kara* [From the rearguard position] (Miraisha, 1982), p. 114.
[120] Takeuchi, *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, pp. 41-42.
[121] Shimizu Ikutarō, *Kinō no tabi* [Yesterday's journey] (Bungei Shunjūsha, 1977), p. 308.
[122] Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin*, pp. 9-10.
[123] Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, pp. 36-37.
[124] Yamamoto Mari, *Grassroots Pacifism in Postwar Japan: The Rebirth of a Nation* (Routledge, 2004), p. 60.
[125] Bronson, *One Hundred Million Philosophers*, p. 91; Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, pp. 40-44.
[126] Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, p. 144.

history. The specific term "intellectuals" arose in modern Europe and is tied to this continent's history. But before they could emerge, they were preceded by various intellectual communities of the late medieval and early modern Europe, such as the *literati*, also known in some contexts as the *république des lettres*.[127] In the sixteenth and seventeenth century France, *république des lettres* positioned itself against two privileged groups: the Catholic clergymen, who had traditionally held a monopoly on scientific knowledge, and the nobility, who often scorned the secular *literati* or at least treated them as a lower social class.[128] Members of this community of scholars possessed a distinct worldview, not always reconcilable with the dominant values of post-medieval European society. Considering themselves to be superior due to their extensive knowledge, they regarded the extension of political rights for non-ecclesiastical men of letters as the primary political objective.[129] What is important in this early formation is not merely the presence of learned elites, but the emergence of a self-conscious group that claimed social and political relevance on the basis of knowledge rather than inherited status.

Members of the seventeenth century *république des lettres* served in many ways as antecedents of the eighteenth century *philosophes*, occupying a central position in the French Enlightenment, who could, in turn, be seen as direct predecessors of intellectuals. Voltaire, himself a member of that group (and hardly an objective observer), described them as those among the educated class who stood against "obscurantist" scholastic thinkers and "indolent" university scholars of the eighteenth century. In spite of their name, *philosophes* were mostly politicized journalists and social critics rather than philosophers sensu proprio. Contributing strongly to the intellectual culture of the Enlightenment, they also took an active part in the French Revolution.[130]

During the Napoleonic period, their place was taken by the adherents of "ideology," a new field of science concerned with promoting a vision of society based upon the Enlightenment values.[131] After initial support for Napoleon's liberal policies, their protest

[127] Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, trans. T. Kilmartin (W.W. Norton & Company, 1962), p. 203.
[128] Krzysztof Pomian, *Przeszłość jako przedmiot wiedzy* [Past as an object of knowledge] (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2010), pp. 256-261.
[129] Ibid., pp. 268-269.
[130] Bourdieu, "Fourth Lecture. Universal Corporatism: The Role of Intellectuals in the Modern World," trans. G. Sapiro, ed. B. McHale, *Poetics Today* 12, 4 (1991), pp. 656-657; Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class: A Frame of Reference, Theses, Conjectures, Arguments, and an Historical Perspective on the Role of Intellectuals and Intelligentsia in the International Class Contest of the Modern Era*, (Macmillan, 1979), p. 62.
[131] Zygmunt Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters: On modernity, post-modernity and intellectuals* (Polity Press, 1987), pp. 99-100.

against a state concordat with the Catholic Church made them a target of repressions. These were initiated personally by Bonaparte who angrily and dismissively named them "ideologues" before proceeding to purge them from all public positions.[132]

The term "ideology" lost its initial meaning and former *philosophes*/"ideologues" became entrenched in a struggle first against Napoleon, later against the Romantics, and finally the restored French monarchy.[133] It was the famous Dreyfus affair from 1894 that managed to unite many well-educated journalists, academics and artists around a common case.[134] The event is often believed to have cemented the intellectuals as a distinct group, even though the precise name was probably first used at the beginning of the twentieth century by Georges Clemenceau.[135] The archetype of an intellectual born during the Dreyfus affair controversies presented a highly educated and cultured specialist, who willingly transcended the boundaries of his specialization in order to influence the political and social sphere through his intellectual and moral authority. The epitome of this understanding of an intellectual was presented in the influential open letter "J'accuse…!" written by Émile Zola in response to the trial of Dreyfus.[136] For a long time Zola himself was considered an "archetypical intellectual" before the 1960s brought figures such as Albert Camus, Jean-Paule Sartre, and Simone de Beauvoir to public attention.[137] However, as noted by Lewis Coser, the Dreyfus affair only served to popularize intellectuals who had already existed in the society of France, other Western European countries, and the United States.[138] Thus, what the affair made visible had been an already existing social category whose boundaries, functions, and identity remained in statu nascendi—an ambiguity that becomes even more apparent when the term is compared with parallel concepts developed outside Western Europe.

Zygmunt Bauman suggested that the very emergence of intellectuals as a distinct group with its own name in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century could be seen as a rallying call for all highly educated people employed in intellectual jobs who at that time were already

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[132] Lewis A. Coser, *Men of Ideas: A Sociologist's View* (The Free Press, 1970), pp. 194-195.
[133] Over the course of the 19th century, "ideology" gradually came to mean what it means now. At the same time, the place of the original concept of "ideology" was taken by the new field of sociology, invented by August Comte.
[134] Dreyfus affair was a political crisis in France in response to the highly controversial court-martial of Alfred Dreyfus in 1894. Opinions on Dreyfus and his trial split the French public opinion, particularly the intellectuals, into two camps. For many of them, Dreyfus Affair constituted the crucial moment of self-identification as intellectuals.
[135] Bourdieu, *Fourth Lecture*, pp. 656-657; Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, p. 21.
[136] Bourdieu, *Fourth Lecture*, pp. 657-658.
[137] Eyerman, *Between Culture and Politics*, p. 60.
[138] Coser, *Men of Ideas*, pp. 215-222.

deeply divided along the lines of technical, artistic and academic specializations. It provided them with a sense of sociopolitical mission, encouraging them to use their authority for the "good of humanity" and in the name of the hypostasized "Reason."[139] If that were indeed the case, it would mean that from the beginning the concept of "intellectuals" was filled with certain ideological implications rather than being value-free.

Regardless, the emergence and subsequent popularity of the term can be seen through any survey of twentieth century literature on social and political sciences. The historical significance as well as the postulated role of intellectuals was and still is a topic of much deliberation among scholars who argue over the basic definition. The sheer number of these repeated discussions is a clear proof that the problem of intellectuals was considered a key issue in any historical or social study of modernizing societies. It became a particularly important topic for Marxist analyses which sought to include the intellectuals in their class theory.[140]

Studies dealing with intellectuals adopt definitions that could be simplified to representing either one of the three types: 1) a purely descriptive definition, listing characteristic traits necessary for an individual in order to be classified as an intellectual, 2) a functional definition, which seeks to understand intellectuals through their social role rather than their attributes, and 3) a normative definition, treating everyone who identifies with a certain set of norms or ideology as an intellectual.

The simplest purely descriptive definition is that intellectuals are those who perform intellectual work professionally—in contrast to other types of work, such as menial labor. However, this definition is not generally used in scholarship and criticized as too broad.[141] Its existence and occasional usage is tied to the fact that it had been the standard definition of "intellectuals"/"intelligentsia" in the Soviet Union and was thus for many decades present in Marxist-Leninist scholarship.[142] A significantly more narrow and, at the same time, much more common understanding of intellectuals treats them as creators of ideas—those who not only use their intellect and knowledge to perform their work, but are also responsible for the creation of intangible concepts and passing them to the rest of society, where these concepts can either influence certain behavior as a theory or can be directly implemented by technical specialists,

[139] Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, pp. 21-23.
[140] Stanley Aronowitz, "On Intellectuals." In *Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics, Academics*, ed. Bruce Robbins (University of Minnesota Press, 1990), pp. 3-7.
[141] Eyerman, *Between Culture and Politics*, pp. 5-6.
[142] Martin Malia, "What Is the Intelligentsia?" In *The Russian Intelligentsia*, ed. Richard Pipes (Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 2-3.

economists, and politicians.[143] This is a curious definition due to the fact that it limits the scope of intellectuals' activity to the theoretical sphere, even though historically many social and political activists were intellectuals. Prominent examples include abolitionists and progressive politicians (even presidents) in the United States as well as members of Soviet and Chinese communist politburos.[144]

These two definitions—intellectuals as intellectual workers and as creators of ideas firmly entrenched in the theoretical sphere—could be seen as two opposed poles of the descriptive type. Many different definitions of this type are located in between, listing for example professions that automatically make one an intellectual (most commonly: academics, artists, opinion journalists). Such definitions are generally simple to use and allow for a wide possibility of research, but their obvious weakness lies in overgeneralizing and treating all members of certain professions as intellectuals without accounting for their individual attitudes.

The functional definition provides a strong response to these doubts and is supported by traditionally powerful authorities of mid-twentieth century social science, like Karl Mannheim and Antonio Gramsci. In his impactful work from 1928, *Ideology and Utopia*, which was widely read in Europe, America, and Asia (including Japan), Mannheim built upon sociological work of Max Weber and Karl Marx, and presented a highly original theory of society in which the intellectuals occupied a significant role, supplying other members of society with interpretation of the world.[145] In traditional (preindustrial) societies this function was often institutionalized in a closed profession (caste) of official intellectuals, such as priests or mandarins, who simply performed their duties, making their ideas reflect the current socio-economic conditions. This situation could be contrasted with the position of intellectuals in modern (industrial) societies in which they no longer possess any top-down sanctioned monopoly on knowledge and meaning, and are "free" of representing interests of any particular class while at the same time not being a separate class in themselves. Utilizing the opportunities provided by modern capitalist society, they can choose which class to align with and which ideas to advance.[146] While Mannheim's analysis of preindustrial intellectuals can hardly be seen as valid in regards to the Edo-period Japan, which did not possess a true equivalent of Chinese mandarins or other

[143] Thomas Sowell, *Intellectuals and Society* (Basic Books, 2012) (e-book), Chapter 1, "Defining intellectuals."
[144] Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals*, p. 54; Coser, *Men of Ideas*, pp. 224-225.
[145] Robert J. Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics* (George Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 55.
[146] Karl Mannheim, *Ideologia i utopia* [Ideology and utopia], trans. Jan Miziński (Wydawnictwo "Test," 1992), pp. 8-10.

similar groups, his understanding of modern intellectuals proved very attractive to Japanese intellectuals themselves during the early and mid-twentieth century.[147]

As argued by Mannheim, modern intellectuals do tend to form any long-term cohesive group. Their ideas reflect a wider spectrum of problems and thoughts present across the whole society. Thus, they can be described as both heterogenous and "free-floating." The only common trait among them is possession of knowledge which allows them to formulate ideas. Through their education, intellectuals are able to overcome their own class background and either join one of the existing classes as theoreticians of class objectives or become independent, striving to represent the entire humanity.[148]

In relation to the three presented types of definition, Mannheim's theory could be seen as being in some way close to the descriptive type, defining intellectuals only through their objective characteristics. However, the notion of intellectuals being driven by their education to form socially relevant ideas clearly makes it a functional type of definition. In this way, Mannheim approaches what later researchers termed "public intellectuals," understood as those who do not stick to their narrow specialized field and are active in the public sphere.[149] They do not even need to be academics or to perform intellectual work on a daily basis.[150] It is easily noticeable that this concept is very similar to how the intellectuals' role was understood during the times of Dreyfus affair. However, accepting the concept of "public intellectuals" would logically require an acceptance of "intellectuals" as a more basic term. Furthermore, if "public intellectuals" could be defined by their objective traits, it would mean that "intellectuals" in general must be understood in a purely descriptive way. Thus, using the term "public intellectuals" means accepting the first type of definition as a correct one.

Despite relative popularity of the term "public intellectuals," the usage of this concept is far from universal. Pierre Bourdieu considers intervention in the political sphere and sense of responsibility for the advancement of society as necessary traits of intellectuals in general.[151] A different outlook is provided by the hugely influential socioeconomic theory of Gramsci who aligned it with the Marxist class theory. Arguing that every member of society could become

[147] In Japan, Maruyama Masao was strongly influenced by Mannheim's work. On this topic see Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 86.
[148] Mannheim, *Ideologia i utopia*, pp. 124-128.
[149] Amitai Etzioni, "Are Public Intellectuals an Endangered Species?" In *Public Intellectuals: An Endangered Species?*, eds. Etzioni, Alyssa Bowditch (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), pp. 1-2.
[150] Sowell, *Intellectuals and Society*, Chapter 2, "Knowledge and Notions."
[151] Bourdieu, *Fourth Lecture*, p. 656.

an intellectual if not for the socioeconomic barriers, he considered knowledge a source of political power which could be employed by intellectuals (understood broadly as those who are able to obtain this knowledge) either to safeguard their own interests or to represent proletariat as part of the revolution. Those who chose the second were "organic intellectuals," because they organically belonged to a social class instead of "floating" above it.[152] In Gramscian analysis, only "organic intellectuals" were worthy of attention as those who held historical agency. Because in Marxism agency cannot be wielded by any subject other than a social class, only by becoming an organic part of a class could an intellectual obtain that agency.[153]

Gramsci's concept of intellectuals was thus both functional and normative since, in his view, intellectuals had to represent the proletariat. His view inspired postwar social and political scientists to come up with very similar concepts of "movement intellectuals" and "popular intellectuals" applied to those who joined and/or led the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s.[154] As these movements were characterized by clearly left-wing or progressive political orientations, belonging to the categories of "movement" or "popular" intellectuals necessitated identification with their ideological objectives—a normative type definition.

Many prominent postwar scholars who contributed to the research on intellectuals as a social group give definitions of intellectuals that are in line with the functional type. Coser defines intellectuals as those among the educated who do not simply live "from ideas," treating their intellectual work as a regular job and source of income (like many academics), but live "for ideas," willingly choosing to engage with them for some higher, more general purpose.[155] Ron Eyerman, though he employs a different approach, also abstains from giving any objective factors determining a classification as an intellectual. He argues that in order to conduct research centered on intellectuals, it is necessary to understand them in structural terms, through their (often aspired) role in society rather than through any preestablished set of characteristics.[156]

Most of the definitions of intellectuals relevant in the twentieth century scholarship belong to the functional type which should not come off as a surprise considering how

[152] Eyerman, *Between Culture and Politics*, pp. 82-83.
[153] Aronowitz, "On Intellectuals," p. 11.
[154] Eyerman, *Between Culture and Politics*, pp. 15, 106-107; Michiel Baud, Rosanne Rutten, "Introduction." In *Popular Intellectuals and Social Movements: Framing Protest in Asia, Africa, and Latin America*, eds. Baud, Rutten (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 8. For a more comprehensive overview of the methodological approach toward the relationship between intellectuals and the new social movements see Ron Eyerman, Andrew Jamison, *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991).
[155] Coser, *Men of Ideas*, pp. VII-VIII.
[156] Eyerman, *Between Culture and Politics*, pp. 1-2.

influential until the 1970s were the works of Mannheim and Gramsci.[157] With the 1970s and a sudden rise of postmodernism in social sciences, this paradigm started to change. Bauman may be thought to have clearly represented this change when he outright rejected any fixed definition of intellectuals, considering this term to mean different things based on historical and cultural context.[158] Regardless of whether such an approach is correct or not (or maybe only applicable to a more contemporary context),[159] it is true that from a standpoint of anyone who aims to research intellectuals in a certain context, a working definition suitable for that particular research seems like a much more viable choice than simple attachment to a single universal definition of intellectuals.

However, an analysis of the problem of intellectuals would be incomplete if it did not account for the existence and continuous popularity of one such concept, very similar in essence and often overlapping, namely the "intelligentsia." Originating from the Latin word *intelligentia*, meaning "intelligence" as a mental faculty, it has been typically used to refer to various social groups in Eastern and Central European context since the nineteenth century, most notably in Poland and Russia. It later came to be used also outside this context and today still remains in contemporary academic and non-academic use.[160]

Historically, the Russian intelligentsia originated from the intellectual "circles" of the 1830s and 1840s concerned with promoting the philosophy of German idealism. However, as a consistent social group, it developed a decade later, in connection to Tsar Alexander II's great social reforms of 1855 which initiated the process of modernization in Russia.[161] Richard Pipes defined intelligentsia of that time as a group which accepted the thought of French and German positivism, adopting it in its entirety—without regard for cultural conditions—and in its most radical form. In result, the newly-established group purposefully isolated itself from the rest of Russian society and oriented around a set of firmly held ideas such as a monistic view of nature, socialism (in many of its variants), and revolutionism.[162]

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[157] Ron Eyerman, Lennart G. Svensson, Thomas Söderqvist, "Introduction." In *Intellectuals, Universities, and the State in Western Modern Societies*, eds. Eyerman, Svensson, Söderqvist (University of California Press, 1987), p. 5.
[158] Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, pp. 1-2.
[159] Eyerman, Svensson, Söderqvist, "Introduction," pp. 2-3.
[160] Understood as the territories comprising former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, from 1772-1795 under control of Russia, Prussia/Germany, and Austria.
[161] Malia, "What Is the Intelligentsia?," pp. 1-2.
[162] Richard Pipes, "The Historical Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia." In ibid., p. 48.

Popular understanding of "intelligentsia" was cemented by the famous novel *Fathers and Sons*, published in 1862 by Ivan Turgenev. The author provided a detailed description of the two generations of Russian intelligentsia: the aristocratic "fathers," who believed in idealism, and the plebeian "sons," who were drawn to materialism. This generational conflict, historically accurate for mid-nineteenth century Russia, lasted until the 1880s. The successful assassination of Alexander II by a Polish revolutionary, Ignacy Hryniewiecki, was followed by further divide inside the Russian intelligentsia, which from that point onward became a largely heterogenous group whose main (and perhaps only) common trait was the tendency to always give priority to ideology.[163]

Considering the historical factors responsible for the emergence of the Russian intelligentsia, it could be said that the development as well as the very identity of that group was closely connected to the two powerful social processes which heavily influenced Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century: modernization and Westernization. Pipes goes as far as to argue that intelligentsia was a side product of those processes and any changes in their course likewise affected that group.[164]

Contrary to some misconceptions, Polish intelligentsia developed independently from the Russian one. Even though its emergence is often dated as the mid-nineteenth century, similarly to Russia, its origins actually trace back to the culture of the Polish Enlightenment several decades earlier.[165] Initially, it mostly comprised the members of liberal professions, particularly doctors and lawyers.[166] Already in 1861, a Polish magazine in Lwów (in the Austrian partition) discussed the meaning of "intelligentsia," arguing that simply being educated and performing intellectual work was not enough to be considered a part of the group. What was necessary was the interest in national affairs, in this case the issue of Polish independence.[167] Today, more than a hundred years later, the concept of "intelligentsia" in the scholarship on Poland is still very similar. Attempts at reaching any consensus pertaining to its synthetic definition are still at the forefront of the discussion.[168] Historians either treat

[163] Malia, "What Is the Intelligentsia?," pp. 2, 12.
[164] Pipes, "The Historical Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia," p. 47.
[165] Maciej Janowski, *Narodziny inteligencji 1750-1831* [The birth of intelligentsia, 1750-1831] (Instytut Historii PAN-Wydawnictwo Neriton, 2008), p. 10.
[166] Jerzy Jedlicki, *Błędne koło 1832-1864* [Vicious circle, 1832-1864] (Instytut Historii PAN-Wydawnictwo Neriton, 2008), p. 52.
[167] C.Ch., "O inteligencji w znaczeniu polskim" [On the intelligentsia in the Polish meaning], *Dziennik Literacki* [Lwów] 100 (1861) – cited after: Janowski, *Narodziny inteligencji*, p. 9.
[168] Witold Molik, "Badania nad historią polskiej inteligencji w okresie zaborów" [Studies on the history of Polish intelligentsia during the partition period], *Galicja: Studia i materiały* 11 (2024), pp. 9-10.

intelligentsia simply as a socio-professional group, or as an "intellectual elite of a nation."[169] Like in Russia,[170] this elite gathered around high-profile journals and associations.[171]

It is clear that "intelligentsia" is a very similar concept to that of "intellectuals," with analogous issues of whether to define it descriptively or functionally. The fact that it developed simultaneously but independently both in Russia and Poland shows that its emergence was probably tied to the broader social, economic, and cultural conditions of Central and Eastern Europe. This would make sense also in light of the popularity of the term in German language in contrast to its relatively rare usage in French or English. Throughout history, Germany, due to its Central European position, has often displayed connected phenomena, particularly east of the river Elbe.

Considering these conclusions, it would be prudent to look at the practical implications of the term "intelligentsia" in contemporary scholarship. Very often, it seems to be employed synonymously with "intellectuals" or in place of "intellectuals" in certain historical contexts, especially in connection to Central and Eastern Europe.[172] Some authors, however, try to conceptualize "intelligentsia" as a universal term with a clear meaning distinct from that of "intellectuals." In these cases, intelligentsia is often referred to as a group larger in number than intellectuals. Thomas Sowell, who exemplifies this tendency, defines intellectuals as those who create ideas while understanding intelligentsia as all those who are connected to ideas through their work, either creating or simply spreading them.[173] Raymond Aron, another example, refers to everybody who performs an intellectual job as intelligentsia.[174] In both cases "intelligentsia" is a much broader term than "intellectuals."

1.3. Toward the definition of intellectuals in postwar Japan

It was against this background of different meanings ascribed to intellectuals as a newly emergent social category in Europe that the two words—"intellectuals" and "intelligentsia"—

[169] Janusz Żarnowski, "Inteligencja polska, jej ewolucja historyczna przed wojną i w dobie powojennej" [Polish intelligentsia and its historical evolution before and after the war], *Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych* 79 (2018), p. 128.
[170] Malia, "What Is the Intelligentsia?," p. 14.
[171] Żarnowski, "Inteligencja polska," p. 132.
[172] Also in some of the works cited here, hence sometimes the dissertation mentions "intellectuals" while the source material uses the term "intelligentsia," albeit in the same meaning as "intellectuals."
[173] Sowell, *Intellectuals and Society*, Chapter 1, "The Intelligentsia."
[174] Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, pp. 205-206.

entered non-European contexts during the period of global modernization. Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, both of them found their way into Japan and the modern Japanese vocabulary, becoming the words that are in use even today. "Intellectuals" were translated literally to *chishikijin* 知識人 while "intelligentsia" entered as a loanword *interigencha* インテリゲンチャ, although eventually popularized as *interi* インテリ, an abbreviated form.[175] While both of these words entered the Japanese discourse separately, their different connotations quickly became blurred and, as a result, started to denote the same object, which persists also in contemporary scholarship. Even in the cases when an author tries to differentiate between two types of intellectuals these two types are not attributed to separate words.[176]

For this reason, in this dissertation I will mostly utilize the term "intellectuals" in English, treating it as the main equivalent of both *chishikijin* and *interi*. For the sake of clarity, I will refrain from using the term "intelligentsia," except when necessary. This terminological choice, however, does not resolve the underlying problem of definition. The historical trajectories and internal differentiations that were discussed in the previous sections make clear that any definition of "intellectuals" suitable for postwar Japan must be both historically grounded and analytically flexible.

Relatively to the pre-1945 period when many Japanese intellectuals remained passive in the face of militarism, postwar Japanese intellectuals exhibited a strong tendency to become involved in politics, which is symbolized by their dedication to various political objectives, such as advancing democratization, resisting rearmament, or protesting the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. This invokes associations with Émile Zola and his colleagues who protested the trial of Dreyfus. In both cases, belonging to the intellectual community was understood by many of its members as requiring adopting certain positions on public matters. J. Victor Koschmann echoes this attitude when he recalls the words of Sartre during his visit to Japan in 1965. The French philosopher stated that intellectuals can be defined as those who use their high education to attack the values of a "bourgeois society."[177] Even though it would be expected of them to

[175] There are also other words sometimes treated as synonyms, e.g. 有識者 *yūshikisha*, 知識層 chishikisō, 知的階級 chiteki kaikyū, or 主知主義者 *shuchishugisha*, but their meanings, though similar, do not exactly correspond to "intellectual" or "intelligentsia".

[176] Yoshino Genzaburō's analysis of intellectuals is a very good example of that: Yoshino Genzaburō, "Chishikijin no chi'i ni tsuite," pp. 2-8.

[177] This seems consistent with the often-quoted words of Sartre that "intellectual is somebody who doesn't mind his own business."

support the status quo due to their privileged social position, they willingly decide to turn against it for the "good of humanity." Koschmann considers this understanding—which clearly represents a normative-type definition—valid for early postwar Japan.[178]

Notwithstanding the doubts on whether their postwar social position really was privileged (as explained in the previous section), literary historian Bruce Robbins is right to describe such framing as a rhetorical or political-rhetorical tool.[179] Indeed, normative definitions of intellectuals, which try to give priority to one type of political or social attitude tell us more about those who formulate them, rather than the object of definition. All definitions of intellectuals are, after all, constructed by the intellectuals themselves, as noted by Bauman.[180] That observation seems profoundly insightful. Japanese friends of Sartre who supported democratic reforms after 1945 and vehemently opposed remilitarization in the 1950s wanted to think of intellectuals as of those who they were aspiring to be. Their sense of mission rested not only on the feeling of guilt, but also of privileged position (in terms of knowledge and education). By constructing a narrow understanding of their community's role, they could expel from this community anyone perceived as not matching the political and ethical standards they themselves had created.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, Maruyama Masao, himself almost an archetypical postwar Japanese intellectual, wrote frequently on the topic of intellectuals, seeking to provide a definition valid for modern Japan. He proposed three different ways to look at this group: in the formal sense, in the practical sense, and in the ideal sense. The difference between the formal (*keishikiteki* 形式的) and practical (*jisshiteki* 実施的) essentially amounted to difference between members of a social class of intellectuals—due to their education, social position, and occupation—and those who, while not belonging to any distinct group, are considered "intellectuals" by their environment, often in a colloquial or casual way, owing to their wits, knowledge, or curiosity.[181] Both of these definitions are descriptive; the third one, however, concerning intellectuals in the "ideal" (*risōteki* 理想的) sense, perceived them as those who commit themselves to "universalistic culture" and humanism, advancing a progressive liberal

[178] Koschmann, "Intellectuals and Politics," pp. 395-396.
[179] Bruce Robbins, "Introduction: The Grounding of Intellectuals." In *Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics, Academics*, pp. XV-XVI.
[180] Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, p. 8.
[181] Noda Yasuhisa, "Maruyama Masao ni okeru 'chishikijin' no imi" [Maruyama Masao's understanding of 'intellectuals'], *Ehime Daigaku Hōbun Gakubu Ronshū: Sōgō Seisaku Gakka-hen* 3 (1997), pp. 86-87.

political cause.[182] Thus, like Sartre, Maruyama tended to look at intellectuals through normative lenses consistent with his own ideology, even though he simultaneously allowed for alternative definitions.

Even today, normative approach enjoys a relative popularity among Japanese scholars. Tokura Kanji considers the following definition by Hashimoto Tsutomu from 2012 to be "classic" (*kotenteki* 古典的) in regards to the postwar period: "Intellectuals are those who, through creative endeavors that redefine (*sasshin* 刷新) existing paradigms, act with political ideals and passion, exercise leadership in the public sphere, and who do not conform to the system (*taisei* 体制), but instead take on the role of shaking up the existing order from a peripheral position and awakening (*kakusei* 覚醒) the people."[183] But, once more, such a framing, though very much in line with the intellectual climate of early postwar Japan, seems very exclusionary. Even Tokura himself makes a caveat that this definition is not perfect and can be subject to change.[184]

Would it be really acceptable to arbitrarily deny the status of an intellectual to anybody just on the grounds of not holding certain values or beliefs? Were anti-Dreyfusards necessarily non-intellectuals just because they disagreed with what Zola had preached in "J'accuse…"? Acceptance of this pretense on parts of some scholars should be seen as mistaken as it gives precedence to the worldview of one particular group—even if that group is the most numerous or impactful—over the others.

Another historian of modern Japan, Herbert Passin, provides a different proposal of definition. According to him, postwar Japanese intellectuals were a "self-aware body of educated persons who by vocation, interest, or disposition dealt with or were concerned with general ideas and issues that went beyond purely technical and professional matters."[185] This definition has an advantage of avoiding reducing the intellectuals to a certain professional group or to holders of certain opinions. It also seems most fitting for my research which tries to grasp intellectuals not as a social group in itself, but as a community of scholars, writers, and educators shaped by its continuous interaction with the global Cold War and its manifestations. Furthermore, the definition is similar to the concept of "public intellectuals" derived from

[182] Ibid., pp. 92.
[183] Tokura Kanji, "'Sekai' ni okeru Shimizu Ikutarō to shakaigaku: Sengo Nihon no jānarizumu to chishikijin" [Shimizu Ikutarō and sociology in "Sekai:" Journalism and intellectuals in postwar Japan], *Kansai Daigaku Hōgaku Ronshū* 63, 4 (2013), p. 903.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Passin, "Modernization and the Japanese Intellectual," p. 452.

Mannheim, which could be fitting since Mannheim's ideas enjoyed significant popularity among Japanese intellectuals of the mid-twentieth century.[186]

Of course, even while accepting Passin's understanding of the intellectuals, a lot of discretion is necessary as it still is only a working definition, certainly far from perfection or universality. But this vagueness has some practical value. Historian Maciej Janowski rightly observes that while it is impossible to construct a completely clear, precise, and universal definition of "intellectuals," the continuous ambivalence of this concept is in itself informative as it demonstrates the changing social perception of roles and place of the intellectuals under historical circumstances.[187]

Maruyama's earlier categorization of definitions of intellectuals serves as a good example of a certain tendency that is relatively common even in the contemporary scholarship on intellectuals in general and intellectuals in Japan. This tendency seeks to differentiate between the "true" intellectuals—those who create new ideas and retain intellectual originality—and all others, who only spread and discuss what had been already formulated and operate within paradigms invented by the former group. Alvin W. Gouldner, Thomas Bottomore, and Thomas Sowell are just some examples of this approach which in Japan is seconded by Tsuzuki Tsutomu.[188] This tendency can be already seen during the early postwar Japan.

In 1947, Yoshino Genzaburō, a prominent progressive journalist, wrote—treating it as a matter of fact rather than a theory or interpretation—that Japanese intellectuals are divided into two groups: the "creators of culture" (university professors, authoritative specialists in various fields, professional critics, writers, and possibly also lawyers, doctors, and religious clergy) and the "recipients of culture" (highly-trained engineers, white-collar workers, public officials, teachers, and, more generally, everyone with higher, vocational, or secondary-level education as well as students receiving such education). According to Yoshino, the former group could not have existed without the latter since its members form readership and market for intellectual production.[189] Himself an editor-in-chief of a major magazine, Yoshino was clearly interested in the dynamics between both groups of intellectuals and his insight is very informative on the status of early postwar Japan's society. In his view, this society was similar to the prewar one.

[186] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 86.
[187] Janowski, "Narodziny inteligencji," p. 9.
[188] Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin*, p. 6-7. Tsuzuki is aware of some issues with this viewpoint, but nevertheless seems to accept it.
[189] Yoshino, "Chishikijin no chi'i ni tsuite," p. 3.

For example, secondary or vocational education was still considered a marking of a well-educated person; the postwar trend of inflation—and subsequent decline in prestige—of such education had not yet happened.

There are several problems with such a viewpoint. First, it is very difficult (and sometimes impossible) to say who is the original author of a given idea or concept. The number of possible ideas with which a human mind can come up with is limited and anyone who follows their history through a longer span of time will quickly notice that rarely do people come up with anything truly original.[190] New concepts usually emerge as a combination of older ideas, sometimes under different names, "repackaged" to fit the sociopolitical and cultural landscape of the current time period and geographical area. It is not ahistorical to admit that; history changes natural environment, culture, and even mentality of people, but does not significantly change how the human mind works on a biological level (at least not in the way that could be observable during the relatively short scope of recorded human history).

What is more, there is no reason to assume that creators of original concepts are necessarily more influential than those who discuss and pass them further. The opposite is often the case. For example, historian Tōyama Shigeki in 1955 co-authored *The History of Shōwa* (*Shōwa-shi* 昭和史). As a book on recent Japanese history, it which proved hugely influential in shaping the critical postwar thinking about Imperial Japan.[191] However, Tōyama did not hide the fact that much of his reflection about Japanese history was not entirely new, but heavily based on the thought of prewar *kōza-ha* 講座派 Marxists, most notably Hani Gorō. In light of the aforementioned approach, only Hani should be considered a true intellectual. Yet both of them managed to exert significant influence on Japanese discourse on recent history, albeit in different moments of time.[192] As an intellectual, Tōyama was not in any way inferior to Hani—his role was just different. Whereas Hani was a theoretician associating himself with radical activists, Tōyama was a scholar writing on history not for the sake of developing a theory, but to shape views of the prewar period. Both were intellectuals in the full sense of the word with

[190] Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 3-5.
[191] *Shōwa-shi* [The history of Shōwa], eds. Tōyama Shigeki, Imai Sei'ichi, Fujiwara Akira (Iwanami Shinsho, 1955).
[192] This influence can be visibly seen not only through the great commercial success of his book (completely sold out on day one and reprinted several times), but also by looking at the dispute which it managed to trigger, conducted in *sōgō zasshi* (*Bungei Shunjū*, *Chūō Kōron*), mostly throughout 1956.

neither being more "true" in this role than the other. This demonstrates fallacy in any efforts to differentiate a special group of "true" intellectuals.

For this reason I have decided to adopt an approach which combines descriptive traits with social function—not because I believe it to be qualitatively better (I do not), but because it better fits the type of research conducted in this study. The "normative" approach, while certainly possible to justify, would be too reductionist to allow for a broad analysis of postwar Japanese intellectuals in the context of Cold War polarization and emerging lines of political and ideological division.

My working definition differs from those employed by some historians dealing with similar subject matter, but follows what I believe to be the right direction, outlined by Herbert Passin earlier in this section. In realities of postwar Japan, intellectuals were mostly, although not exclusively, academics or journalists (sometimes both) who gathered around *sōgō zasshi*, the "general opinion" magazines, which occupied a very influential position during the late 1940s and 1950s, effectively shaping public opinion on many matters. For them, being an intellectual was tied to self-identification with a higher purpose related to the fate of Japan: devastated by war, deprived of independence, and in search for a vision that could once again give direction and purpose to her modernization. This community will be researched here phenomenologically: its position looked at from a perspective focusing on the experienced reality of the times and its subjective voices treated as volitional expressions of a fully conscious agent.

Chapter 2. Rise of the postwar intellectual community, 1945-1947

The war in the Pacific against the Western Allies began on 7 December 1941 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Since July 1937, Japan had already been locked in an informal state of war with China which had escalated from a small-scale border incident. The support of the United States and Great Britain for China even before Pearl Harbor made Japan regard both wars as a single military struggle and call it the "Greater East Asia War" (*Dai-tōa sensō* 大東亜戦争).[193]

The actual Japanese military involvement on the East Asian mainland had started much earlier, though. In September 1931, Japan's forces invaded the northeastern parts of China and established the puppet state of Manchuria (commonly called "Manchukuo" from its Chinese name *Manzhouguo* 满洲国, the "State of Manchuria") on territories internationally recognized as belonging to China.[194] This event was followed by a series of other military incidents, including repeated border clashes with the Soviet Union on Mongolian border from 1932 to 1939. Although much of this was never formalized, the period between 1931 and 1945 saw Japan continuously at war, a phenomenon that Japanese Marxist historians framed as the "Fifteen Years War" (*gojūnen sensō* 五十年戦争).[195] Therefore, historical description of timeframe for World War II in Japan is conditioned on the location and bias of the narrator. The conflict had profound consequences for how the war was experienced and later remembered, particularly by intellectuals.

For society at large, the fact that Japan was at war was not immediately apparent—at least until the escalation of hostilities in China, if not until the beginning of the Pacific War. For a long time, the country was able to function domestically almost the same as before, without resorting to total mobilization.[196] Yet for the intellectuals—who stood at the forefront of society

[193] Miwa Kimitada, "Pan-Asianism in modern Japan: Nationalism, regionalism and universalism." In *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, eds. Sven Saaler, J. Victor Koschmann (Routledge, 2007), p. 30.
[194] Jakub Polit, *Gorzki triumf: Wojna chińsko-japońska 1937-1945* [A bitter triumph: Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945] (Wydawnictwo Avalon, 2013), pp. 30-48.
[195] Banno Junji, *Japan's Modern History, 1857-1937: A new political narrative*, trans. J.A.A. Stockwin (Routledge, 2014), p. 204.
[196] The escalation in China proved to be a deciding moment since the Imperial Japanese Army mobilized reserves for the invasion of North China Plain. See Yoshida Yutaka, "The Battlefield Experience of Japanese Soldiers in t he Asia-Pacific War," trans. Bo Tao, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 18, 19 (2020), www.apjjf.org/2020/19/yoshida-tao. Accessed 21 September 2026.

in terms of political awareness—these fifteen years of continued conflict constituted a formative experience.

During these fifteen years, the earlier laws prohibiting "anti-Japanese" thought (communism, anarchism, antimonarchism, etc.) began to be enforced much more strictly and not only in relation to political activists, but also academics. Even when treated only as a scientific paradigm rather than political ideology, Marxism started to be seen as dangerous, even among scholars. The military police, Kempeitai 憲兵隊, increasingly operated outside its normal scope, often overruling the authority of ordinary police, using its power to hunt down political and ideological enemies of the army.[197] In the 1940s, the nation moved toward a "total war" (*sōryokusen* 総力戦) against America. This meant that all members of society, including intellectuals, were required to increasingly contribute to the wartime economy, neighborhood associations (*tonarigumi* 隣組), and "total spiritual mobilization" (*seishin sōdōin* 精神総動員) by all means possible. In the case of intellectuals, this of course meant using their talents and elite education to promote the objectives of the state and the military, which not only included writing in support of the war but also spreading the anti-Western and anti-American propaganda.[198]

But the narrative of anticolonial, pan-Asiatic struggle against the West was much more than simple propaganda; its tenets proved attractive for many Japanese intellectuals. Takeuchi Yoshimi reminisced that while many of them felt anger toward their country's war with China (viewed as politically unnecessary and needlessly damaging to Sino-Japanese relations), the war with Western powers—the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands—gained wide support among intellectuals in Japan.[199] Many of them, either willingly or as a result of pressure, committed the so-called *tenkō* 転向, or "conversion," to state ideology.[200] Shimizu Ikutarō had "converted" in this manner and started to write extensively in support of the war with America.[201] Many communists likewise performed *tenkō*.[202] Miki Kiyoshi, a famous socialist

[197] Ben-Ami Shillony, *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan* (Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 14-15.
[198] Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* pp. 34-43.
[199] Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Overcoming Modernity." In *What Is Modernity? Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi*, ed. and trans. Richard F. Calichman (Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 120-121.
[200] Tsurumi Shunsuke, *An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan* (Routledge, 2010) (e-book), Chapter 2.
[201] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 3, "Tenkō to iu tokiguchi no gimon" [Solution to the question of 'tenkō'].
[202] Tsurumi, *An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan*, Chapter 3.

thinker critical of the military, joined the state-sponsored Shōwa Research Association (Shōwa Kenkyūkai 昭和研究会), a think tank devoted to the conceptualization of Pan-Asianism.[203]

To be sure, not every intellectual supported the state during the war or committed *tenkō*; and not all of those who "converted" did so honestly: a female anarchist, Kutsumi Fusako, is a good example of continued opposition even after *tenkō*.[204] Many more kept silent, withholding views neither in support or against the war. A significant number of intellectuals was drafted into the Imperial Japanese Army and often sent to distant locations in Asia or on the Pacific.[205]

Aside from ideological pressure, censorship constituted another factor that strongly affected Japanese intellectuals during the war. From the Meiji to the early Shōwa period, it was not neither considerably thorough nor harsh.[206] However, the outbreak of war with China in July 1937 intensified restrictions on freedom of speech, making it increasingly difficult for writers and journalists to challenge the status quo. This trend only accelerated after the outbreak of the Pacific War. Beginning in the late 1930s, a new modus operandi for censorship was developed, based on regular meetings between government officials and publishers. Rather than the unwanted content being removed directly, the authorities sought to ensure that it never appeared in the first place. During the war, editors of magazines and publishers of books often corrected texts in various ways in order to make them more in line with military objectives of Japan.[207] Even if a politically controversial topic escaped censorship, the author could become a target of non-governmental nationalist militias and face intimidation. Such was the case of Minobe Tatsukichi, a legal scholar pressured to resign from his professorship in 1935 for advocating a liberal interpretation of the Meiji Constitution called the "emperor organ theory" (*tennō kikan setsu* 天皇機関説).[208]

The wartime experience of Japanese citizens was not restricted to their relationship with the state and the military along with their ideology. Regardless of individual views and attitudes, ultimately everyone equally faced the horrors of Allied bombings, nuclear attacks, food

[203] William Miles Fletcher III, *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan* (The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 84-88; "Miki Kiyoshi." In *Nijū seiki Nihon jinmei jiten* [Biographical dictionary of the twentieth century Japanese], ed. Nichigai Associates (Nichigai Associates, 2004). Cited after Kotobank: www.kotobank.jp/word/三木清-138351. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[204] Tsurumi, *An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan*, Chapter 10.
[205] Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* p. 48.
[206] Marius B. Jansen, "Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization." In *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization*, pp. 80-81.
[207] Leith Morton, "Self-censorship: the case of wartime Japanese poetry," *Japan Forum* 19, 3 (2007), p. 393.
[208] Stephen S. Large, Emperor *Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography* (Routledge, 2003), pp. 29-30, 65.

shortages, and the devastation accompanying the final months of World War II. Japan's surrender, announced on August 15 and formally signed on 2 September 1945, put an end to the conflict while simultaneously enabling a fundamental reconfiguration of many spheres of prewar and wartime Japanese society, including academia and opinion journalism—the two principal areas of activity for Japanese intellectuals.

The community of remorse in August 1945 emerged out of the plethora of wartime experiences. The "remorse" refers to a sense of guilt for individual conduct during the war, which often included *tenkō*, passivity, or inability to take up meaningful resistance. The term also refers to a shared set of values related to Japan's postulated democratization. The period between August 1945 and January 1947 allowed members of this new community to function without the Cold War pressure, which characterized the later years. How the community of intellectuals operated in this environment was heavily dependent on the new internal situation of Japan related to the U.S. occupation.

2.1. Conditions for intellectual discourse in postwar Japan

The Allied occupation of Japan began on 27 August 1945, when the first American troops entered the country; with the signing of the Instrument of Surrender on 2 September 1945 serving as the official starting date.[209] The occupation was conducted in the name of all Allied powers but was, in fact, administered almost exclusively by the United States through the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Other Allies, such as Great Britain, wielded only minimal influence.[210] The General Headquarters (GHQ), an administrative organ directly under SCAP, was staffed entirely by American personnel. Two collegial bodies were created in order to represent all of the Allies and communicate their will to the Supreme Commander. The Far Eastern Commission was the highest political authority of the occupation and possessed the right to dictate its policies to SCAP while the Allied Council for Japan, stationed in Tokyo, served as his advisory board. However, both of these bodies proved

[209] Robert E. Ward, "Reflections on the Allied Occupation and Planned Political Change in Japan." In *Political Development in Modern Japan: Studies in the Modernization of Japan*, ed. Ward (Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 478.
[210] Peter Lowe, *Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British policies towards Japan, China and Korea, 1948-1953* (Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 11.

ineffective and unable to reach consensus on key matters, in practice leaving all decisions to the discretion of SCAP.[211]

Unlike in Germany, Japan's polity not only survived defeat but retained all of its institutions except the military. Under the occupation regime, the monarchy itself was preserved, even if the emperor's status was later modified to some degree. The government and its ministries, both houses of the National Diet, as well as local governments all remained in place. Their structure and power were gradually altered through reforms carried out by the Japanese themselves, in response to general directives issued by SCAP.

American domination in the occupation of Japan contrasted especially with the relatively weak influence of the Soviet Union. This was a direct result of how World War II had ended in the region. "Yalta System" meant that the mutual relations between the great powers were based on the set of agreements made during the Yalta Conference in February 1945 and later confirmed the follow-up meeting in Potsdam in July 1945. This agreement rested on a return to the old status quo in East Asia, taking Japan's recent possessions (such as Manchuria) away from her and awarding to the Soviet Union territories lost by Russia in 1905, like Southern Sakhalin ("Karafuto" 樺太 in Japanese).[212] Immediately after defeating Germany, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was content with how the Yalta System played out in the region and wanted to cooperate with the Western Allies in order to strengthen the political benefits the Soviets had gained at Yalta and Potsdam. He hoped strongly, however, for a separate occupation zone in Japan proper—a matter regulated at neither of these two meetings. From Stalin's perspective, an economically and militarily revived Japan could pose a future threat to his ambitions and interests, which was very similar to his attitude toward Germany.[213] For this reason, even after the announcement of Japan's surrender in mid-August 1945, he tried to force the American side to hand him a separate occupation zone on the Japanese Islands, an attempt ultimately unsuccessful.[214] In the end, Soviet forces did not enter Japan proper.[215]

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[211] Ward, "Reflections on the Allied Occupation," pp. 478-479, 488.
[212] Zhao Suisheng, *Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity* (St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 84-86.
[213] Melvyn P. Leffler, "Bringing It Together: The Parts and he Whole." In *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Routledge, 2013), p. 48.
[214] Shen Zhihua, *Mao, Stalin and the Korean War*, pp. 31-32.
[215] To be precise, Soviet forces did enter Japan proper in Southern Sakhalin/Karafuto as that prefecture's status was officially upgraded to *naichi* 内地 ("inner land") in 1943. However, due to the prefecture's position on the fringes of the empire—and since the administrative integration happened so late—it never became a part of Japan proper in popular imagination, and is usually not treated as such by historians.

Strong American influence over the occupation meant that the general objectives of the Allies regarding Japan, formulated at the Potsdam Conference, became conflated with the political objectives of the United States. To explain this process, it is necessary to compare both sets of goals. The former were expressed explicitly in the Potsdam Declaration. Officially titled the "Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender," it was signed by the heads of state or government of the U.S., Great Britain, and China, and issued on 26 July 1945 during the eponymous conference in response to Japan's continuous resolve to keep fighting. The Soviet Union, though initially not among its signatories, participated in the talks surrounding the declaration and from the beginning agreed with its objectives. The Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's reluctance to sign it stemmed from his desire to hide the Soviet Union's hostile intentions from Japan. Owing to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact from 1941, which was supposed to remain in effect until 1946, Tokyo did not consider Moscow an enemy.[216] Stalin, however, had been preparing to invade Japan already before the Potsdam Conference. He planned to push into Japan-controlled Manchuria and South Sakhalin and, from there, launch an invasion of the Japanese home islands, beginning with the northernmost island of Hokkaido. Seeking time to transfer his forces from Europe to East Asia, he did not sign the Potsdam Declaration to avoid alarming Tokyo about his true intentions.[217] While the Soviet Union was not among the initial signatories, it formally adhered to the document when declaring war against Japan and invading its territories along with Manchuria on 8 August 1945.[218] From that point onward, the Soviets were counted among the victors over Japan as evidenced by their involvement in all collective bodies which formally represented the Allies on matters related to the occupation of Japan.

The Potsdam Declaration listed the following objectives of the occupation: (1) elimination "for all time" of "the authority and influence" of the militarists responsible for leading Japan into war; (2) disarmament of the Japanese military forces; (3) destruction of Japan's "war-making power"; (4) limitation of Japanese sovereignty to Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido, plus "minor islands"; (5) "exaction of just reparations in kind"; and (6) "revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people."[219] It is

[216] Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 61.
[217] Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 132-133.
[218] Polit, *Gorzki triumf*, pp. 932-933.
[219] "Potsdam Declaration. Proclamation of Heads of Governments, United States, United Kingdom, and China," July 26, 1945, in *Political Reorientation of Japan: Report of Government Section, SCAP*, Vol. 2, *Appendices* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 413.

worth noting that these objectives were simultaneously the conditions Japan had to accept by signing the Instrument of Surrender. Perhaps deliberately general given the circumstances, these objectives were vague enough to allow the United States to conflate them with its own objectives.

The latter were elaborated on in two subsequent documents: the "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," issued by the U.S. Department of State, headed by James F. Byrnes, in August 1945, shortly before the occupation began, and the "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander of the Allied Power for the Occupation and Control of Japan," sent to SCAP by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1945.[220] The first one set forth a large number of specific objectives for the occupation, as well as two primary goals: 1) democratization; and 2) ensuring that Japan would never again pose a threat to the United States or to world peace.[221] Although the document did not explicitly prioritize one over the other, the content and the manner of its implementation suggest that the second goal had priority. As evidenced by the occupation-era reforms (such as the decisions regarding the emperor), not all SCAP decisions served the cause of democratization; however, all of them were aimed at advancing the interests of the United States.

The specific objectives were an elaboration of the rationale behind the primary goals. Among them, the greatest emphasis was placed on total demilitarization, territorial cessions, and the punishment of war criminals. Using somewhat vague language, the document also outlined the aim of creating "conditions" in Japan conducive to the development of a democratic society and the protection of human rights. Regarding the Japanese people and democratic values, terms such as "coercion" and "teaching" were employed, implying the use of sociotechnical tools rather than force. Decentralization of industry—so frequently cited in the literature as an element of the "4D" policy applied to Germany—was not listed among the occupation's objectives. Economic issues were addressed in the document in general and somewhat ambiguous terms, limited to a call for economic reform—without specifying its nature—and a provision for reparations to countries affected by Japanese aggression.[222] In 1950, Edwin O. Reischauer, a prominent diplomat and specialist on Japan, argued that the "Initial

[220] John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 73.
[221] "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," 29 August 1945, in *Political Reorientation of Japan*, Vol. 2, p. 423.
[222] Ibid., pp. 423-425.

Post-Surrender Policy" was one of the best-formulated American foreign policy documents, remaining relevant well into the 1950s.[223]

The instructions sent to MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff largely reiterated or slightly supplemented the State Department's guidelines while clarifying various matters regarding the relationships between SCAP, GHQ, the U.S. Eighth Army (responsible for occupying all of Japan), and the various staffs. Fundamentally, they offered no new directives concerning Japan, though it is noteworthy that, compared to other documents, they put a stronger emphasis on SCAP's authority to intervene directly in the prerogatives of Japanese institutions, even implicitly encouraging such action.[224]

A comparison of the Potsdam Declaration, the State Department directive, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive reveals a striking progression: each successive document placed increasing weight on the importance of democratization—in the final instance, coupled with encouragement to bypass the principle of indirect rule and to implement specific measures through direct intervention. While the statement issued by the heads of state in Potsdam on 26 July 1945 should be viewed as part of the negotiations preceding the surrender, the two subsequent documents were drafted in late August. Consequently, the American Joint Chiefs—a body of military officers with their own independent assessment of the situation in Japan—likely remained skeptical of the principle of indirect rule championed by the State Department under Byrnes.

Democratization as the central aim of the American administration at the start of the occupation was not merely a matter of top-down policy. Both General Douglas MacArthur, who served as SCAP from 14 August 1945 until 11 April 1951, and the vast majority of GHQ personnel held somewhat idealistic views regarding the democratization of Japan, considering it a special mission of the United States.[225] In line with pre-Cold War liberal universalism, they appeared to believe that if Japan became a fully democratic nation, she would undoubtedly prove to be a trustworthy ally to America.[226] Moreover, many GHQ officials—including MacArthur's aide-de-camp and chief of GHQ's Government Section, Major General Courtney

[223] Edwin O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan* (Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 31-32.
[224] "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan," 3 November 1945, in *Political Reorientation of Japan*, Vol. 2, p. 430.
[225] Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal*, ed. Herbert Passin (The Free Press, 1987), pp. 35-36; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 77, 209-212.
[226] Fukui Haruhiro, "Postwar politics, 1945-1973." In *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol. 6, *The Twentieth Century*, ed. Peter Duus (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 155.

Whitney, and that section's deputy chief, Colonel Charles Kades—were "New Deal idealists" for whom democratization also entailed progressive socioeconomic reforms. Both were heavily involved in Japan's political reform process and actively participated in drafting the new constitution of 1946.[227]

The contents of the Potsdam Declaration and the "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," as well as ideological leanings of GHQ's senior officials, were hardly a secret. Japanese political elite and intellectuals were well aware of the American objectives. While most politicians and bureaucrats attempted to maneuver between American expectations and their own goals, many intellectuals took the American plan for Japan seriously and chose to engage with it.

Nonetheless, dismissing the Allied character of the occupation as a mere façade and treating it as a purely American endeavor, even if somewhat justified, would obscure how the Japanese perceived that period. Other Allies, particularly the Soviet Union, had little power to influence occupation policy. Deliberations of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan often produced no practical results or unified declarations, prompting MacArthur to ignore them.[228] Yet during the first year and a half of the occupation, the reforms promoted by GHQ—and implemented, to varying degrees, by the Japanese government—were widely seen as reflecting the will of all the Allies, including the Soviets. This was expressed explicitly in an appeal released by the reactivated Japan Communist Party (JCP; Nihon Kyōsan Tō) on 10 October 1945, which credited the United States and Great Britain, alongside the Soviet Union, with enabling a "democratic revolution" in Japan.[229]

This perception was reinforced by the distinctly left-wing character of many of these reforms, such as those concerning labor (legalization of free trade unions and legislation modeled on America's Wagner Act) and agriculture (land confiscation and redistribution).[230] Furthermore, on October 4, at the outset of the occupation, MacArthur—though not without

[227] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 370-373.
[228] Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 293.
[229] Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966* (University of California Press, 1966), p. 48; Katarzyna Starecka, "Przebieg i skutki czystki politycznej w okupowanej Japonii" [The political purge in occupied Japan: Implementation and effects], *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne* 149, 2 (2022), p. 345.
[230] Taira Koji, "Economic development, labor markets, and industrial relations in Japan, 1905-1955." In *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol. 6, pp. 647-648; Mark B. Williamson, "Land Reform in Japan," *Journal of Farm Economics* 33, 2 (1951), pp. 169-176. The latter work was written by a staff member of SCAP's Natural Resources Section which it makes it more valuable as it provides insight into how the occupation authorities viewed their objectives in this area.

reservations—ordered the Japanese government to release all political prisoners, including communists and anarchists.[231] Consequently, many Japanese intellectuals came to view the United States not only as an ally of democracy but also as a progressive force capable of fostering a social revolution in the country.

Owing to SCAP's polices, the JCP, which had remained delegalized during the war, was able to resume its activities as early as November 1945 with members freshly released from prison. The party's postwar leader, Nosaka Sanzō, openly described the American occupation as a "liberation" and the party's organ, *Shinbun Akahata* 新聞赤旗 (*The Red Flag Gazette*), thanked the Americans for defeating the Empire of Japan.[232] With this tacit patronage, the JCP was able to quickly build up its base of support in the Japanese society and become a mainstream political force. The early postwar years marked the greatest successes in the party's history, such as securing 9.79% of the total vote in January 1949 general election.[233] Most of this remarkable growth can likely be attributed to Nosaka's strategy of political moderation and emphasis on reform rather than armed struggle.[234] However, this strategy entirely depended on GHQ's tolerance and goodwill toward the communists, manifested during the initial stage of the occupation. The JCP also benefitted from the strong support of Japanese intellectuals, many of whom—even if not communist themselves—viewed the party as an agent of positive change in the struggle for democratic modernization.[235]

Simultaneously with political reforms and the release of prisoners, GHQ prosecuted those deemed responsible or complicit in Japan's wartime aggression. The Potsdam Declaration had promised that "stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals," but this phrasing was very vague and it remained unclear whether this term should encompass only military personnel or also civilians.[236] Aside from the political decision made by the Americans to abstain from persecuting the Emperor or any member of his family, the Allies as a whole took a maximalist approach: approximately 25,000 Japanese civil and military officials, including those overseas, were arrested and investigated across all Allied jurisdictions and trialed before local tribunals,

[231] Daizaburo Yui, "Democracy from the Ruins: The First Seven Weeks of the Occupation in Japan," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies*, 19, 1 (1987), pp. 40, 43-44.
[232] Curtis Anderson Gayle, "China in the Japanese Radical Gaze, 1945-1955," *Modern Asian Studies* 43, 5 (2009), p. 1263. As an example, Gayle, gives Nosaka's own work from 1948: Nosaka Sanzō, *Nihon minshuka no tame ni* [For the democratization of Japan] (Jinminsha, 1948).
[233] Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement*, p. 72.
[234] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, pp. 32-35.
[235] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 92.
[236] "Proclamation," July 26, 1945, in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1945, Vol. II, The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam Conference), ed. Richardson Dougall (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), Document 1382.

including those managed by the Soviets and the Chinese. [237] However, the central tribunal intended for the top military and political figures was held in Tokyo and fully controlled by the Americans. The International Military Tribunal of the Far East, or the "Tokyo Trials" (as it is often referred to), convened in April 1946; the trial was finally decided in November 1948. In the end, twenty-five political and military leaders received sentences: seven were hanged and sixteen were imprisoned for life. [238]

Separately from the trials, SCAP ordered purges of people from various professions, removing them from their jobs and from public life. The first victims of these purges, designated as early as October 1945, were police officers and teachers. In January 1946, the largest purge in Japan's history took place, targeting politicians, bureaucrats, former military personnel, business leaders, local officials, and political activists. While the purge itself was not announced publicly in Japan, a number of communist activists cooperated with the Americans as their informants, using this opportunity to remove "reactive" elements from the Japanese political life. As a result, most representatives in the National Diet were barred from running in elections ever again and the new postwar party landscape largely crumbled. Due to the loss of members, the Japan Progressive Party (Nihon Shinpo Tō 日本進歩党) practically ceased to exist, while the Japan Liberal Party (Nihon Jiyū Tō 日本自由党) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP; Nihon Shakai Tō 日本社会党) were severely weakened.[239] All of these parties were relatively new, founded shortly after Japan's surrender, but their cadres consisted mostly of prewar and wartime politicians.

Intellectuals were also involved in purges, both as victims and as perpetrators. Many authors writing in support for the war along with their publishers were included in one of the categories of people (category G) intended for the purge.[240] James Orr describes how younger intellectuals (under forty years old) with left-wing, often radical worldview ostracized their moderate or conservative colleagues in the fields of literature, film, and arts, leading some of them to quit their work. The author notes how easy it was for the younger generation to place the blame for the war on their older peers since, owing to their age, the former had never had any opportunity to hold any responsible positions before 1945.[241]

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[237] Higurashi Yoshinobu, *The Tokyo Trial: War Criminals and Japan's Postwar International Relations*, trans. The Japan Institute of International Affairs (Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, 2022), pp. 70-71.
[238] Ibid., pp. 225-227.
[239] Starecka, "Przebieg i skutki czystki politycznej," pp. 344-349.
[240] Ibid., p. 350.
[241] Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, pp. 20-21.

The Allied occupation abolished all government provisions related to censorship. Yet it simultaneously introduced its own form of this practice—fully informal, not grounded in any laws or ordinances, and dependent solely on personal discretion of the officials in the Civil Information and Education (CIE) Section, which was the GHQ division in charge of measures related to education, cultural policy, and religion. As such, it was the body responsible for directing the purge in media as well as executing censorship.[242] Regarding the censorship policy, CIE operated under extremely vague instructions. These prohibited, for example, "false and destructive" criticism of the Allies, while at the same time requiring to keep all restrictions on freedom of speech to a "minimum." This new form of censorship bypassed the Japanese government entirely, dealing directly with the publishers.[243] GHQ prohibited most information on the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leaving the public largely in the dark as to the nature of the attack and the number of casualties.[244] Other disallowed topics included misconducts by Allied personnel, defense of Japanese war criminals, loss of territories, reparations and peace treaty discussions, mixed blood (mostly American-Japanese) children, and black market activities.[245] The Americans also forbade any use of terms related to the wartime discourse of military expansion, such as *eirei* 英霊 (the "heroic spirits" of soldiers who sacrificed their lives for the emperor) or *hakkō ichiu* 八紘一宇 ("eight corners of the world under one roof"), a Pan-Asian slogan.[246]

Comparing censorship before and after 1945, Yoshino Genzaburō, editor-in-chief of *Sekai*, remarked that the latter was much more demanding. Previously, publishers were merely required to delete certain words or paragraphs deemed inappropriate, often substituting them with "XX" marks. GHQ, on the other hand, strove to conceal the very existence of censorship and thus required that texts be rewritten entirely to remove any sign of alteration. Because the entire procedure was non-transparent and the publishers never knew what the CIE officials might find objectionable, they constantly risked having to rewrite or reformat entire issues of newspapers or magazines at the last minute, causing delays in publication. Yoshino himself

[242] *Political Reorientation of Japan*, Vol. 1, pp. 59-60.
[243] Etō Jun, *Closed Linguistic Space: Censorship by the Occupation Forces and Postwar Japan*, trans. The Japan Institute of International Affairs (Japan Publishing Industry Foundation of Culture, 2020), pp. 108-112, 127-129.
[244] Monica Braw, *The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Occupied Japan* (Routledge, 1991), pp. 89-106.
[245] Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy*, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann, (Continuum, 2002), pp. 385-388.
[246] Miwa, "Pan-Asianism in modern Japan," p. 31.

often spent long hours outside a CIE official's bureau, waiting for the person inside to finish reading the next issue of his magazine.[247]

One notable example of American censorship in practice occurred when the very first issue of *Sekai* was being published. The opening editorial, which described the current situation in Japan, had to be rewritten in order to remove two short passages that expressed sadness for the loss of territories during the war and the dismantling of Japan's heavy industry.[248] The article did not criticize the occupation regime in any way; it simply touched upon the matters considered taboo, which was enough for the GHQ CIE to intervene. The risk of such interventions made publishers more willing to put pressure on their authors toward self-censorship and to engage in preventive censorship themselves in order to avoid delays that could harm magazine sales.[249]

The Americans also possessed effective control over the distribution of print paper. The wartime paper-rationing system, in place since September 1937, was managed by two public organizations: the Japan Newspaper League (Nippon Shinbun Renmei 日本新聞連盟) and the Japan Publishers Association (Nippon Shuppan Kyōkai 日本出版協会), both of which were under the supervision of the Japanese government.[250] But SCAPIN-195, a directive issued by SCAP on 26 October 1945, ordered the state to take full control of the distribution process from these organizations and to create a new system, in which a body made up of representatives of government, large and small publishers, and third-party individuals, would be responsible for managing the production as well as distribution of print paper. Simultaneously, the Japanese government was obliged to provide GHQ with information on all publishers chosen as eligible for receiving paper along with the rationale behind their eligibility.[251] With the new system giving the occupation authorities general oversight and instituting strict paper-rationing rules,

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[247] Yoshino Genzaburō, "Sengo no sanjū-nen to 'Sekai' no sanjū-nen" [Thirty years of the postwar and thirty years of "Sekai"], *Sekai* 362 (1976), pp. 256-257; Monica Braw also gives a detailed – though slightly different – account of how complex and elaborate was the censorship system operated by the American occupation authorities – Braw, pp. 54-58

[248] Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* p. 197.

[249] There is a valid question whether censorship conducted by a magazine's editor should also be considered a form of self-censorship if considered not from the perspective of an individual author but a single magazine issue treated as a whole. Contemporary typology of censorship does not solve this problem—see Gergely Gosztonyi, *Censorship from Plato to Social Media* (Springer, 2023), pp. 8-14.

[250] Ikawa Mitsuo, "Senryōki ni okeru shinkō-shi to zenkoku-shi: 'Chūkyō Shinbun' o chūshin ni shite" [New newspapers and national papers in occupied Japan: The case of *Chūkyō Shinbun*], *Masu Komyunikēshon Kenkyū* 42 (1993), pp. 151-152.

[251] "Elimination of Newspaper and Publishers' Associations Control over Distribution of Paper," 26 October 1945, Tainichi Shireishū, Nihon Senryō Kankei Shiryō, National Diet Library, Tokyo, Japan, pp. 1-2.

any practical possibility of "rogue" journals appearing on the market has been mostly eliminated.

Censorship and paper control made it difficult to find voices strongly critical of SCAP or GHQ policies in the occupation-era newspapers and magazines. That does not mean, however, that any skepticism toward the United States, moderate criticism, or discussion of taboos was disallowed completely and everywhere. Despite difficulties described by Yoshino, *sōgō zasshi* were offered more leeway than other media, such as newspapers or radio. For example, even in the heavily polarized political landscape of the late 1940s and early 1950s, these magazines engaged in lengthy discussions of the peace treaty, despite its status as a censored topic.[252] Since the censorship process required the CIE officials to review all content, they must have been aware of these discussions, which suggests that they tacitly permitted them. This should not come off as a surprise since differentiating the scope and "intensity" of censorship depending on the type of publication was a standard procedure even in countries with broader and harsher censorship regulations, such as Communist Poland or other Soviet satellites after the war—and "magazines for intellectuals" were generally allowed more freedom than other press titles.[253] Since the majority of GHQ staff identified not only with American policy but also with general goals of democratization and social reform, there is valid ground to suppose that they would be more willing to allow further liberties for progressive intellectuals.[254]

2.2. The founding of *Sekai*

Final years of the war proved difficult for Japanese publishers and many magazines had to enter a temporary hiatus due to economic difficulties or pressure from the military. These included major *sōgō zasshi*. *Chūō Kōron* stopped its publication after July 1944; *Bungei Shunjū* lasted longer, but also eventually stopped after June 1945.[255] However, both returned in January 1946 along many other, new opinion magazines. The most long-lived among the new early postwar monthlies was *Sekai*.

[252] See Chapter 4 which deals with the discussions surrounding the Treaty of San Francisco.
[253] *The Black Book of Polish Censorship*, trans. and ed. Jane Leftwich Curry (Vintage Books, 1984), pp. 26-27.
[254] Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, pp. 35-36.
[255] See *Chūō Kōron* and *Bungei Shunjū* issues for the years 1944-1945.

If *Chūō Kōron* is Japan's oldest *sōgō zasshi*, then *Sekai* is the most famous one—and arguably also the most archetypical. As a postwar magazine, its commentary, themes, and authors perfectly encapsulated the mainstream intellectual discourse of the era. From 1946 until at least the 1960s, reading *Sekai* was considered a mark of a quintessential intellectual; its topics were essential knowledge for any educated person.[256] The first issue of *Sekai* was published in January 1946. However, it originated several months earlier, during the closing weeks of World War II.

At that time, when most members of Japan's political elite had already come to terms with their country's defeat and mainly focused on how to end the war without compromising the emperor's position and authority, some intellectuals started to discuss the shape of postwar Japan. One such group, calling itself Dōshinkai 同心会 (Like-Minded Association), held meetings in the private residence of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, the person who would later sign the Instrument of Surrender. Dōshinkai members, all of whom were opponents of Japan's wartime establishment, wanted to start a new opinion magazine which would promote the vision of a new "peaceful Japan." They agreed to take this idea to their longtime associate, Iwanami Shigeo.[257]

Already over sixty-five years old at the time, Iwanami was the founder and longtime president of Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, one of Japan's major publishing houses, renowned for its editions of Japanese and foreign classics as well as academic works. Established in 1913, the beginning of the Taishō period (1912-1926), the publishing company played a key role in fostering the pro-Western, liberal intellectual climate of that era. It even gave rise to what later became known as "Iwanami culture" (*Iwanami bunka* 岩波文化). Although the word "culture" is utilized here somewhat loosely, the term generally refers to Iwanami's strategy of publishing primarily highbrow literature, translating socially significant works from overseas, and deliberately promoting ideas and theories seen as innovative, or even provocative, when set against the values of contemporary Japanese society. Through its publications, Iwanami Shoten attempted to cultivate (*kyōyō* 教養) a broad humanistic awareness among its readers.[258]

[256] Takeuchi, *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, p. 117. Takeuchi shows that during the early postwar years *Sekai* was consistently the most favored magazine among students and faculty of the University of Tokyo, Japan's most elite academic institution.
[257] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "'Sekai' no sōkan."
[258] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, pp. 106-107.

President Iwanami, who was himself an intellectual, was well-acquainted with many of the era's leading writers and scholars.

In the context of prewar Japan, "Iwanami culture" is often contrasted with "Kōdansha culture" (*Kōdansha bunka* 講談社文化), an analogous term referring to the rival publishing house, Kōdansha 講談社. While the former was regarded as elitist (both in a positive and pejorative sense), the latter was far more flexible in its publishing policy, frequently releasing works that reflected dominant views and capitalizing on public sentiments. During World War II, as Iwanami increasingly struggled to survive amid mounting censorship and government-military pressure, Kōdansha flourished, readily embracing militarism and publishing prowar, anti-Western works that shaped the worldview of much of Japan's middle and lower classes.[259]

In August 1945, when the war was coming to an end, Iwanami busied himself and the Dōshinkai members with planning his company's return to prominence after Japan's inevitable surrender. Reflecting on the war, he felt that "Iwanami culture" had been too closed-off from ordinary people. In his view, this mistake had contributed to the triumph of prowar publishers like Kōdansha. He believed that once the war ended, his company should take the lead in the struggle for democratization and a lasting peace.[260] For these efforts to succeed a new medium was needed—one that would present pluralistic and diverse worldviews, both Japanese and Western, to a broader educated audience. This was how the idea of *Sekai* was born.[261]

Besides Shigemitsu Mamoru and his aide from the ministry, Kase Toshikazu, all members of Dōshinkai were intellectuals—the most influential among them being Abe Yoshishige.[262] Abe occupied a pivotal position in the intellectual discourse of the occupation era, belonging to the older generation of intellectuals and wielding considerable authority right after the war. Born in 1883 into a wealthy, upper-class family, Abe Yoshishige began his career after graduating from Tokyo Imperial University. During the Taishō period, he became known as a historian of Western philosophy specializing in Kantianism and German Neo-Idealism. He introduced the thought of Rudolf Eucken into Japan and even spent some years studying in

[259] Ibid., p. 107; Maruyama Masao, "The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism," trans. Andrew Fraser. In Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*, ed. Ivan Morris (Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 63. However, according to Maruyama, true intellectuals mostly remained outside of Kōdansha's influence, firmly belonging to the "Iwanami culture."
[260] Yoshino, "Sengo no sanjū-nen," pp. 254-255.
[261] Tokura, "'Sekai' ni okeru Shimizu Ikutarō no shakaigaku," p. 910.
[262] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "'Sekai' no sōkan." Other members of Dōshinkai included: Yamamoto Yūzō, Shiga Naoya, Watsuji Tetsurō, Tanaka Kōtarō, Tanikawa Tetsuzō, Abe Yoshishige.

Heidelberg, Germany. Alongside his work as a contributor to *Asahi Shimbun*, a major liberal newspaper, he taught at several institutions of higher learning. Although his career advanced smoothly in the 1930s, by the 1940s he had come under close surveillance by Kempeitai for his vocal opposition to militarism.[263]

Before and during the war, he was widely regarded as pro-American and pro-Korean—this second label arose from his appreciation for classical Korean culture and criticism of Japan's colonial policy. However, this is complicated by a fact that from 1926 to 1940 Abe was employed at the Keijō Imperial University and in some way himself participated in the Japanese cultural colonization of Korea.[264] While contemporary scholarship is divided on the evaluation of Abe's attitude toward Korea, during the wartime period his sympathies for the Koreans, as well as his pro-American stance deprived him of any possibility to become a significant public voice. Nevertheless, as a member of social elite, he remained well-connected with antiwar and pro-Western politicians and bureaucrats and was also a longtime friend of Iwanami.[265]

This last connection proved vital for the creation of *Sekai*, as it was Abe who linked Dōshinkai to Iwanami. As noted above, Iwanami had been contemplating the creation of a new magazine that would connect intellectuals with the broader public but was uncertain whether his company could manage such a task. However, in late September 1945, after the war had ended and the Allied occupation had begun, Abe encouraged Iwanami to proceed and even offered the assistance of Dōshinkai members.[266] By that time, the group no longer served as a bridge between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and intellectuals, having become a purely non-political circle of closely acquainted liberals and pacifists.

One member, Tanikawa Tetsuzō—a philosopher and pacifist who had enjoyed considerable prewar popularity—proposed naming the magazine *Sekai* 世界, meaning "world."[267] The name reflected a desire to strengthen Japan's cultural ties with the West in the aftermath of World War II. It was the same sentiment that later led Maruyama Masao to describe the occupation period as Japan's second *kaikoku*, or "opening of the country"—the first being

[263] "Abe Yoshishige." In *Nijū seiki Nihon jinmei jiten*. Cited after Kotobank: www.kotobank.jp/word/安倍能成-14381. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[264] Nam Kijeong, "Ilbon 'Jeonhu Jisigin'ui Joseon Gyeongheomgwa Asia Insik: Pyeonghwamunje Damhwahoereul Jungsimeuropp" [Japanese postwar intellectuals' experiences in Korea and its impacts on their attitudes toward Asia], *Korean Journal of International Relations* 50, 4 (2010), pp. 59-60.
[265] Yoshino, "Sengo no sanjū-nen," p. 255.
[266] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "'Sekai' no sōkan."
[267] Ibid.

the well-known opening from the 1860s which eventually brought upon the Meiji Restoration.[268] Just as that first opening ushered in modernization, the new opening was seen by many intellectuals as an opportunity for a renewed phase of social, economic, and political reform—a continuation of Japan's "unfinished" modernization. This concept appeared among both progressive liberal thinkers like Maruyama and more moderate prewar liberals like Watsuji Tetsurō. The latter elaborated on this idea in a well-known postwar essay, *Sakoku: Nihon no higeki* 鎖国：日本の悲劇 (*Sakoku: The Tragedy of Japan*), with *sakoku* 鎖国 meaning both "closed country" and the isolationist policy of the Edo period.[269]

This concept reverberated throughout the early postwar period in the writings of numerous liberal and progressive intellectuals. It rested on a firm belief in modernization theory—a framework of global development that posits all societies will eventually transform from "traditional" to "modern" forms, and that the post-Enlightenment liberal democratic values of the West represent universal principles that can be successfully transplanted anywhere in the world, regardless of geography or culture. Modernization theory, rooted in the Enlightenment idea of progress, reached the height of its influence after World War II, dominating social sciences until the late 1960s.[270]

While contemporary perspectives treat it only as a theory—true to its name—most postwar Japanese intellectuals regarded it as unquestionable truth. Specialization in social sciences was often equated with adherence to modernization theory, and the only serious alternative—after other ideological paths had been discredited due to Japan's defeat—was Marxism, which viewed modernization through the lens of class struggle and linear progress toward a communist society. Moreover, Marxism itself was regarded less as an ideology than as a scientific methodology.[271]

Yet the thinking behind the name *Sekai* and the notion of a second "opening of the country" was not grounded solely in faith in modernization. It also reflected the belief that Japan's modernization, which had begun in the early Meiji period, has subsequently stalled, leaving the nation's transformation into a fully modern, democratic state incomplete. The words "modern" and "democratic" are crucial here. Although, in historical context, modernity

[268] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 110.
[269] Robert N. Bellah, "Japan's Cultural Identity: Some Reflections on the Work of Watsuji Tetsurō," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 24, 4 (1965) pp. 590-591.
[270] Ronald Inglehart, Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65, 1 (2000), pp. 19-20.
[271] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, pp. 100-101.

obviously need not entail democracy—as the histories of many modern authoritarian states clearly demonstrate—many Japanese intellectuals believed otherwise. As J. Victor Koschmann has shown, they viewed democracy not merely as a political system but as a bottom-up revolution necessary for Japan to shed its remaining "semi-feudal" (*junhōken* 準封建) elements.[272] Rejecting prewar Japan as unmodern and semi-feudal was, in essence, a Marxist-Leninist interpretation formulated by the Comintern back in the 1920s and promoted by both Japanese communists and procommunist intellectuals of the prewar *Kōza-ha* 講座派 school of Marxism.[273] However, this view was also embraced by many liberals and progressives critical of Japan's modernization, who criticized what they perceived as its insufficient degree of democratic reform.[274]

The Japanese intellectuals' belief in a link between modernization and democratization was even stronger than that of their American peers. This was evident even several years after the occupation had ended. The international conference held in Hakone, Japan, in 1960 serves as a fitting example. Attended by many specialists in Japan's contemporary history, economy, and culture, the event revealed a significant difference of opinion. The American scholars argued that democracy emerges naturally once a society reaches a certain level of economic development, thus making that development the primary goal over any particular reforms. The Japanese participants were appalled by such statements. They reiterated that it was precisely this line of thinking that had led prewar Japan to evolve into an increasingly authoritarian, "fascist" state.[275] For the Japanese, modernization had to include democratization at its core from the onset; otherwise, the process would inevitably be deemed a failure. The American position was, in fact, correct in light of modernization theory, and the Japanese—who highly regarded such classics of the modernization school as Talcott Parsons—were aware of that.[276] Yet for them, their personal disillusionment with Japan's prewar history and wartime trauma clearly took precedence over any theoretical assumptions. This attitude was characteristic of many Japanese intellectuals since the end of the war.

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[272] Ibid., pp. 243-244.
[273] Nohara Shinji, "The Reception of Adam Smith in Japan: The Formation of the Idea of *Shimin Shakai*, or Civil Society, by Zenya Takashima before the End of World War II," *Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 44, 3 (2022), p. 372.
[274] Ibid.
[275] Maruyama Masao, "Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme." In *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization*, pp. 489-490; Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, pp. 110-111.
[276] Seki Hiroharu, "Heiwa no seijigaku" [Political study of peace], *Nenpō Seijigaku* 27 (1976), pp. 113-114.

Born out of precisely this line of thinking, *Sekai* translated these ideas into a form of magazine, quickly becoming a vehicle for all intellectuals supporting major progressive reforms and democratization.[277] The extent and swiftness of the magazine's success are all the more striking when compared the lukewarm reception it received upon its debut.[278]

Sekai was officially established in December 1945 by Iwanami Shoten, with its first issue appearing in January 1946. At the time, the *sōgō zasshi* market was dominated by strongly left-wing magazines founded immediately after the war: *Jinmin Hyōron* 人民評論 (*People's Critique*), *Minshu Hyōron* 民主評論 (*Democratic Critique*), *Sekai Hyōron* 世界評論 (*World Critique*), and *Zen'ei* 前衛 (*Vanguard*). The last one was directly linked with the revitalized Japan Communist Party. Alternative viewpoints were mostly limited to two older magazines: *Chūō Kōron* and *Kaizō*. The first was considered moderate and the latter—"bourgeoise left." The new monthly launched by Iwanami was immediately attacked by competitors as elitist and out of touch with the new era.[279] While *Sekai* was never a conservative magazine, it could certainly appear as such to some observers at the very beginning. In early occupation-era Japan, when virtually all new initiatives were either revolutionary or extremely progressive, *Sekai* deliberately avoided opening with the kind of controversial, iconoclastic statements that were so common at the time. It attempted to balance its progressivism with at least some degree of classical liberalism characteristic of the Taishō period.[280]

However, while the new left-wing magazines initially seemed to wield considerable influence, most of them proved short-lived. Among the newly established *sōgō zasshi*, it was *Sekai* that ultimately secured a strong and lasting position in the market, gaining a wide readership almost instantly. The main reasons for this success were likely Iwanami's high, long-standing prewar reputation, market oversaturation with socialist publications, and the lack of a genuinely liberal medium. *Sekai*'s rise was so swift and immense that by early 1946 it already ranked at the top of all *sōgō zasshi* in several opinion polls, securing first place in categories such as readership, reputation, and willingness to recommend to others. It even managed to place first or second in polls encompassing not only *sōgō zasshi* but monthly magazines in general.[281]

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[277] Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no chishikijin*, p. 10.
[278] Takeuchi, *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, p. 101.
[279] Oguma, "Minshu to aikoku," p. 197; Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chpater 4, "'Sekai' no sōkan."
[280] Yoshino, "Sengo no sanjū-nen," pp. 256-257.
[281] Takeuchi, *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, pp. 79-81.

Yet the impact of *Sekai* extended far beyond its large readership. The main reason it is widely considered the archetypical postwar *sōgō zasshi* is that, in the words of Takeuchi Yō, a leading scholar of postwar opinion magazines, it became the foremost medium of the community of remorse.[282] Such a role would have been impossible for any radical left journal. Japanese communists, having been persecuted during the war, were driven more by hate toward the political establishment rather than by remorse or guilt—of course unless they had converted to the state ideology during the war.[283] *Sekai* became a perfect outlet for those who regarded the course of Japan's development since the Meiji period a mistake and felt it imperative for intellectuals to engage actively in public life. Their initiative was simultaneously progressive (in its belief in modernization and democratization) and regressive (in its attempt to erase personal guilt and "atone" for wartime complicity). The Allied occupation created a perfect environment for such a project.

The process by which *Sekai*, a new magazine, secured a leading position in Japan's intellectual life was remarkably fast, yet it also involved a significant evolution of its profile. When Iwanami accepted Abe's proposal to create *Sekai*, he allowed Dōshinkai members to form the magazine's core writing staff. At the same time, however, he appointed as editor-in-chief a person representing a somewhat different worldview: Yoshino Genzaburō.[284]

A graduate of Tokyo Imperial University, Yoshino was a journalist and writer associated with socialism and the antiwar movement. Although politically to the left of Iwanami, he was not a radical and seems to have enjoyed Iwanami's considerable trust, having worked for him since the mid-1930s.[285] It was at this time that Yoshino published his famous book *How Do You Live?* (*Kimi-tachi wa dō ikiru ka* 君たちはどう生きるか), which reflected on ethics and individual liberty in the form of a coming-of-age novel.[286] The decision to appoint Yoshino as editor-in-chief can be attributed to several factors: he was already an experienced and accomplished journalist, he was still not old (forty-seven at the time), and, being significantly

[282] Ibid., p. 59.
[283] Conversion (*tenkō*) from communism to Pan-Asianism or Japanese statism was not a rare phenomenon. In such cases, converted communists would have sufficient reasons to join the community of remorse after the war. For a comprehensive analysis of tenkō in modern Japanese history see Tsurumi Shunsuke, *Tenkō kenkyū* ['Tenkō' studies] (Chikuma Sōsho, 1976).
[284] Yoshino, "Sengo no sanjū-nen," p. 255.
[285] "Yoshino Genzaburō." In *Nijū seiki Nihon jinmei jiten*. Cited after Kotobank: www.kotobank.jp/word/吉野源三郎-654224. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[286] Yoshino Genzaburō, *Kimitachi wa dō ikiru ka* [How do you live?] (Shinchōsha, 1937). Later postwar editions were released by Iwanami Shoten with a reprint of Maruyama Masao's 1981 analysis of the novel and its significance. For an interesting analysis see Maruyama Masao, "'Kimitachi wa dō ikiru ka' o meguru kaisō" [Reflections on "How do you live?"], *Sekai* 429 (October 1981), pp. 295-306.

more progressive than the Dōshinkai members, he was well-suited to lead a journal aiming to become a broad intellectual platform representing diverse viewpoints relevant to the new era, not only the "old school" prewar liberalism.

The first issue of *Sekai*, published in January 1946, opened with an editorial reflecting back on the war: both its outbreak and consequences.[287] It stated that "politics, which ought to serve morality and culture, instead made both its slaves," and pushed the blame on "ignorance, shortsightedness, insufficient education, lack of virtue, and human vice" among "military men, politicians, bureaucrats, and their followers." Yet all of this, it argued, would not have occurred had Japan's culture not been so "powerless," its morality so "empty," and its "cultural-intellectual class" (*bunkajin chishiki kaikyū* 文化人知識階級) so "indolent, cowardly, and irresponsible." This strong confession, which went beyond blaming militarists and wartime leaders, was followed by a clear objective: the building of a strong "culture state" (*bunka kokka* 文化国家). The strength of this state, the editorial declared, should be measured not by its politics but by its contribution to progress and welfare of all humanity; only when the world could feel grateful for Japan's existence would this mission be deemed a success.[288] The idea of a culture state became popular in public discourse immediately after the war, offering a model of modernization distinct from the "rich country, strong army" (*fukoku kyōhei* 富国強兵) ideal promoted since the 1880s.[289] The aspiration to make Japan a culture state was present in *Sekai* from the very outset, in the ideas of Abe and Iwanami.[290] True to the magazine's name, the editorial framed Japan's success as something measurable only from outside—by the "world."

This reckoning with the past was followed by a political argument listing the major objectives of the Allied occupation associated with democratization and considering them to be far more than mere imposition of the victor's will on the defeated. Instead, they were judged to be aligned with basic human nature and the "right path of heaven and earth" (*tenchi no kōdō* 天地の公道)—the very aims of the Meiji Restoration.[291] The authors deliberately employed the vocabulary from Emperor Meiji's "Five-Article Oath" ("Gokajō no go-seimon" 五箇条の御誓

[287] The editorial was written mostly by Tanaka Kōtarō with some assistance from Abe Yoshishige. See Takeuchi Yō, *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, p. 87.
[288] "Hakkan no ji" [Address for the first issue], *Sekai* 1 (I 1946), pp. 4-5.
[289] Harry D. Harootunian, "Between Politics and Culture: Authority and the Ambiguities of Intellectual Choice in Imperial Japan." In *Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taishō Democracy*, eds. Bernard S. Silberman, Harootunian (Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 122.
[290] Tokura, "'Sekai' ni okeru Shimizu Ikutarō no shakaigaku," p. 910.
[291] "Hakkan no ji," pp. 5-6.

文) of 1868, a foundational document outlining the principles of Meiji-era modernization.[292] If the goals of the Allied occupation were to be the same as those of Emperor Meiji, the argument went, then the occupation would represent a natural continuation of the Meiji Restoration, fully consistent with the emperor's will. In this way, liberal and progressive values associated with democratization were interpolated into the traditional discourse of the Imperial Way, thereby legitimizing the occupation in conservative eyes. Moreover, many intellectuals of the older generation, including Iwanami, held deep reverence for the "Five-Article Oath," making such references especially powerful.[293]

But the argument did not stop there. It went on to summarize all the occupation's objectives as amounting to a "qualitative advancement of the people" and a "healthy elevation of public opinion" leading to the "realization of social justice" in Japan.[294] This served to clarify that the previously described vision, consistent with the ideals of the Meiji Restoration, was also compatible with the notion of social democracy and not in any way "reactionary." In the intellectual discourse of early postwar Japan, this stance could be described as centrist: supportive of demilitarization, democratization and social reforms, but nevertheless still willing to respect political traditions of the prewar period.

The opening address was followed by individual opinion pieces elaborating on these themes. Abe expanded upon the concept of morality, linking it with democracy as the "morality of the people" (*kokumin dōtoku* 国民道徳). Using primarily philosophical language yet keeping his discussion closely tied to Japan's present circumstances, he argued that people's morality and individual self-realization were opposed to nationalism and should serve as the foundation for the new Japan.[295] Without denying the necessity of political consciousness (*kokkashin* 国家心), which he believed to already be strong among the Japanese, he called for something even more important: social consciousness (*shakaishin* 社会心).[296] For Abe, the greatest threat to the eventual awakening of such a consciousness laid in people silently accepting the realities of occupation and obediently following everything imposed from above. This behavior, he feared, would only feed the natural "slavish disposition" (*doreiteki konjō* 奴隷的根性) inherent in

[292] "Gokajō no go-seimon," 14 March 1868, 勅-00001100-00300, Gyōsei Bunsho [Administrative Records], Kokuritsu Kōbun Shokan, Tokyo, Japan [hereafter: NAJ], www.digital.archives.go.jp/item/4123189. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[293] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, pp. 109-110.
[294] "Hakkan no ji," p. 6.
[295] Abe Yoshishige, "Gōki to shinjitsu to chie to wo" [Calling for fortitude, truth, and wisdom], *Sekai* 1 (January 1946), pp. 7-13.
[296] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

human beings—a tendency recently exploited in Japan by the military-bureaucratic elite—and thus impede the growth of democracy.[297]

This relatively lofty commentary was balanced by other contributions from intellectuals of considerable reputation. Among them were Mushanokōji Saneatsu, a celebrated novelist associated with naturalism and Tolstoyan humanism, and Ōuchi Hyōe, one of Japan's foremost economists, affiliated with the prewar *Rōnō-ha* 労農派 (non-communist) school of Marxism and imprisoned during the war.[298] While Ōuchi focused on Japan's contemporary economic situation, particularly the problem of inflation, Mushanokōji addressed themes similar to Abe's, though in a more down-to-earth manner.[299] Arguing that the Japanese people are generally "gentle" (*otonashii* 温和しい) and easily come to like those who bear them no ill will, he cited the example of the Americans who, since the start of the occupation, had shown considerable goodwill toward Japan. For this reason, most anti-American sentiments had quickly disappeared. Japan, he concluded, should remain peaceful so long as no "ideologues" again seek to incite the people against other nations.[300]

Together, these voices—along with the opening editorial—expressed cautious optimism about Japan's near future and a firm commitment to supporting democratization.

Bringing together diverse ideas into a unified vision of progress made *Sekai* exceptional among the postwar *sōgō zasshi*. The magazine also stood out for the amount of space it devoted to world affairs. Beyond articles and opinion pieces that already contained an internationalized perspective, every issue of *Sekai* from the second onward included a large section titled "Sekai no shio" 世界の潮 ("Tides of the world") dedicated exclusively to foreign affairs, mostly focusing on Europe and North America. Although the section's length varied, it was rarely shorter than ten pages, averaging about fifteen in 1946-1947. In the early 1950s, it rose to around twenty, and in some cases—such as the January 1952 issue—it reached thirty-nine pages. While a section on world affairs was not something entirely new (prewar issues of *Kaizō*, for example, had featured such section), it was notable that immediately after the war neither *Chūō*

[297] Ibid., p. 18.
[298] "Mushanokōji Saneatsu." In *Nijū seiki Nihon jinmei jiten*; "Ōuchi Hyōe." In ibid. Both cited after Kotobank: www.kotobank.jp/word/武者小路実篤-17002, www.kotobank.jp/word/大内兵衛-39026. Both accessed 21 September 2026.
[299] Ōuchi Hyōe, "Chokumen-suru infurēshon" [Confronting the inflation], *Sekai* 1 (January 1946), pp. 32-47; Mushanokōji Saneatsu, "Haisen to jibun no nozomu sekai" [The lost war and the world I desire], *Sekai* 1 (January 1946), pp. 102-107.
[300] Ibid., pp. 103-104.

Kōron nor any other major magazine included anything similar. The economic situation was difficult, paper was scarce, and both new and revived magazines struggled to survive. Dedicating a substantial portion of each issue to foreign affairs from the very beginning demonstrated the clear intention of *Sekai* to strengthen Japan's connection with the outside world.

2.3. Shared vision of Japan

As demonstrated above, *Sekai* was formed mainly by intellectuals of the older generation who had already established their reputations before the war—most of them liberals—under a progressive editor-in-chief, Yoshino Genzaburō. Tasked by Iwanami Shigeo with making *Sekai* a magazine representing the Japanese intellectual community as a whole, Yoshino involved people of diverse worldviews, turning *Sekai* into a pluralistic medium of opinion. That is why, even in its very first issue, a Marxist like Ōuchi Hyōe contributed an article alongside a liberal such as Abe Yoshishige. This was neither a one-time occurrence nor was Ōuchi the only Marxist who lent his pen to *Sekai* during its first years of publication. Others included economist Uno Kōzō, known for developing a Japanese interpretation of Marx's theory of value, or legal scholar Yokota Kisaburō, an expert on international law and one of the few Japanese lawyers to participate in the Tokyo Trials. Their pieces in *Sekai* were not short op-eds but feature articles of the issues that received their contributions.[301]

Sekai stood out in this regard as the most prominent example of inviting intellectuals from widely differing backgrounds, exemplifying a new style of *sōgō zasshi*. Some other magazines, however, followed a similar path, evidently taking *Sekai* as a model—especially the long-established *Chūō Kōron* and the newly founded *Tenbō* (*Outlook*). Despite its traditionally moderate stance, the former featured, for instance, Hani Gorō, a legendary figure of the Japanese left who represented a strand of Japan's Marxist scholarship strongly influenced by Leninism and more or less communist in character.[302] *Tenbō*, on the other hand, was a new magazine established around the same time as *Sekai* by literary critics Usui Yoshimi and Karaki Junzō, and published by their relatively young (and still small at the time) company Chikuma

[301] For example: Uno Kōzō, Shihonshugi no soshikika to minshushugi [Democracy and the organization of capitalism], *Sekai* 5 (May 1946), pp. 16-28 or Yokota Kisaburō, Sekai kokka-ron [Theory of the world state], *Sekai* 9 (September 1946), pp. 17-29.
[302] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, pp. 55-56.

Shobō 筑摩書房.[303] *Tenbō* entered the market strongly by releasing a posthumous work by Miki Kiyoshi along with an article by Karaki analyzing his life.[304] Miki, who died in prison only a few days after the war had ended (before the release of political prisoners in October 1945), was a leading socialist thinker at the time.[305] Like *Sekai* and *Chūō Kōron*, *Tenbō* published contributions from Marxists, progressives, and liberals while continuing to build upon Miki's intellectual legacy.

Despite the obvious ideological and generational differences between the many contributors to the magazines of the late 1946, their expressed opinions fit together surprisingly well. They reveal a shared vision of what Japan ought to become, as well as a common sense of mission. I believe these two aspects—vision and mission—to be the core of Japan's postwar intellectual community. Undoubtedly, the period from the fall of 1945 until early 1947 was when that community emerged and reached its peak. The three *sōgō zasshi*—foremost among them *Sekai*, together with the older *Chūō Kōron* and the smaller *Tenbō*—constituted not only the focal point of the mainline intellectual discourse, but also the platform for the shared vision of Japan held by the intellectual community. The big readership of these magazines during the first year and a half of the occupation shows that this vision resonated strongly with the educated and urban segments of Japanese society.[306]

The intellectuals' shared vision of Japan centered on two main objectives and several issues surrounding them: the democratization and demilitarization of the country. Both were broad and general goals, interpreted with varying nuances. More left-leaning intellectuals expected far-reaching reforms, whereas the older generation of prewar liberals, such as the Dōshinkai members, favored a more moderate approach. Still, both groups sought democratization. Demilitarization, on the other hand, was a simpler and more uniform goal—understood as eliminating Japan's militarism and supporting the war-renouncing Article 9 of the new constitution, which explicitly forbade possession of military forces. Although this

[303] Origins of *Tenbō* are still under-researched. Some details can be found in the early sections of the book *Sen kyūhyaku nanajū-nen tenkanki ni okeru "Tenbō" wo yomu: Shisō ga genjitsu datta koro* [Reading *Tenbō* during the transformative time of 1970: When ideas were reality], eds. Ōsawa Masachi et al. (Chikuma Shobō, 2010).
[304] Miki Kiyoshi, "Shinran," *Tenbō* 1 (January 1946), pp. 28-55; Karaki Junzō, "Miki Kiyoshi to iu hito" [A person called Miki Kioshi], *Tenbō* 2 (February 1946), pp. 66-79.
[305] Najita Tetsuo, Harry D. Harootunian, "Japan's Revolt against the West." In *Modern Japanese Thought*, ed. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 232-238.
[306] Takeuchi, *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, pp. 79-81.

collective vision of Japan lacked a distinct name, a popular contemporary term used to describe it was the "culture state," introduced already in the opening article of *Sekai*'s first issue.

The idea of a culture state was not new; the term itself was a translation of the German *Kulturstaat*—a nineteenth-century concept of a state devoted to the cultivation of national culture. In postwar Germany, which was also under Allied occupation (albeit in a different manner), *Kulturstaat* was revived as an alternative to both the totalitarian Nazi police state and the militaristic traditions of Prussia. German culture had long been an important source of inspiration for the Japanese since the Meiji period.[307] For this reason, many Japanese intellectuals were well-versed in German history and philosophy, which had held a dominant position in pre-1945 Japan.[308] The concept of *Kulturstaat* was thus familiar to them, allowing them to draw on it directly rather than only through the parallels between the Japanese and German occupations.[309]

The notion that Japan should become a culture state was discussed at length in *Chūō Kōron*, in an article written by a left-wing economist, Morito Tatsuo, in April 1946. Morito was a well-known figure in Japan. He became the center of attention during the so-called "Morito incident" (*Morito jiken* 森戸事件) of 1920, when he was dismissed from his post at Tokyo Imperial University for discussing the ideas of Peter Kropotkin, a Russian anarchist, in an academic journal.[310] After the war, Morito quickly became a prominent public figure, also politically, as a member of the newly formed Japan Socialist Party, even serving as Minister of Education in 1947-1948 in Katayama Tetsu's Socialist cabinet.

In his article for *Chūō Kōron*, Morito expressed surprise at the strong consensus—both among intellectuals and within society at large—that Japan should become a culture state, despite the term not appearing in the Potsdam Declaration or any of SCAP's directives. Investigating the reasons behind the idea's popularity, he concluded that culture was the only sphere in which even an utterly defeated, unsovereign nation like Japan could still develop and hope to excel.[311] While supporting the idea of culture state himself, he noted that, for at least

[307] Passin, "Modernization and the Japanese Intellectual," p. 476.
[308] Matsuno, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai,' p. 70.
[309] On the development of the "culture state" idea in Japan see Nakamura Miho, "Sengo Nihon no 'bunka kokka' gainen no tokuchō: Rekishiteki tenkai wo fumaete" [Characteristics and historical development of the idea of "culture state" in postwar Japan], *Bunka Seisaku Kenkyū* 7 (2013), pp. 135-156.
[310] Marshall, *Academic Freedom*, pp. 124-132.
[311] Morito Tatsuo, "Bunka kokka ron" [About the culture state], *Chūō Kōron* 61, 4 (April 1946), p. 7.

some who had readily embraced it in this "revolutionary period," it might have been out of opportunism, since such a concept could serve as a "fine attire" for any kind of state—socialist, aristocratic, or even militaristic—without altering its fundamental nature. In this way, advocating for making Japan a culture state could be seen as a means of diverting attention from the most progressive aspects of democratization.[312]

Defining the culture state as "a state that makes culture its highest principle," Morito emphasized that it was vital to support the establishment of not merely any culture state, but rather a culture state in which the people actively participate in culture.[313] Building such a state should proceed simultaneously with the democratization of culture, essentially amounting to the creation of an entirely new form of culture.[314] The process, he argued, would have to take the form of a "cultural revolution" (*bunka kakumei* 文化革命).[315] The construction of a democratic culture state should also go hand in hand with Japan's transformation into a socialist economy and its complete and permanent demilitarization.[316] Finally, education was deemed crucial, as it was needed to create the "subjective conditions" necessary for building a culture state in Japan.[317]

Morito's argument reveals at least two key facts. First, he noted that by the spring of 1946, the idea of building a culture state in Japan had already been widespread—so much so that it had been embraced even by those partially resistant to the occupation-mandated democratization. Second, the concept was to some extent ambiguous. Even though it clearly pointed toward demilitarization and the renunciation of power politics, it did not necessarily imply a democratic revolution. If it did, Morito would not have felt the need to stress it so strongly in his article. However, the "opportunists" who insincerely embraced the idea of a culture state—those mentioned by Morito—seem to have been the ruling politics and bureaucrats rather than his fellow intellectuals. As discussed above, democratization was a common goal among intellectuals, and although Morito's call for a "revolution" clearly carried Marxist connotations, the term itself was widely accepted among early postwar Japanese

[312] Ibid., p. 8.
[313] In Japanese, the phrase was: "文化を最高の原理とする国家" (*bunka o saikō no genri to suru kokka*).
[314] Morito, "Bunka kokka ron," pp. 9-11.
[315] Ibid., p. 14.
[316] Ibid., pp. 13-14.
[317] Ibid., p. 16.

intellectuals (even those who were neither communists nor socialists) as synonymous with "democracy."[318]

If any of the occupation-era reforms could be described as revolutionary, it was undoubtedly the adoption of the new constitution, which significantly altered Japan's polity and the role of the monarch. As noted by a law professor and *Sekai* contributor, Tanaka Jirō, the possibility of genuine progressive change in Japan depended on the shape of the new constitution.[319] This was common knowledge, and the issue of constitutional revision, as a central topic in public debate, also figured prominently in press discussions, including opinion monthlies, throughout all stages of its year-long development.

The topic of a new constitution emerged immediately after the surrender, when General MacArthur encouraged the Japanese people to draft a new one themselves, suitably for a democratic Japan.[320] This statement triggered a flurry of proposals, ranging from loose ideas circulated in the press to spontaneously formed extra-governmental committees that produced their own drafts. Many were linked to newly emerging political parties. One of the best-known examples was the so-called Constitutional Research Association (Kenpō Kenkyūkai 憲法研究会), which brought together several progressive and left-wing intellectuals.[321] There was also the Konoe Commission, composed of prewar bureaucrats and politicians and seemingly supported by MacArthur himself, at least in the beginning. Despite ambitions to go very far in proposed constitutional changes, it never completed the task due to the suicide of its head, former Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, who took his life in anticipation of indictment in the Tokyo Trials.[322]

However, MacArthur's remarks were little more than a slogan meant to rally public enthusiasm, since the Japanese government remained in place, and the only legal means of changing its structure was through the amendment process established by the still-valid Meiji Constitution of 1889. According to its provisions, constitutional amendments could only be

[318] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 113.
[319] Tanaka Jirō, "Nihon kenpō no minshuka: Seifu no kenpō kaisei hōan wo chūshin to shite" [Democratization of the Constitution of Japan: About the government's proposal for constitutional amendment], *Sekai* 5 (May 1946), p. 31.
[320] Yoshida Shigeru, *Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man*, ed. Nara Hiroshi, trans. Yoshida Ken'ichi, Nara Hiroshi (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), p. 107.
[321] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 356.
[322] Oka Yoshitake, *Konoe Fumimaro: A Political Biography*, trans. Okamoto Shumpei, Patricia Murray (University of Tokyo Press, 1983), pp. 183-195.

proposed by the Emperor himself. Only then would they proceed to be voted on by both houses of the National Diet: the House of Representatives and the House of Peers.[323] Since Emperor Shōwa was willing to cooperate, the task of drafting a new constitution was entrusted to the government.[324] While the topic was discussed energetically (and at times erratically) as early as fall 1945, the formal drafting process took place in early 1946, culminating in the final document.[325]

The government assigned the drafting work to a commission headed by Matsumoto Jōji, an esteemed legal scholar known for a liberal interpretation of the Meiji Constitution before the war. The commission, made up of academics and officials, completed its draft in February 1946 and presented it to General MacArthur. However, the Supreme Commander was dissatisfied, as Matsumoto's proposal merely amended parts of the prewar constitution to secure a liberal reading, instead of rewriting it entirely.[326] Frustrated with the results, MacArthur ordered the Government Section of GHQ to produce its own draft—which it did, under the supervision of General Whitney. He entrusted this task to Colonel Kades and his team which consisted of several American intellectuals, most notably Milo Rowell, a lawyer and U.S. Army officer, and Beate Sirota Gordon, a translator for GHQ and women's rights advocate.[327]

The American team worked very quickly and submitted the finished draft to the Japanese government in the same month.[328] The American draft was written by Whitney. Both Matsumoto and Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō were reluctant to accept MacArthur's version since, in their view, it stripped too much power from the Emperor. Yet, American pressure coupled with Emperor Shōwa's personal willingness to accept the change, ensured that the GHQ draft prevailed.[329] After minor revisions negotiated by the government, the final version was given to the emperor who then officially submitted it to the National Diet in June. Much controversy and deliberation followed, with both chambers introducing further amendments before ultimately approving the document. On 3 November 1946, the Emperor gave his assent,

[323] Taki'i Kazuhiro, *The Meiji Constitution: The Japanese Experience of the West and the Shaping of the Modern State*, trans. David Noble (International House of Japan, 2007), p. 160.
[324] Jakub Polit, *Smutny kontynent: Z dziejów Azji Wschodniej w XX wieku* [A sad continent: East Asia during the twentieth century] (Wydawnictwo Arcana, 2004), pp. 191-192.
[325] For the detailed timeframe see the following paragraphs.
[326] Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History* (Alfred A. Knopf Publisher, 1956), pp. 247-249.
[327] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 359, 364-369.
[328] Ibid., pp. 372-373.
[329] Yoshida, *Yoshida Shigeru*, p. 101.

thus making it law. The new constitution of Japan came into effect exactly half a year later, on 3 May 1947.[330]

The topic of new constitution was initially a matter of public debate, with various proposals finding their way to the press. These proposals notwithstanding, the government of Japan simultaneously worked on its own project of constitutional revision. However, when the draft produced by the governmental commission failed to satisfy MacArthur, the Americans took the initiative and proceeded with their own project. From that point onward, the entire constitutional process was carried out either behind closed doors or within the National Diet, involving only professional politicians and bureaucrats. Even though parliamentary discussions were public, the most important aspects of the new constitution were decided before the project reached the Diet. Nevertheless, intellectuals actively participated in the broader public debate through the magazines: both at the beginning and later, when the only discussed proposal was the American one.

Their perspectives were not always those of detached observers, as some were directly involved in political democratization and reforms. Morito, who served as Minister of Education for a year, was not the only example. Ōuchi Hyōe, a progressive economist and frequent *Sekai* contributor, participated in government economic planning in 1945-1946 and enjoyed the respect of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru despite their ideological differences.[331] Both Morito and Ōuchi also took part in the aforementioned Constitutional Research Association, which produced its own constitutional draft back in 1945.[332] Another intellectual closely connected to the government was Tanaka Jirō, a law professor at Tokyo Imperial University, who contributed to the decentralization of Japan's executive branch, particularly at the local level.[333] In April 1946, after MacArthur's draft had already been accepted by the government and made public but before its submission to the Diet, Tanaka wrote an article for *Sekai* in which he analyzed the proposal.[334]

[330] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 391-392, 399-401; Fukui, "Postwar politics," p. 156.
[331] Laura Hein, *Reasonable Men, Powerful Words: Political Culture and Expertise in Twentieth Century Japan* (University of California Press, 2004), p. 100.
[332] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 356.
[333] "Tanaka Jirō." In *Nijū seiki Nihon jinmei jiten*. Cited after Kotobank: www.kotobank.jp/word/田中二郎-1089968. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[334] Tanaka, "Nihon kenpō no minshuka."

The extent of Tanaka's own knowledge at the time remains unclear. Whether due to limited access to information or, more likely, censorship, he treated the MacArthur draft as a governmental project simply supported by the Supreme Commander and consistent with his intentions. Offering considerable praise, Tanaka argued that the proposal was much more democratic and progressive than most observers had expected.[335] He lamented, however, that once again it was a project imposed from above—just as the Meiji Constitution had been. For this reason, he believed it necessary to "democratize" the process itself rather than merely the contents. For Tanaka, whether the constitution would turn out more progressive or more conservative was secondary to how "close" it would feel to the people of Japan. He therefore insisted that the House of Representatives should debate the contents extensively, making revisions as needed. Only then, he argued, could the people of Japan—following these deliberations in the press—foster a connection to the constitution and accept it as their own.[336]

This extensive commitment on part of Tanaka and other Japanese intellectuals to make citizens of Japan connect to the new constitution on a personal level might be initially surprising. It starts to make sense, however, once the document's contents are taken into account. Analyzing the text of its preamble, which is very idealistic in character, Olga Barbasiewicz identifies it as expressing a specific type of "mission" to contribute to building world peace and eradicating all social evils. This mission is supposed to be undertaken by the entire Japanese nation and based on their collective wartime experience.[337] Even if they did not write the document themselves, Japanese intellectuals of the community of remorse could have easily related their own sense of mission to the one expressed in the new constitution.

Analyzing the American draft, Tanaka commended its fundamental principles: human rights, pacifism, and popular sovereignty. He observed that the proposal was modeled after the constitutional systems of the United States and Great Britain. In his view, the new constitution abolished the "emperor system" (*tennōsei* 天皇制; a Marxist term for Japan's absolute monarchy), but did so indirectly, through provisions that strengthened democratic institutions vis-à-vis the Emperor while redefining him as a symbol of the people rather than a ruler.[338] When examining major *sōgō zasshi* like *Sekai*, *Chūō Kōron* or *Tenbō*, Tanaka's stance—cautiously optimistic about the reforms while concerned about ensuring that democratization

[335] Ibid., p. 30.
[336] Ibid., p. 32.
[337] Barbasiewicz, *Pomniki i miejsca pamięci w relacjach międzynarodowych*, pp. 58-59.
[338] Tanaka, "Nihon kenpō no minshuka," pp. 32-36.

takes root in Japanese society—appears to have been representative of most Japanese intellectuals between the late 1945 and early 1947.

The symbolic role of the emperor (*shōchō tennō* 象徴天皇), in particular, garnered attention from intellectuals. During the interwar period, Yanagita Kunio, the father of Japanese folklore studies, was an influential voice in the discussions around this topic, particularly as he conceptualized the emperor as a spiritual symbol of Japan. Although he remained cautious on the topic, Yanagita took care not to imply any association between the emperor and political power.[339] While anti-monarchism was never a strong political or intellectual current in Japan—either before or after the war—many opposed the monarchy's modern manifestation. The so-called emperor system rested on the Meiji Constitution, which had been modeled on the 1871 Constitution of the German Empire, in which the Emperor held considerable power.[340] Simultaneously, Meiji Constitution vested him with a special, suprapolitical authority derived from Japanese tradition and Shintō mythology, repurposed to fit the political needs of state- and nation-building.[341] Many arguments against the emperor system stemmed from Marxist critiques of Japan's modernization (or, in some interpretations, its lack thereof) and of the supposedly semi-feudal socioeconomic relations that persisted.[342] However, in May 1946, Maruyama Masao published in *Sekai* what was arguably his most famous essay, "Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism" ("Chōkokkashugi no ronri to shinri" 超国家主義の論理と心理), which offered a new way to analyze the monarchy's role in the recent war.[343]

As already mentioned, Maruyama Masao was a political scientist specializing in the history of Japanese political thought, but he was also deeply familiar with German intellectual tradition. Often regarded as an archetype of the postwar Japanese intellectual, Maruyama embodied what Takeuchi Yō described as a "legitimate line" (*seikei* 正系) of this archetype: born into a well-off upper-middle class family, raised in the Yamanote part of Tokyo, educated at the Tokyo First Middle School and Tokyo First High School, then entering the Law

[339] Kawada Minoru, *The Origin of Ethnography: Yanagita Kunio and His Times*, trans. Toshiko Kishida-Ellis (Kegan Paul International, 1993), pp. 98-100.
[340] Taki'i, *The Meiji Constitution*, pp. XI-XII, 41-43.
[341] Ben-Ami Shillony, *Enigma of the Emperors: Sacred Subservience in Japanese History* (Global Oriental, 2005), pp. 161-165.
[342] Nohara, "The Reception of Adam Smith in Japan," pp. 379-380.
[343] Maruyama Masao, "Chōkokkashugi no ronri to shinri" [Logic and psychology of ultranationalism], *Sekai* 5 (May 1946), pp. 2-15. This is a reference to the original Japanese article. From here on, I will be citing the English edition: Maruyama, "Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism," trans. Ivan Morris. In Maruyama, *Thought and Behaviour*, pp. 1-24.

Department of Tokyo Imperial University and ultimately finding employment there.[344] At the same time, being born in 1914, he belonged to a younger generation than Abe Yoshishige, Ōuchi Hyōe, Morito Tatsuo, or even Yoshino Genzaburō.

Because of this age difference, his wartime experience differed substantially from that of his older colleagues. Around the time the war with China began, he became an assistant professor at the university. His relatively junior position spared him the moral dilemma of whether to openly oppose the Japanese state, since his status and reputation at the time were still not particularly high. Yet his youth also brought a different kind of trial when, in 1944, he was drafted into the Imperial Japanese Army to serve in military intelligence. In the summer of 1945, his unit was stationed in the Hiroshima area and narrowly avoided annihilation by the atomic bomb.[345] After Japan's surrender, Maruyama returned to academia, soon gaining wider recognition as a public intellectual. He became most closely associated with *Sekai*, though he also contributed occasionally to other magazines such as *Tenbō* and *Hyōron* 評論 (*Critique*).

"The Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism" was one of a series of essays in which Maruyama sought to answer several major questions concerning the motivations behind the actions of Japanese leaders, soldiers, and citizens during World War II. He frequently employed comparisons between Japanese and European history, with the Emperor's position serving as one such case. Demonstrating how Western history was marked by a separation of political and religious authority (even if one sometimes influenced or dominated the other), Maruyama contrasted this with the Japanese case, in which the Emperor—traditionally possessing religious authority—was also granted supreme political sovereignty under the Meiji Constitution. In this way, the Emperor became the axis mundi, the center of Japan's political, social, religious, and cultural world.[346]

In prewar and wartime Japan, the only objective criterion of morality was one's proximity to the Emperor. Consequently, the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy—free from civilian oversight and answering directly to the Emperor—were by definition more "righteous" and "moral" than any non-military politician or bureaucrat (with the exception of a few court officials close to the Emperor). Maruyama used this theory to explain certain aspects of Japanese social psychology: the tendency of soldiers to commit atrocities (which were "made

[344] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 1, "Seikei gakureki kidō."
[345] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, pp. 8-9.
[346] Maruyama, "Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism," pp. 8-10.

moral" by their position regardless of the acts' any inherent ethical value) and the behavior of leaders who, once cut from their proximity to the Emperor, became powerless and devoid of ideology or conviction, as shown by their confessions during the Tokyo Trials. This condition, Maruyama argued, was a consequence of Japan's emperor system, which rested on the monarch's dual authority. This was also one of the key elements which, according to Maruyama, prevented democratic modernization.[347]

It was precisely this type of dual political-religious authority that the symbol emperor theory of the new constitution sought to counter. Tsunetō Kyō, a scholar of international relations and a pacifist who had resigned from Kyoto Imperial University in 1933 to protest Japan's aggression in China, undertook perhaps the most extensive analysis of the symbol emperor theory in the early postwar years. His work, consisting of both an explanation of its individual aspects and an exploration of its historical origins, appeared as a series of articles published in *Sekai* from October to December 1946.[348]

Tsunetō's central argument was that, although Japan's hereditary monarchy remained intact institutionally, from the perspective of "various powers" (*shokennō* 諸権能) previously vested in the emperor, the new constitution was unprecedented in Japanese history—nothing short of a revolution.[349] He did not consider the Meiji Constitution entirely useless or evil, but rather deeply flawed. Viewing the new constitution as a correction of these flaws, he concluded that it was sufficient to guide Japan in the "right" direction. At the same time, he noted that the new monarchy no longer possessed any "mysterious authority" (*shinpiteki ken'i* 神秘的権威) described by Maruyama and that, apart from his symbolic function, the Emperor was now the same as any citizen—a fitting change for the new Japanese state.[350]

Examining these constitutional debates as they unfolded in the monthly magazines inevitably raises the question of their purpose. Were these analyses intended to influence the political process surrounding the new constitution? Such a conclusion seems unlikely, given that non-politicians were excluded from the main drafting process, which occurred behind the closed doors of GHQ and the Japanese government. Most people could only follow later

[347] Ibid., pp. 11-19.
[348] Tsunetō Kyō, "Tennō no shōchōteki chi'i ni tsuite" [On the symbolic position of the emperor] (I), *Sekai* 10 (October 1946), pp. 2-16; Tsunetō, "Tennō no shōchōteki ch'i ni tsuite" (II)," *Sekai* 11 (November 1946), pp. 39-54; Tsunetō, "Tennō no shōchōteki chi'i ni tsuite" (III)," *Sekai* 12 (December 1946), pp. 44-56.
[349] Tsunetō, "Tennō no shōchōteki ch'i" (I), pp. 2-3.
[350] Tsunetō, "Tennō no shōchōteki ch'i" (III)," pp. 55-56.

deliberations in the Diet when the essential content of the new constitution had already been determined and only secondary aspects remained under discussion. Moreover, as already shown, some of the authors of these analyses were themselves politically involved—as advisors or even cabinet members.

While the possibility of influencing parts of the political process (for instance, within the Diet) cannot be dismissed entirely, it is reasonable to assume that the primary motivation behind these essays was different. Rather than addressing politicians, they were directed chiefly toward the public. As Tanaka Jirō had previously emphasized, the real concern was not how the constitution would ultimately turn out (since its key elements were satisfactory to most liberals and progressives), but whether the Japanese people would embrace it and regard it as their own—differently to the prewar constitution which had treated the people as subjects rather than participants in a political process.[351] This explains why Tsunetō Kyō's comprehensive analysis of the emperor symbol theory appeared not during the drafting process nor the Diet debates, but immediately after the constitution was adopted. Its goal was not to influence the political process, but to enlighten the public about the constitution's meaning and ensure it was interpreted "correctly"—that is, in line with the author's own convictions. Popular identification with the constitution was deemed more important than real political influence of the people. Quite possibly, however, this resulted not from an unwillingness to grant such power to the public but as the only possibility in the realities of occupied Japan. The government of Japan was powerless to oppose the American project of constitution. Even more powerless were the intellectuals. But since the general principles of the new constitution—espousing liberal democracy, pacifism, women rights, and protections of labor—were to their liking, they embraced the role of "public educators" without any visible reluctance.

After the constitution had passed the Diet and was promulgated by the Emperor in November 1946, Rōyama Masamichi, a deputy editor-in-chief of *Chūō Kōron*, expressed this objective even more explicitly. He argued that the main question concerning the new constitution was how the parliament—now vested with supreme political power—would function in the future, given the Japanese people's lack of experience with a parliamentary system.[352] What followed was a detailed explanation of the parliamentary system as it would

[351] Tanaka, "Nihon kenpō no minshuka," p. 40.
[352] Rōyama Masamichi, "Shin-kenpō to gikai seido" [Parliamentary system and the new constitution], *Chūō Kōron* 61, 11 (November 1946), pp. 16-17.

operate under the new constitution. Once again, what stands out is the author's desire to educate the public about its civic responsibilities, speaking from the moral high ground of an intellectual who feels duty-bound to guide society.

But there were also responsibilities which encompassed society as a whole, without differing between intellectuals and the people. Yanaihara Tadao, one of the most prolific early postwar writers and a frequent contributor to all major *sōgō zasshi*, argued that, as a nation, Japan was called upon to awaken to its "world-historical mission" (*sekaishiteki shimei* 世界史的使命).[353] A Christian pacifist of the Uchimura Kanzō tradition, Yanaihara was a highly original and eclectic thinker who often adopted positions that could be considered left-wing while promoting a distinct kind of Japanese messianism grounded in peace. The concept of "world-historical mission" clearly echoed prewar and wartime notions of Japanese exceptionalism as well as the teleological view of history characteristic of Hegelianism, Marxism, and Christianity. Yet for Yanaihara, this mission consisted of demonstrating to the world the possibility of a fully demilitarized nation devoted to peace in all domestic and international relations. He regarded this as even more crucial than political democratization.[354]

Although Yanaihara was not Marxist and drew from both Christian and Shintō symbolism, he also used the Marxist term "emperor system" to describe Japan's political institutions and advocated for their reform.[355] His essay in *Sekai* from August 1946 shows that, despite his unique vocabulary and religious overtones, his vision of Japan was essentially aligned with the broader progressive vision of the postwar intellectual community, featured in other articles. Yanaihara was also one of those intellectuals who made regular contributions to multiple different magazines, exemplifying the broad character of the community of remorse.[356]

Intellectuals of early postwar Japan differed markedly from each other and could be variously described as Marxist, progressive, liberal, or by other names. Yet these labels were often fluid, and their ambiguity itself testifies to the strong sense of community shared by most Japanese intellectuals. Nowhere is the internal pluralism of this group more visible than in the case of the Institute of the Twentieth Century (Nijū Seiki Kenkyūjo 二十世紀研究所). Founded in February 1946 by Shimizu Ikutarō, it brought together a number of well-known scholars

[353] Yanaihara Tadao, "Nihon kokumin no shimei to hansei," *Sekai* 8 (August 1946), pp. 25-26.
[354] Ibid., pp. 31-32.
[355] Ibid., p. 27.
[356] For example: Ibid., pp. 25-32; Yanaihara Tadao, "Heiwa kokka e no michi" [The road to a peaceful state], *Tenbō* 8 (August 1946), pp. 33-46; Yanaihara Tadao, "Uchimura Kanzō," *Chūō Kōron* 61, 6 (June 1946), pp. 62-69.

from diverse fields of the humanities and social sciences.[357] Looking from today's perspective, the breadth of ideological and political perspectives represented (varying from classical liberalism to Marxism) was matched by the prominence of its members. Shimizu gathered several of his peers of similar age, like Kuno Osamu, Miyagi Otoya, or Takashima Zen'ya, as well as a number of intellectuals from the younger generation, such as Maruyama, his long-time friend Hayashi Kentarō, Tsuru Shigeto, and Fukuda Tsuneari.[358]

The Institute devoted itself to supporting and integrating young Japanese researchers across disciplines and to promoting popular education. The latter aim was realized through a series of lectures and workshops offered to the general public on topics related to politics, society, economics, and philosophy, often involving the reading of original sources. This initiative, which enjoyed great popularity in 1946 and early 1947, effectively gathered scholars who believed in a progressive vision for Japan and were committed to realizing it.[359] It was a pure manifestation of the postwar community of intellectuals.

2.4. Boundaries of the postwar intellectual community

The existence of any community necessarily presupposes the existence of outsiders. Japanese intellectuals were no exception. Some groups and individuals, either by choice or circumstances, distanced themselves or were excluded from the community, often becoming isolated as a result. However, there were a number of those, who, while keeping their distance, refused to fade into irrelevancy and continued to exert influence on the wider discourse. They can be said to have occupied the "outlying zones," or boundaries, of the intellectual community.

The first group of intellectuals belonging to this category were young writers and literary critics associated with the proletarian literature movement. Characterized by their political and social radicalism, they attempted to initiate an extensive purge in the world of literature and arts (*bungei* 文芸) by examining the problem of Japanese war responsibility. The main vehicle for their effort was *Kindai Bungaku* (*Modern Literature*), a magazine founded in late 1945. Despite a strong Marxist (or sometimes Marxist-Leninist) orientation of the associated writers, they

[357] Matsuno, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai,'" p. 70.
[358] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "Nijū Seiki Kenkyūjo."
[359] Matsuno, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai,'" pp. 71-72.

generally disagreed politically with the Japan Communist Party.[360] Although formally a literary magazine, its sociopolitical focus made *Kindai Bungaku* closer to a typical *sōgō zasshi*. During the early years of the occupation, it succeeded in initiating several high-profile debates among Japanese intellectuals, and the voices of its authors regularly reached *Sekai* and other mainstream magazines.[361]

The main purges carried out by GHQ's Government Section in late 1945 and 1946 mainly affected the worlds of politics, business, and local government, while the CIE Section took responsibility for the purge in media and cultural spheres. The authors associated with *Kindai Bungaku* took special interest in the part of these ecosystems which concerned the "men of letters" (*bungakusha* 文学者). Driven by ideological zeal, they sought to aid the Americans in removing from the creative work anyone "tainted" by their collaboration with the military or at least complicity toward the wartime government. However, rather than perceiving this task from a purely political standpoint, they conceptualized it intellectually as the problem of war responsibility.

One of the most important discussions on this topic took the form of a *zadankai*, which ultimately found its way to the April 1946 issue the magazine *Ningen* 人間 (*Human*), similar to *Kindai Bungaku*. The participants generally agreed that war responsibility did not merely consist of concrete actions (or lack thereof) of particular individuals, but was instead conditioned by the question of the self. Feudal elements within each person's self were judged to be the main factor behind the emperor system and wartime Japanese "fascism." Japanese intellectuals could not resist them as a group supposedly because they did not yet possess fully emancipated and modern senses of self.[362] This was not the only time the men of letters addressed the problem of war responsibility. It remained one of their core themes, strongly connected to the question of "subjectivity" (*shutaisei* 主体性)—a topic for which *Kindai Bungaku* became best known.

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[360] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, pp. 82-84 gives a good analysis of the differences between *Kindai Bungaku* and the JCP. However, some of them remained close to the JCP, as evidenced by the famous episode from 1950 when Odagiri Hideo asked Mishima Yukio to join the communist party.

[361] Ibid., p. 43.

[362] Ara Masato et al., "Bungakusha no sekimu (zadankai)" [Duty of the men of letters (roundtable discussion)] *Ningen* 1, 4 (April 1946), pp. 150-166. Some of the authors make a mistake of attributing the debate to *Kindai Bungaku*, perhaps due to the fact that the participant were affiliated with that magazine. However, *Ningen* was the only magazine where the debate was published at the time and it had a different publishing company than *Kindai Bungaku*.

However, at least two factors made the debate on war responsibility less impactful than might have otherwise been expected. One issue was that the *Kindai Bungaku* writers were not prominent figures in prewar Japanese literature, and their youth (most were in their thirties, some even in their twenties), though providing them with a different perspective, also weakened their authority vis-à-vis more experienced and reputable intellectuals.[363] While figures like Maruyama or Tsurumi Shunsuke were also very young at the time, their elite education (national or, in Tsurumi's case, even international) early career success, and connections allowed them to take center stage in postwar Japan's intellectual world from the outset. This was something that the *Kindai Bungaku* writers lacked. Secondly, as evidenced by the aforementioned roundtable discussion, the debate on war responsibility tended to drift into a philosophical realm of personal introspection. While interesting from a theoretical perspective, such inward-looking tendencies limited its practical influence on Japanese society.

This was not the case only among the men of letters. Even much later attempts to discuss the war responsibility of intellectuals in a roundtable format yielded similar results. Such was the case of the December 1948 *zadankai* organized by a smaller magazine, *Shakai* 社会 (*Society*). On that occasion, participants—including intellectuals from various positions on the left—ultimately concluded that war responsibility was not limited to the leaders and the most active supporters of militarism, but extended to nearly all Japanese citizens, including, of course, the intellectuals. However, they also agreed that any atonement had to occur on an individual level, and that the problem of war responsibility was connected to the problem of Marxism: rather than being held responsible for the war, intellectuals should be held responsible for failing to adopt Marxism.[364]

There were also more proactive efforts to identify war responsibility in postwar Japan that originated from the proletarian literature movement and sought to become directly involved in the purge. In March 1946, Odagiri Hideo, a key participant in the *Ningen* roundtable discussion, published a detailed purge list in *Shin-Nihon Bungaku* (*New Japanese Literature*), another major periodical connected with the men of letters. The list consisted of twenty-five names of writers and critics allegedly bearing the greatest responsibility for supporting

[363] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, pp. 50-51.
[364] Mashita Shin'ichi et al., "Sensō sekinin no dōtokuteki kyūdan: Tōkyō saiban no shūketsu ni atatte" [Moral condemnation of war responsibility: At the conclusion of the Tokyo Trials," *Shakai* 3, 12 (December 1948), pp. 24-39.

militarism.[365] While not the only such example, Odagiri's list is considered the most important and consequential.[366]

Every person named by Odagiri was a literary figure of considerable renown in Japan at that time. Each of the listed men (there were no women) had reached the height of his career in the 1920s or 1930s and had, in some way, contributed to wartime propaganda during the 1940s. All were significantly older than Odagiri, who was thirty-five at the time. While the degree of involvement in Imperial Japan's propaganda efforts was the main criterion for inclusion, the list can also be viewed from a career perspective: a young and relatively unestablished literary critic calling for the purge of twenty-five of Japan's top literary figures to make room for younger and more left-wing writers. This does not negate the sincerity of Odagiri's externalized motivations but rather highlights another dimension in which the debate over war responsibility unfolded.

The effectiveness of Odagiri's short article is difficult to assess. Many of the listed men indeed lost their jobs; examples include Nakamura Murao, Yasuda Yojūrō, and Togawa Sadao. However, they were removed from their positions in academia and the literary world at various times, and Odagiri's direct influence remains uncertain. It would probably be more accurate to say that the list strengthened the pressure on institutions, on the men themselves, and on their colleagues to fire them—or urge them to resign—from their positions. Without a doubt, it also damaged their reputations. These and other purged intellectuals, while not disappearing entirely, lost their influence in Japan and often retreated into private life.

However, several of the men on Odagiri's list did not face any serious consequences and even remained active among postwar Japanese intellectuals. Examples include Kobayashi Hideo, Yamada Yoshio, Yoshikawa Eiji, and even one member of the Dōshinkai group: Mushanokōji Saneatsu. Moreover, there are no references to the latter's wartime responsibility in *Sekai*. Another man on Odagiri's list, Kikuchi Kan, despite having played a major role in mobilizing Japan's literary world for the war effort, in 1946 strongly condemned Japan's aggression in the Pacific, calling it irresponsible and leading to a "miserable defeat." He placed all blame on the leaders and excused himself—and other Japanese—on the grounds that they

[365] Odagiri Hideo, "Bungaku ni okeru sensō sekinin no tsuikyū" [Pressing for war responsibility in literature], *Shin-Nihon Bungaku* 3 (March 1946), pp. 64-65.
[366] Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 189.

had simply tried to fulfill their duties as citizens of their country.[367] While this kind of renunciation of personal responsibility is certainly striking, it was not a commonly voiced stance among postwar Japanese intellectuals. Kikuchi should thus be seen as someone who stood apart from the prevailing attitude of the community of remorse.

It was no coincidence that among the men of letters, Odagiri was the one who most actively advocated the purge of those deemed responsible for Japanese militarism. Unlike many of his colleagues who distanced themselves from the JCP, Odagiri was affiliated with Japanese communists. Even *Shin-Nihon Bungaku* itself—while belonging to the same current of proletarian literature movement as *Kindai Bungaku*—was significantly closer to communism politically, even maintaining ties with the Cominform.

In short, between 1945 and 1947—and possibly longer—communists and communist-leaning intellectuals constituted the only group consequently calling for the purge of public figures who had been in any way involved in the war effort. Outside of explicitly political outlets like *Shinbun Akahata*, such calls appeared mainly in procommunist magazines (like *Zen'ei*) and associations, the most prominent of which was the so-called "Minka" 民科—short for Minshushugi Kagakusha Kyōkai 民主主義科学者協会 (Association of Democratic Scholars). Minka was established in January 1946 with three main objectives, explicitly stated in its declaration: (1) to create a "democratic scholarship" that would respond to the "desires of the people"; (2) to fight "feudalism, militarism, fascism, and all other reactionary forces" in the field of science; and (3) to pursue and defend academic freedom.[368] Starting in February 1946, Minka also published its own journal, *Riron* 理論 (*Theory*). From the very beginning, its goal was to attack the idealism of the Kyoto School—prewar Japan's most famous tradition of philosophy—from the standpoint of historical materialism.[369] Beyond purely philosophical disagreements, Marxists accused the Kyoto School of having provided a theoretical foundation for Japanese statism (*kokkashugi* 国家主義). While Japan's postwar leftward turn certainly provided such critiques with a strong momentum, the Kyoto School's leading philosopher, Tanabe Hajime, still enjoyed great popularity in postwar Japan. Another of its thinkers, Watsuji Tetsurō, was a regular contributor to *Sekai* and *Tenbō*. This shows that despite significance on the left, Minka's influence in broader Japanese intellectual life was limited, similarly to the

[367] Yoshida Yutaka, "Senryō-ki ni okeru sensō sekinin-ron" [Theory of war responsibility in the occupation period], *Ikkyō Ronsō* 105, 2 (1992), p. 123.
[368] Matsuno, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai,' pp. 69-70.
[369] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 88.

Kindai Bungaku circles. Interestingly, however, Minka's membership was more pluralistic than its ideological profile would suggest, including many non-Marxists.[370] It shows that even more radical groups were relatively open in character—and that many Japanese intellectuals did not disassociate themselves from colleagues with different political leanings, perceiving them as part of the same community.

The debate on war responsibility itself warrants some more attention. The issue of guilt and reflection on wartime mistakes was central to the identity of the community of remorse. Why, then, was this topic so quickly sidelined and left mostly to radical intellectuals? First of all, the debate on war responsibility was marred by several problems that prevented it from becoming a central topic in any of the major magazines before 1948—by which time both the internal and external situation in Japan had already changed considerably due to Cold War.[371] The first of these problems was that, before intellectuals could even initiate a discussion on responsibility, the topic was unexpectedly raised by the Japanese political authorities shortly before the occupation began.

On 17 August 1945, two days after announcing the surrender of Japan, the Emperor nominated Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko to lead Japan's new transitional cabinet. Its objectives were to prepare the nation for peace and ensure a smooth beginning of the occupation. The new prime minister launched a nationwide social campaign, conducted under the slogan of "a hundred million's repentance" (*ichioku-sō zange* 一億総懺悔). The phrase referred to Japan's total prewar population of almost one hundred million people (when including population of the colonies). The campaign called upon all Japanese citizens to reflect critically on the war as well as on their individual actions.[372] The idea was conceived by Prince Higashikuni's advisor, an Evangelical Christian pacifist, Kagawa Toyohiko, who believed that Japan had become the world's "prodigal son" (in reference to the famous New Testament parable) and should atone for squandering its power, resources, and military on an unrighteous cause.[373] However, the campaign could also be seen as an attempt to shift the burden of war responsibility from individual leaders onto the nation as a whole.

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[370] Bronson, *One Hundred Million Philosophers*, pp. 54-55.
[371] Although the first complex treatment of the problem of war responsibility of intellectuals came as late as 1956, when it was discussed by Tsurumi Shunsuke in response to Fukuda Tsuneari. Tsurumi Shunsuke, "Chishikijin no sensō sekinin" [War responsibility of intellectuals], *Chūō Kōron* 71, 1 (January 1956), pp. 57-63.
[372] Hasegawa Takashi, *Higashikuni seiken: Gojū-nichi* [Fifty days of the Higashikuni cabinet] (Kōkyū Shuppankyoku, 1987), pp. 203-205, 247-248.
[373] Ibid., pp. 149-150.

While the start of the occupation and the subsequent cabinet change made the campaign fade away, its echo lingered in the writings of some of the advocates of nationwide reflection on war responsibility, such as liberal historian Tsuda Sōkichi and conservative educator Ōshima Masanori, both of whom addressed this issue in 1946, albeit in different outlets. Despite employing slightly different arguments, the two men maintained that the war could never have occurred without the complicity and moral weakness of ordinary citizens who allowed themselves to be deceived and manipulated by military leaders and bureaucrats. If their moral standards had been higher, they argued, militarism would never have achieved such a success in Japan.[374]

SCAP's official policy stood in direct opposition to such views. It rested on the assumption that a handful of corrupt military men and politicians seized power in Japan by exploiting the weaknesses of its political system and then plotted to drag the nation into a war of aggression. This was the view presented by the American side during the Tokyo Trials.[375] Both the emperor and the general public (with the exception of a few nationalist intellectuals and activists) were regarded as essentially innocent. Thus, it was decided that the guilty leaders must be punished, and the political system restructured to prevent any future usurpation of authority.[376]

As a result, Japanese intellectuals found themselves in a situation where both poles of the debate on responsibility—responsibility of the few officials at the top and responsibility of the entire nation—had already been taken by political actors and their respective supporters. According to Yoshida Yutaka, whose extensive research has focused on Japan's postwar public memory, most liberal and progressive intellectuals more or less reluctantly chose to align themselves with SCAP and the Tokyo Tribunal's stance regarding the war responsibility of the Japanese people as a whole. At least three decisive factors contributed to this decision. First, the quasi-democratic character of the trials, in which "the peoples" of Japan and other Asian countries accused Japan's leaders of military aggression and war crimes. Second, the concern that raising the issue of collective responsibility would serve to exonerate the leadership.[377] And third, the notion of "national repentance" evoked associations with wartime rhetoric, which had

[374] Yoshida, "Senryō-ki ni okeru sensō sekinin-ron," pp. 129-130.
[375] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 456-457.
[376] Ibid., p. 278.
[377] Yoshida, "Senryō-ki ni okeru sensō sekinin-ron,", p. 129.

always been framed in broad, national categories—something that most intellectuals of the community of remorse sought to avoid.[378]

In these circumstances, the debate on war responsibility as a popular issue was largely handed over to far-left or communist intellectuals, who were the only groups consistently speaking up about this issue in early postwar Japan. This is not to say that the past and individual deeds during the war held no significance for other intellectuals. Their very identity as a group was centered around the past and wartime experience, hence the term "community of remorse." However, remorse is a complex category, and as an emotion, it is by definition subjective. It could mean different things to different individuals: one might feel remorse for a lack of action, while another might feel the same emotion for a deed considered wrong in retrospection. Thus, remorse constituted a category broad enough to accommodate people with varied pasts. Regret over one's actions and a commitment to Japan's democratization were sufficient to warrant acceptance into the intellectual community.

The ambiguity of the term "community" of remorse presents a difficulty for any scholar attempting to categorize postwar Japanese intellectuals by political stance, ideology, or experience, fitting them into clearly delineated boundaries. This situation motivated Takeuchi Yō to address the ambiguity by proposing a second, overlapping community, which he called *munen kyōdōtai* 無念共同体—a term perplexing to translate into English, since *munen* 無念 also means "remorse," though with a slightly different nuance. In contrast to *kaikon* (Maruyama's original word for "remorse"), which denotes a deep regret for something one has done (with a distinctly subjective aspect), *munen* more often refers to regret over something that happened beyond one's control. Takeuchi used this second meaning of the "community of remorse" to refer to those who lamented how things have turned out, rather than feeling guilty for their own actions. He noted that these intellectuals were more willing to recognize positive aspects of the prewar modernization. Although they despised militarism and felt chagrin over Japan's wartime actions, their mindset differed from that of those who wanted Japan to start completely anew.[379]

Takeuchi's attempt to divide the community of remorse into those who felt *kaikon* and those who felt *munen* certainly sheds light on the pluralism of attitudes among postwar

[378] Ibid., p. 131.
[379] Takeuchi, *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, pp. 45-48.

intellectuals, yet it also unnecessarily complicates the issue, since the original definition already encompassed various kinds of regret. When he introduced the term, Maruyama deliberately left room for ambiguity regarding each intellectual's individual feelings. He even offered two markedly different examples of regret: one of a communist who regretted that, after being arrested, allowed himself to be "converted" by the police and submitted a recantation statement; and another of a prewar liberal who regretted his inability to oppose—or even his submission to—the rising forces of militarism in Japan.[380] The starting and ending points of these cases stand far apart. A communist in prewar Japan was someone who refused to recognize the Japanese state, completely disavowed it, was later arrested, and ended the war as a former prisoner. A liberal, on the other hand, began as a believer in the ideals of the Meiji Restoration and Japan's modernization but ended as an ex-supporter of the wartime regime. The latter would fit Takeuchi's community of remorse (*munen*) perfectly, were it not that this type was already included in Maruyama's original concept.

The personal and ideological diversity among members of the community of remorse did, in fact, lead to the eventual breakdown of the group. Takeuchi is therefore right to observe that certain differences proved crucial. However, the split occurred later, and the earliest cracks in the surface of shared ideals did not appear until around mid-1947—over a year and a half after the war's end. For this reason, any insistence on redrawing the boundaries of the original post-August 1945 community on the basis of later disagreements should be seen as retrospective and, consequently, ahistorical. Future strife does not logically necessitate earlier contradictions. A good example of someone fitting Takeuchi's definition of *munen*-type intellectuals is Rōyama Masamichi from *Chūō Kōron*. He serves as a telling example of an intellectual who was readily accepted into the community of remorse despite his close affiliation with the wartime political establishment.

Born in 1895, Rōyama graduated from the prestigious Law Department of Tokyo Imperial University and was both a political scientist (employed at various universities over the years) and an opinion journalist affiliated with several *sōgō zasshi*, such as *Kaizō* (before the war) and *Chūō Kōron* (after the war), eventually becoming the latter's deputy editor-in-chief. During the 1920s and most of the 1930s, Rōyama associated with several Japanese socialists, expressed social-democratic views, and criticized the rise of militarism, though he never entered into outright radical opposition. From the late 1930s onward, however, he became increasingly

[380] Maruyama, "Kindai Nihon no chishikijin,"

prowar and began to ideologically legitimize Japan's aggression in China and the South-East Asia. Moreover, in the April 1942 elections he ran for and won a seat in the House of Representatives as a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai 大政翼賛会), Japan's wartime ruling political party. Curiously, he never renounced his social-democratic convictions and, after the war, strongly supported democratization from the same positions from which he had earlier endorsed Pan-Asianism.[381]

Becoming a key participant in postwar intellectual debates, Rōyama commanded enough respect among his peers that when he became a target of GHQ's purge in 1947, younger progressive liberals like Kimura Takeyasu and Maruyama personally appealed to the occupation authorities for his exemption.[382] He consistently maintained left-wing positions, though without moving too close to communism, leading Kimura Masami—a scholar of Cold War intellectual history—to describe him as a "right-wing socialist."[383]

Regardless of this evaluation, which is mostly based on his later activities, in 1945-1947 Rōyama stood at the center of the same community that also included avowed Marxists, liberals, and progressives, consistently supporting Japan's democratization. While for more radical intellectuals—such as those from *Zen'ei* or *Shin-Nihon Bungaku*—the inclusion of figures like Rōyama was questionable at best, most intellectuals were willing to see him as part of their community due to his strong commitment to the common cause. This willingness later eroded as Cold War polarization deepened tensions in Japan, but in the early postwar years, the belief in shared goals among Japanese intellectuals was apparently strong enough to accommodate figures such as Rōyama. From the phenomenological standpoint, whether his personal feelings were closer to *kaikon* or to *munen* is of secondary importance.

So far, the boundaries of intellectual community were examined mostly from the left side. It is only natural since the public debate in postwar Japan was strongly tilted to the left. However, intellectuals occupying significant positions and functioning on the right side of the border of the community also existed, even if fewer in number. Perhaps the best example of such an intellectual is Fukuda Tsuneari, a literary critic and translator of English literature.

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[381] Marshall, *Academic Freedom*, p. 182

[382] Kamejima Yōichi, "Maruyama Masao to sōritsu-ki no Seikei Daigaku" [Maruyama Masao and Seikei University during its establishment period], *Seikei Hōgaku* 92 (2020), pp. 372-373.

[383] Kimura Masami, "Anticommunism of Japanese Socialist Thinkers during the Occupation Period, 1945-52." Paper presented at the American Historical Association 138th Annual Meeting, New York City, January 2025. Kimura also gives the argument of Rōyama's prewar affiliation with Kawai Eijirō, which, in her opinion, serves as one more reason to consider him a "right-wing socialist."

A member of the younger generation—he was thirty-three when the war ended—Fukuda had already achieved early notoriety for his provocative views on modern Japanese literature. Although he had not supported the wartime regime, which he accused of violence and suppression of individuality, Fukuda was dismayed by the enthusiastic reaction of many fellow intellectuals to Japan's surrender.[384] His criticized their attitude and what he saw as their overreliance on America for installing liberal values in Japan. At the same time, he remained committed to democratization of Japan and did not withdraw from the public debate, actively engaging other intellectuals and challenging their views in *sōgō zasshi* that welcomed his contributions.[385] Despite his opposition to the ideas of many of his colleagues, he became a member of the Institute of the Twentieth Century along them. This was primarily due to his friendship with Shimizu Ikutarō, the Institute's president, who invited him to join.[386] Yet someone ostracized by the community could never have maintained such relations with a figure like Shimizu, one of Japan's most influential progressive voices at the time. This demonstrates the impressive degree of pluralism allowed within the postwar community of intellectuals, provided that one did not fall victim to the purge.

While Fukuda was hardly representative of any larger group of intellectuals, his criticism is noteworthy for how categorically he rejected the intellectuals' pretensions to lead the masses. More than their ideas, Fukuda deplored their isolation from the lives and values of ordinary citizens. In his view, the postwar community of intellectuals lacked any ethical mandate to "enlighten" (*keimō* 啓蒙) the Japanese, since its members had not proven themselves morally suited to such a task during the war, having shown weakness and a lack of individual agency in the face of overwhelming militarism. It was not, Fukuda argued, that they could have opposed the war but failed; rather, it was impossible to oppose the wartime Japanese state entirely—especially for writers. Japanese intellectuals had committed the same mistakes and shown the same weaknesses as ordinary citizens. And for this reason, any notion that they constituted a distinct group with a special duty to lead the masses was hypocritical, since they were essentially the same as those they wished to guide.[387] It is interesting how this line of

[384] Matsuno, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai,'" pp. 77.
[385] In *Tenbō*, for example: Fukuda, "Minshū no kokoro," pp. 78-86.
[386] Matsuno, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai," p. 77. The same Shimizu Ikutarō also helped him with finding employment after the war – Takeuchi Yō, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Introduction, "Sen kyūhaku hachijū hachinen hachigatsu jūninichi."
[387] Fukuda Tsuneari, "Bungaku to sensō sekinin" [Literature and war responsibility]. In *Sengo shisō no shuppatsu* [The beginning of postwar thought], ed. Hidaka Rokurō (Chikuma Shobō, 1968), pp. 228-234; Matsuno, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai,'" pp. 77-78.

reasoning actually made Fukuda close to the far-left commentators, also prone to questioning the supposed moral superiority of many postwar Japanese intellectuals.

However, what often escapes contemporary specialists who write about Fukuda is that while he frequently opposed other intellectuals, he nevertheless espoused many of their most common opinions. This becomes evident when reading one of Fukuda's earliest articles on public affairs: "The Heart of the Masses" ("Minshū no kokoro" 民衆の心), published in *Tenbō* in March 1946.[388] In this relatively obscure work (at least compared to his well-known essays from the 1950s and 1960s), Fukuda, true to his usual style, vehemently bashed other intellectuals—many of whom were his seniors—accusing them of inability to understand what liberalism actually is and blindly adhering to empty "representations" (*hyōshō* 表象) of Western liberal thought without concern for the situation in Japan. He contrasted the superficiality of Japanese progressive liberals with parts of John Dewey's *Liberalism and Social Action* from 1935, in which the American philosopher underlined the need of mediating all ideas with everyday experiences of ordinary people.[389] Fukuda stated that Japanese intellectuals apparently have learned nothing since the Meiji period when they had repeated the same mistake by simply importing foreign ideas. Overwhelmed by their number and meanings, they easily fell into a fake syncretism which rendered these ideas useless and made it possible to one day be a liberal and become a nationalist the next.[390]

But the crux, perhaps hidden to Fukuda himself, lies in the fact that he essentially reiterates the argument about the second opening of the country and juxtaposes Japan unfavorably against the West. In the essay, he also criticized Japan's capitalism and Meiji-era modernization.[391] He also remained extremely critical of the war and Japan's prewar political establishment—yet another tenet of the worldview represented by the community of remorse.[392] It shows that despite his animosity against many contemporary intellectuals, Fukuda still belonged to the same ideological current of postwar Japanese liberal democratism. Whether he fits the label of a "conservative liberal" or simply an "unorthodox progressive" remains a matter of dispute. Regardless, he can certainly be identified as a member of the community of remorse. In his case, the remorse was not for his own actions or lack thereof, but of the entirety of Japan's

[388] Fukuda, "Minshū no kokoro." Although "The heart of the masses" is a literal translation, a better one would perhaps be "Psychology of the Masses" or even "Understanding the Masses."
[389] Ibid., pp. 78-79; John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1935).
[390] Fukuda, "Minshū no kokoro," pp. 83-84.
[391] Ibid., p. 80.
[392] Ibid., passim.

sociocultural trajectory since the Meiji period. There was certainly some ambivalence regarding his exact position inside the broader community of intellectuals and this ambivalence perfectly exemplifies those figures who stood close to the group's boundaries during the first postwar years.

Chapter 3. Intellectuals against the Cold War polarization, 1947-1949

The emergence of Cold War dictated the postwar fate of many countries in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Japan was no exception. Japanese political elite quickly adapted to the new geopolitical conditions and was able to fit very well in the newly divided world. For the intellectuals, however, the situation was significantly different. With the newly established community united by commonly held values (regarding Japan's future) and shared emotional sentiments (regarding Japan's past), many of its members struggled to accept the new status quo imposed by geopolitics and psychological warfare of two opposing superpowers—though very recently allies—the United States and the Soviet Union.

Cold War in Japan began on 1 February 1947, which was the planned date of the general strike organized by Japan's major labor unions. The strike never materialized due to General MacArthur's intervention, which broke his earlier policy of supporting the labor movement and constituted a "turning point in the occupation."[393] The reasons for this move related equally to pragmatic calculations on negative economic consequences of a general strike, as well as the fear of rising communism. Faced with the changed attitude of American authorities, which reflected the globally emerging Cold War logic, most Japanese intellectuals searched for ways to overcome it—efforts which at times generated new tensions among them, like the internal conflict among the writers associated with *Sekai*, but also led to notable collective undertakings. Undoubtedly the most successful among these endeavors, the Peace Problem Discussion Group, was established in November 1948 and published its declaration on possibilities of maintaining peace in March 1949. This success proved that the bonds of community among Japanese intellectuals were still stronger than the Cold War polarization.

3.1. Cold War in East Asia and Japan

Cold War was a global phenomenon which arose from the political, economic, and ideological conditions in the aftermath of World War II. Although not a war in the traditional or legal meaning of the term, it rested on an enduring relationship of hostility between the United States

[393] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p. 320.

and the Soviet Union.[394] Both of these states emerged victorious from the war against the Axis and benefitted the most from the collective victory of the Allies—the fact which elevated them to a "superpower" status. These two new superpowers were not mere states, however; what they stood for, in fact, were different "systems": political (liberal democracy and communism), economic (free market economy and socialist planned economy), and ideological (liberalism and Marxism-Leninism). As such, the two superpowers became the standard-bearers of two contrasting worldviews, impossible—at least in theory—to reconcile with one another. Both had a need to assert themselves worldwide and could leave no room for the other system's values and models.[395]

Regardless of how much such a confrontation may have seemed historically inevitable, the U.S.-Soviet conflict did not erupt spontaneously right after the war but arose gradually from within. Its signs were visible already in 1944, if not earlier, with mutual tensions and distrust surrounding such issues as opening of the second front in the war against Germany or the question of Soviet influence over Eastern Europe.[396] Regardless, the origins of Cold War constitute a major research topic among scholars who debate its precise starting point.[397] Several such moments can be identified. The "classic" narrative follows the influential U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan, who in February 1946 sent the "Long Telegram" from Moscow to Washington, arguing that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and presents a threat to America and her interests.[398] Just the following month, in March 1946, Winston Churchill delivered the famous "Iron Curtain" speech during his visit to the United States.[399] It was one year later, however, that the event which seems to be most widely regarded as the starting point of Cold War occurred.[400] In March 1947, U.S. President Harry S. Truman announced a new direction of American foreign policy, which underlined a necessity to oppose the expansion of Soviet influence and renouncing possibility of any concessions to Moscow.[401] This new policy,

[394] R. Harrison Wagner, "What was bipolarity?," *International Organization* 47, 1 (1993), p. 80.
[395] Antonio Varsori, "Reflections on the Origins of the Cold War." In *Reviewing the Cold War*, p. 281.
[396] For how this process played out see Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953* (Yale University Press, 2006), Chapters 6-8.
[397] Geir Lundestad, "How (Not) to Study the Origins of the Cold War." In ibid., pp. 64-65.
[398] John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 18-20.
[399] Martin McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War 1941-1949*, (Routledge, 2021), pp. 156-157.
[400] Ibid., p. 213.
[401] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 21-23, 58-59.

named the "Truman Doctrine," led to further escalations of antagonisms, which ultimately created the state of an informal conflict that was about to last for the next four decades.

It is important to see how these different "starting points" of Cold War differed from one another. While Kennan's telegram proved influential in shaping the U.S. policy making internally, both the speech of Churchill and Truman's announcement of a new doctrine in foreign affairs constituted highly publicized events which made an impact on international discourse, also in Japan, where they were reported by the press—and to some extent also the *sōgō zasshi*.[402] For this reason, they may be seen as more important when looking at public debate rather than specifically on policies.

Simultaneously to events on the Anglo-American side, the Soviet Union made several moves which likewise could be viewed as the origins of Cold War. Despite agreeing to free and democratic elections in East Central European countries (like Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia) at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin did not keep his promise. The Soviets rigged the parliamentary elections in Poland (January 1947) and Hungary (August 1947), putting these two countries firmly under communist control, while February 1948 saw a Soviet-backed communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia.[403] The Polish elections in particular, along with the increasing Soviet pressure on neutral Turkey and the communist uprising in Greece (which began in March 1946) formed the political backdrop against which the Truman Doctrine.[404]

As a process, the roots of Cold War were connected to the failure to achieve a lasting peace in Europe, regarded by the two superpowers as the key strategic region.[405] Thus, even though the conflict eventually affected all parts of the world, it developed primarily in Europe and only secondarily in other parts of the world, including East Asia.[406] This reality made the Cold War influence in Japan much different than in Germany, which had similarly ended the World War II in a state of foreign occupation. First of all, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in East Asia lacks and easily discernible starting point.[407]

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[402] For example "Sekai no shio" [Tides of the world], *Sekai* 15 (March 1947), pp. 97-101.
[403] Jerzy Holzer, *Europa zimnej wojny* [Europe during Cold War] (Wydawnictwo Znak-Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2012), pp. 67-95.
[404] Ibid., pp. 56-58; John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War* (The Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 10-30.
[405] Varsori, "Reflections on the Origins of the Cold War," p. 295.
[406] Zhao, *Power Competition in East Asia*, p. 83.
[407] Li Xiaobing, *The Cold War in East Asia* (Routledge, 2018), p. 41.

Initially, the two superpowers' rivalry was muted in the region due to their cooperation as part of the Yalta System. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had negotiated with the Soviet Union and Britain at the "Big Three" conferences, trusted Stalin and believed that the United States and the Soviets could remain allies even after the war. His plan for the postwar order, however, did not foresee the emergence of superpowers and instead rested on an unrealistic assumption that the four great powers (U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain, and China) could "manage" the future international order together as the "Four Policemen." Significant dissatisfaction with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union among White House officials appeared already in late 1944 and was steadily growing. When Truman replaced Roosevelt in April 1945 (due to the latter's sudden death), the United States became suspicious of Stalin's motives. Truman's lack of trust was a reason why Washington objected so strongly to granting the U.S.S.R. an occupation zone in Japan in August 1945, and chose to end the war before the full Soviet entrance into the conflict. What resulted from this decision were the two atomic attacks on Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively on 6 and 9 August 1945. The use of nuclear weapons—so far unprecedented in human history—was also meant to demonstrate the power of America to all potential enemies, especially the Soviet Union.[408]

Yet even despite adopting a more hawkish attitude toward the Soviets under Truman, Washington had still remained unwilling to enter any new conflict, as evidenced by American actions regarding China and Korea in the fall of 1945. Furthermore, many key people, like U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes, continued to hold at least some trust in Soviets' intentions and pushed for cooperation. The most powerful factor, which destroyed the remnants of American officials' trust in Stalin, was witnessing the ruthless treatment of all non-communist forces in East Central European nations by the Soviets. Yet the echo of these events hardly reached the region of East and Southeast Asia. This part of the world was primarily shaped by the continuing process of decolonization, which had built upon Japan's wartime aggression against European colonial empires.[409] As a completely new driving force of history, decolonization engulfed the region in a competition for legacy and authority between new states as well as between emergent nations and old colonial powers, such as Britain, France, or Netherlands.

[408] Gaddis, *The Cold War*, pp. 25-27.
[409] Nakamizo Kazuya, Kanō Hiroyoshi, "Decolonization." In *Asia Rising: A Handbook of History and International Relations in East, South and Southeast Asia*, eds. Sahashi Ryō, Matsuda Yasuhiro, Aoyama Waka (Springer, 2024), pp. 151-160.

Scholars point to different origins of Cold War in East Asia. Li Xiaobing, for example, identifies the evolution of American occupation policy in Japan in 1947-1949 as origins but refuses to give a more specific point of beginning.[410] A noted Cold War historian, John Lewis Gaddis, sees the expansion of the conflict into Asia as a sudden development (not a result of gradually rising tensions like in Europe) and links it to international events of 1949-1950.[411] These include the fall of the Republic of China to communist forces led by Mao Zedong in late 1949 and the subsequent Sino-Soviet alliance, as well as the Sovietization of North Korea under Kim Il Sung. Most authors seem to agree particularly on the decisive value of the regime change in China, which puts the outbreak of Cold War in Asia significantly later than in Europe, regardless of which starting point is ultimately chosen.[412] Mao's policy of "leaning to one side," which meant firm support for the Soviets, jeopardized the Yalta framework of equilibrium.[413] It also sparked a wave of criticism of the Truman administration among American politicians, media, and the public—for not giving China enough attention and support.[414] The criticism was justified in that even after pronouncing the Truman Doctrine, the administration did not want its effort and resources diverted from Europe to East Asian countries like China or Vietnam.[415]

The question of various possibilities of looking at the conflict's origins in Asia was undertaken by a prominent Japanese historian of Cold War, Matsumura Fuminori. The difference of perspective, he observed, arises from a difference of assumptions rather than interpretations. Those scholars who put greater emphasis on power politics and security than on ideology tend to embrace the viewpoint which points to Cold War "spilling out" from Europe to East Asia and give the 1949-1950 events in China and/or Korea as the starting point. In this perspective, the U.S. policy of "containment" (in regards to the perceived Soviet expansion), which developed in 1947 as a consequence of the Truman Doctrine and prompted the outbreak of Cold War, did not initially relate to East Asia, since in that region both superpowers were still willing to cooperate within the Yalta System.[416] Gaddis embraces this perspective.[417]

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[410] Li, *The Cold War in East Asia*, p. 41.
[411] John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 54.
[412] Shen, *Mao, Stalin and the Korean War*, p. 28.
[413] Zhao, *Power Competition in East Asia*, p. 88.
[414] Li, *The Cold War in East Asia*, p. 60.
[415] Ibid., p. 44.
[416] Matsumura Fuminori, "Ajia ni okeru reisen no keisei: Futatsu no imēji to sono saikentō" [The formation of the Cold War in Asia: Two images and their reconsideration], *Ajia Kenkyū* 50, 2 (2004), pp. 127-128. The definition of "containment" can be found in: Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 4.
[417] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 55.

The alternative viewpoint is newer, resting on a reevaluation of the role played by Asian nations, as well as the negation of the old "China's lost chance" theory. This theory refers to the supposed possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and Communist China in 1949, right after Mao's victory in the civil war but still before he amended his strained relationship with Stalin in December 1949/January 1950. The supporters of this viewpoint argue that the failure to do so was a significant failure on the part of American foreign policy and that even as late as in the winter of 1949/1950 it was not impossible to avoid the outbreak of Cold War in East Asia.[418] On the other hand, historians, who do not agree with this theory and see the Mao-Stalin alliance as de facto inevitable, tend to give a very early date of Cold War in Asia, pointing to a localized form of the U.S.-Soviet conflict present in the region even as early as in August 1945.[419]

There are two historical facts that seem to validate the latter perspective. The first is the tensions which surrounded the Truman administration's August 1945 attempt to avoid the Soviet entrance into the war with Japan. The second is the administration's subsequent decision to refuse Stalin's demand for a Soviet occupation zone in Japan. Furthermore, despite the initial reluctance on the part of the Soviets to support the communist side in China, by the spring of 1946 the Chinese Liberation Army was already receiving the Soviet support against the forces of Kuomintang backed by the United States. Odd Arne Westad sees this as a typical Cold War struggle, pushing against the narrative of Cold War starting in Asia not sooner than in late 1949.[420] Another Japanese historian, Itō Tsuyoshi, who specializes in trilateral Japanese-Chinese-American relations after World War II, sees Cold War in East Asia as essentially a different conflict than Cold War in Europe, both of which, he argues, possess their own characteristics. This opinion goes against a classical view of the "single" Cold War spreading from Europe to Asia. According to Itō, the foremost among the East Asian Cold War's characteristics is the lack of anything similar to the Iron Curtain. He observes that the power vacuum in East and Southeast Asia created by the withdrawal of Japanese troops was filled by an ideological conflict which took an internalized form in every country. Unlike in Europe, where a clear line divided two parts of the continent, it was a struggle which divided countries

[418] Many essays, written both by Japanese and American historians, which form the contents of the book *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, eds. Nagai Yōnosuke, Iriye Akira (Columbia University Press, 1977)—ascribe to the "China's lost chance" theory and can serve as examples of this perspective.
[419] Matsumura, "Ajia ni okeru reisen no keisei," pp. 127-130.
[420] Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946* (Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 165-166.

from inside: across the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea, across the seventeenth parallel in Vietnam, and across the Taiwan Strait in China. This alternative form of division, different from the European Iron Curtain, is sometimes referred to as the "Bamboo Curtain."[421] Although the conflict later became linked to the global Cold War by the American and Soviet interventions, it had already existed from the very beginning, that is—the defeat of Japan. In addition, unlike in Europe, there was no "common enemy" in Asia. Every state had its own immediate enemy: for South Korea, it was North Korea; for South Vietnam, it was North Vietnam, and for the Republic of China, it was Communist China.[422]

These opinions seem much more convincing than the more traditional approach represented by Gaddis and other historians for whom Cold War started in Asia only in 1949-1950. However, regardless of which perspective one would adopt, virtually all scholars agree that 1) the U.S. policy of containment of Soviet expansionism played an important role in the formation of Cold War, and that 2) this policy was primarily adopted in relation to Western Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, and Japan.[423] Thus, even if the perspective of Westad or Itō was wrong and Cold War did in fact start in East Asia not sooner than in late 1949, still, it would have not changed Japan's unique position within Asia; the position which rested on Japan being a target of U.S. policy in a more similar way to Europe than to other parts of Asia. For this reason, Cold War can be said to had been directly affecting Japan since 1947, regardless of the situation in the rest of the region.

Since the conflict developed in East Asia only secondarily, does it mean that it was mainly Europe-centered or, at least, "European" in character? Westad, who is the author of the "global Cold War" concept, argues that it was not. According to his research, Cold War can be understood as a conflict not limited to two superpowers and their allies but in its relationship with the Third World. As a concept, global Cold War stands in opposition to a popular tendency of treating the conflict as mostly relating to Europe and the Global North. According to Westad, Cold War was "southern" (in a sense that also includes Asia) as much as it was European.[424]

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[421] For example in *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia*, ed. Priscilla Roberts (Stanford University Press, 2006).
[422] Itō Tsuyoshi, "Nichi-Bei-Chū kankei to Ajia reisen no tokuchō: Kōzōteki bunseki no kokoromi" [Japan-America-China relations and the characteristics of the Asian Cold War: An attempt at structural analysis], *Meiji Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo Kiyō* 62, 1 (2023), pp. 36-37.
[423] Matsumura, "Ajia ni okeru reisen no keisei," pp. 130-132.
[424] Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 3-4.

Globalization, understood as global dimension of the superpowers' actions and as global character of the factors shaping the conflict's nature, constitutes one of the key characteristics of Cold War, necessary to account for in order to fully grasp the historical significance of its context for any country involved, such as Japan.[425] Other important characteristics include bipolarity and the nuclear arms race.

Bipolarity is a state of international relations in which all nations eventually gravitate—willingly or not—toward one of the two dominating centers of power. By definition, it contrasts with multipolarity, much more common throughout human history, since before the late modern, industrial-era globalization a bipolar world order would have been impossible. However, "bipolarity" as a term can be—and often is—employed in two different meanings: 1) as "polarization" of the world into two hostile camps as a result of Cold War; and 2) as distribution of power among individual states such that two become much more powerful than the others. This differentiation harbors significant consequences. According to the first meaning, bipolarity was the result of Cold War. Yet according to the second meaning, Cold War was the result of bipolarity.[426] Regardless of whichever is correct—a question with important consequences on the debate regarding the Cold War origins—the most vital aspect of this problem for postwar Japan is the reality of bipolarity itself.

Yet this reality, despite its global character, was never able to make all international actors fully subject to its influence. There were nations which, espousing neutralism, have resisted the supposed necessity of allying with one of the leading superpowers. However, this did not negate a bipolar world order due to the fact that this "middle-zone" did not become another "pole" (which would transform bipolarity into multipolarity)—at least not during the period covered by this dissertation. The term "non-alignment," often linked to such a zone, by definition makes it logically necessary for some sort of polarization to exist in order to enable a lack of alignment. There are three important concepts that are associated with the problem of non-alignment in a polarized world: neutrality, neutralism, and the "Third World."

Being by far the oldest of the three, the concept of neutrality in the context of international relations dates back at least to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (which ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe) and was codified by the Hague Conventions of 1907. According

[425] Uno Shigeaki, "'Ajia reisen shi no saikentō' tōron sōkatsu" ['Reexamining the history of the Cold War in Asia': Discussion summary], *Ajia Kenkyū* 52, 2 (2006), p. 2.
[426] Wagner, "What was bipolarity?," pp. 81-82.

to the early twentieth century definition, neutrality guaranteed the inviolability of the nation's territory while at the same time allowing it to take part in exporting supplies and weapons to any side of the conflict. However, if it wished to issue an embargo or use other similar tool, such a nation was obligated to do so in relation to both sides of the conflict. Historically, neutrality was strongly associated with Europe and certain European countries, such as Switzerland and Sweden.[427]

By contrast, the concepts of neutralism and non-alignment were both developed in reaction to Cold War and as a consequence of decolonization. Rather than describing a legal status of a country in international relations, neutralism was a policy of states and political groups aimed at avoiding alignment with any superpower or bloc. The first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, was an early champion of neutralism. He outlined this idea in September 1946, a year before his country achieved independence. According to him, non-alignment meant free cooperation and beneficial relationships with other countries, as well as full participation in international meetings, but without dependence on any great power and without commitment to any block of nations. It was essentially equivalent to the later ideas of the Non-Aligned Movement, established in 1961 by Nehru together with Sukarno, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Josip Broz Tito—presidents of Indonesia, Egypt, and Yugoslavia respectively.[428]

All of these countries were widely regarded as part of the so-called "Third World."[429] However, the actual meaning of this identification may be slightly confusing since there are two "three worlds" theories which utilize the same vocabulary—the Western and the Maoist one—although the former seems significantly more prevalent in popular imagination.[430] Developed since the early 1950s, the Western theory placed the United States with its allies and the Soviet Union with its allies and satellites as First and Second Worlds respectively. The Third World meant those nations which did not belong to any of the two sides, occupying the "middle ground" of the bipolar world order.[431] The Chinese theory was explicitly formulated by Mao as late as in the 1970s, but in a less organized form had existed already in the immediate postwar

[427] Marco Wyss et al., "A tightrope walk—neutrality and neutralism in the global Cold War." In *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or within the blocs?*, eds. Sandra Bott et al., (Routledge, 2016), pp. 2-3.
[428] Ibid., pp. 3-4; Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 170.
[429] McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War*, p. 202.
[430] Alexander C. Cook, "Introduction: The spiritual atom bomb and its global fallout." In *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*, ed. Cook (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 13-15.
[431] Westad, *The Global Cold War*, pp. 2-3.

period as part of the "Mao Zedong thought" or Maoism. Chinese Communist Party's chairman conceptualized the First World as those who create ideology and lead others, meaning both America and the Soviets. The Second World were those nations that firmly ascribed to one of the two superpowers' leadership and ideology, such as both Western and Eastern Europe. Finally, the Third World meant those who refused to follow any superpower's leadership and encompassed China, India, and many postcolonial nations of Asia and Africa.[432] Despite the idea of the Third World being developed after Cold War had already started, the term is generally employed by historians retrospectively in relation to the post-1945 geopolitical reality, although in regards to the present it is often considered obsolete and substituted for the concept of the Global South.[433]

Although similar and often including the same countries, the Western view of the Third World was much more focused on economic development while the Maoist one seemed to prioritize ideology as well as the subjective decision of a nation to willingly refuse participation in either camp. In addition, Japan's position varied depending on the theory—she was clearly part of the First World in the Western theory but a member of the Second in the Maoist theory. Importantly though, Japan was never seen as a Third World nation.

What is more, during the period analyzed in this dissertation (1945-1952), a "third way" between the two political camps could hardly be seen as a viable option—for Japan, or any other major nation for that matter. Researchers of the Cold War neutralism are generally in agreement that neutrality during Cold War started to be considered a political possibility only after two seminal international events, both of which occurred in 1955: the conference of Third World nations in Bandung and the "neutralization" of Austria.[434] But at that time, Japan was already in its fourth year of regained independence.

Next to globalization and bipolarity, nuclear arms race constituted another key characteristic of Cold War.[435] When World War II ended, America was the only nation capable of developing an atomic bomb: a fact demonstrated at Hiroshima in Nagasaki in August 1945. Far from being surprised at such an occurrence, Stalin had already known before about the American nuclear program. In fact, the Soviets were developing their own atomic bomb since

[432] Xu Lanjun, "Translation and internationalism." In *Mao's Little Red Book*, p. 78; Cook, "Introduction," pp. 16-17.
[433] McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War*, p. 202.
[434] Wyss et al., "A tightrope walk," p. 1.
[435] Wagner, "What was bipolarity?", p. 79.

1940, though with a much slower progress than the Americans.[436] In 1946, the Soviet nuclear program accelerated rapidly, in part due to increased political priority assigned from above, and in part due to successful espionage. As a result, in August 1949, the U.S.S.R. conducted its first successful nuclear test, which meant that from that point onward, both superpowers possessed atomic weapons.[437] Yet simultaneously, a development of another type of weapon, called thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb, was authorized by both sides, and the race to obtain this new, even more destructive bomb dominated the early 1950s.[438]

Starting with Britain, other countries aside from two superpowers were also developing weapons of mass destruction.[439] However, what defined the Cold War nuclear arms race was not mere possession of such weapons but the means to pursue a "strategy of global deterrence," a term introduced by the scholar Arthur Lee Burns in the 1950s.[440] It meant, in short, a state's capability to unleash a military retaliation against any possible threat on a global stage. Utilizing nuclear weapons, such a retaliation should be massive enough to dissuade potential aggressors. Necessary prerequisites for this strategy included a vast nuclear arsenal and great capabilities of developing both the bombs themselves, as well as adequate ballistic missiles. In practice, this meant that even if other countries were able to procure nuclear weapons, only the two superpowers could effectively employ the strategy of global deterrence.[441] Since these superpowers each led a broad military alliance under their own "nuclear umbrellas," any conflict involving them could easily transform into an all-out war, possibly ending in a mutually assured destruction. Thus the need for the so-called "proxy wars," in which the superpowers could act as outsiders, leading to indirect confrontation between the two main blocs.

The nuclear arms race was widely publicized, shaping public opinion on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The fear of possible consequences of a nuclear war strongly affected imagination of peoples around the world, influencing various movements to forbid the possession of atomic bomb.[442] Intellectuals from both communist and non-communist countries

[436] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 92.
[437] McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War*, p. 63.
[438] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 100-101.
[439] McCauley, *Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 66-67.
[440] Arthur Lee Burns, "From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis," *World Politics* 9, 4 (1957), pp. 494-529.
[441] Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 98.
[442] Astrid Mignon Kirchhof, Jan-Henrik Meyer, "Global Protest Against Nuclear Power: Transfer and Transnational Exchange in the 1970s and 1980s," *Historical Social Research* 39, 1 (2014), p. 176.

figured prominently in these movements. Although Japanese intellectuals were not an exception, situation in Japan regarding this topic in 1945-1952 was peculiar.

American censorship in occupied Japan was particularly harsh regarding any mentions of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, since the development of the nuclear weapons often made international news, particularly after the Soviets obtained it in 1949, it was impossible for the Americans to keep the Japanese completely in the dark. In that same year, the U.S. proposed to designate Hiroshima a "city of peace," an action which Ann Sherif considers an effort "to bolster [America's] own moral standing."[443]

Strong presence of the topic of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japanese public memory—along with associated social trauma—both during the postwar period and today, is well-documented and has received attention from many scholars.[444] Immediately after the war, however, the topic was almost non-existent outside of the affected areas, owing not only to the occupation-era censorship, but also to the memory of American incendiary air raids, which had devastated Tokyo and other major cities of Japan. For many ordinary Japanese, the fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, lying in complete ruin after the war, was not much different from the fate of other cities.[445] The notion that there is something special about the Japanese experience due to being attacked by an atomic bomb appeared around 1954-1955, in response to the "Lucky Dragon" incident of March 1954. The incident saw all twenty-three crew members of a Japanese fishing boat (under the name *Fukuryū Maru* 福竜丸 or "Lucky Dragon" in English) contaminated by nuclear fallout from American hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll. The event provoked outrage among the Japanese public, making it aware of the problem of nuclear weapons and their consequences.[446] It also launched the first wave of the anti-nuclear

[443] Sherif, *Japan's Cold War*, p. 6.
[444] Nemoto Masaya, "Naze konna me ni awanakute wa naranakatta no ka? Genbaku higaisha no kurushimi to sono imi no tsuikyū" [Why did they have to go through this? Exploring the suffering of the atomic bomb victims and the meaning behind it]. In *Sensō to bunkateki torauma: Nihon ni okeru dainiji sekai taisen no chōkiteki eikyō* [War and cultural trauma: The long-term effects of World War II in Japan], eds. Takeshima Tadashi, Mori Shigeyuki, Nakamura Eri (Nihon Hyōronsha, 2023), pp. 194-204—is an example of an excellent, and also very good, study dealing with memory and trauma related to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
[445] Yamamoto Akihiro, *Kaku-enerugī gensetsu no sengo shi 1945-1960: "Hibaku no kioku" to "genshiryoku no yume"* [Postwar history of nuclear energy discourse, 1945-1960: "Memories of the atomic bombing" and the "dream of atomic energy"] (Jinbun Shoin, 2012). The first part of the book is dedicated to tracing down mentions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings during the occupation period. Though they were not so few, most of them remained very subtle or indirect.
[446] Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, pp. 37-38.

movement in Japan, which can be described as "cyclical."[447] By no accident, that same year, in 1954, "Godzilla" (*Gojira* ゴジラ), a famous Japanese movie hit, debuted in the theaters. It told the story of a monster awakened by irresponsible hydrogen bomb testing. What ultimately defeated the menace was Japanese ingenuity and self-sacrifice.[448] The "Lucky Dragon" incident and the subsequent wave of antinuclear, antiwar, and often also anti-American, protests ultimately led Japanese society to rediscover the story of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[449]

Thus, despite being a key characteristic of Cold War, nuclear arms race did not impact occupation-era Japan to the extent comparable to other non-communist countries. Throughout all major *sōgō zasshi*—be it *Sekai*, *Chūō Kōron*, or *Tenbō*—Japanese intellectuals commented occasionally on the development of nuclear weapons or nuclear energy, but this was done without any relation to the specific Japanese experience.[450] Neither did these articles occupy a significant spot in the journals of that time. The only exception was when Yukawa Hideki, a Japanese theoretical physicist, received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1949 for research on nuclear power. His work was purely theoretical, however, and not linked to any military usage.[451]

3.2. The Reverse Course

The period between September 1945 and January 1947 constituted the most progressive episode in Japan's postwar history, not only of the occupation era. It was also a time when the objectives of American occupation seemed extremely clear and most intellectuals calling for democratization, regardless of their worldviews, could see SCAP and GHQ as partners in their efforts. This period reached an abrupt—and for most intellectuals, utterly unexpected—end in February 1947.

The Japanese union movement, which was largely built up by the SCAP-driven labor reforms of 1945-1946, had, for the first time in history, grown to be relatively powerful and

[447] Beata Bochorodycz, *Fukushima and Civil Society: The Japanese Anti-Nuclear Movement from a Sociological Perspective* (Routledge, 2022), pp. 40-42.
[448] Sherif, *Japan's Cold War*, p. 1.
[449] Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 37.
[450] For example: Nishina Yoshio, "Genshiryoku mondai" [The problem of nuclear power], *Sekai* 13 (1947), pp. 48-62; Iguchi Ichirō, "Genshi bakudan to sekai seiji" [The atomic bomb and world politics], *Chūō Kōron* 64, 11 (1949), pp. 73-81; Nakaya Ukichirō, "Genshiryoku jidai no fushigi" [Wonders of the atomic age], *Bungei Shunjū* 30, 17 (1952), pp. 158-163.
[451] Saijō Toshimi, "Yukawa Hideki," *Butsuri Kyōiku* 52, 2 (2004), pp. 172-173.

willing to get involved in open confrontations. The year 1946 alone marked approximately 1,260 industrial disputes with participation of nearly 845,000 unionists.[452] In Japan's difficult economic situation, plagued by shortages of food and other commodities, as well as continuing efforts to rebuild devastated cities, major labor unions often clashed with the liberal conservative governments of first Shidehara Kijūrō and later Yoshida Shigeru. In an ultimatum, issued in December 1946, they demanded several legal provisions, including minimum wage, threatening to organize a general strike by 1 February 1947, if their conditions were not met. The ultimatum's main objective was provoking a collapse of the government, viewed as "anti-union."[453] Their force was significant, as overall they represented around three million workers.[454]

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Yoshida was not willing to compromise, considering the labor unions to be nothing more than a "den of communists."[455] This was true only partially, since the Japan Communist Party was one of several left-wing and progressive forces affiliated with the movement. All of these forces were united in their antagonistic stance toward Yoshida.[456] On the other hand, GHQ, sympathetic to the unionists, tried to negotiate, yet without much result. In this situation, MacArthur invoked his authority as SCAP and on 31 January 1947, just one day before the planned general strike, explicitly forbade it.[457]

A change in the occupation authorities' attitude toward labor unions is clearly visible when looking at the letter sent to President Truman by SCAP's political advisor and Chief of Government Section of GHQ, George Atcheson, Jr., on 5 January 1947. Atcheson wrote that, while Japan's government and the population at large remain cooperative which ensures a smooth progress of all intended reforms, the difficult economic situation emboldens an "aggressive minority" that has managed to wrestle control of labor unions and instigate them to participate actively in political matters.[458] Atcheson's opinion, undoubtedly informed by the general mood in GHQ, goes to show that MacArthur's decision was not made ad hoc and

[452] Fukui, "Postwar politics," pp. 174-175.
[453] Andrew Gordon, "Contests for the Workplace" in *Postwar Japan as History*, p. 380.
[454] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 268.
[455] [Yoshida Shigeru], *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis*, trans. Yoshida Ken'ichi (Heinemann, 1961), pp. 38-40.
[456] Sheldon M. Garon, "The Imperial Bureaucracy and Labor Policy in Postwar Japan," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 43, 3 (1984), p. 450.
[457] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 269.
[458] "The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to President Truman," 5 January 1947, in *U.S. Department of State: Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter: *FRUS*], 1947, The Far East, Vol. VI, ed. John G. Reid (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 157-160 (Document 168).

resulted from a reassessment of broader situation in Japan by Supreme Commander and his staff.

The move to ban the general strike came as a surprise both to intellectuals, as well as the unions themselves, which, despite their militant attitude toward the government, obeyed SCAP's order. MacArthur's stated reason for the ban was economic. He argued that a general strike would further sink an already struggling nation, deepening hardships for everyday Japanese. His actual reason, however, was political, since he did not want the firmly anticommunist government to fall.[459] All Japanese cabinets of the occupation era kept a compliant stance vis-à-vis the Americans and Yoshida certainly was not the most conforming. But he cultivated a working relationship with MacArthur since the very beginning of the occupation and the general seemed to feel some affinity for him, perhaps linked to their shared ideological views: both were conservative in sociocultural issues, liberal in economy, and hostile to communism.[460] While MacArthur's personal worldview was heavily mitigated by his surrounding officers, mostly progressive, as well as a sense of a pro-democracy mission in Japan, his private opinions may have influenced his judgment to some extent, especially in unilateral decisions such as the one to ban the general strike of February 1947.

The general strike's fiasco served as a strong blow to the credibility of labor unions, which began to lose their influence in society. MacArthur's decision, regardless of the reasoning behind, cemented the political alliance between him and Yoshida, which eventually brought Cold War to Japan's domestic politics.[461] Equally significant was the major drop of public trust in SCAP, particularly among intellectuals. This, however, can be seen only in retrospection: while the daily press, like *Asahi Shimbun*, informed about the ban on its first page, headlined as "General strike not allowed—General MacArthur's statement," the *sōgō zasshi* kept silent.[462]

Neither *Sekai*, *Chūō Kōron*, or *Tenbō* offered any commentary on the event.[463] Even in *Zen'ei*, a communist magazine focused strongly on labor relations, one can hardly find any mention of the matter at all. In the case of February 1947 issue it can be understood, since the journal was released on the first day of the month and could not have been able to comment on the ban. However, situation becomes peculiar when looking at the issue from March. One of

[459] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp. 318-320.
[460] *The Yoshida Memoirs*, pp. 48-49.
[461] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p. 320-321.
[462] *Asahi Shimbun*, February 1, 1947.
[463] This concerns the issues from February and March 1947.

the magazine's opening articles, dealing with the political situation of labor unions, does not even use the word "general strike" (*zenesutora* ゼネストラ) a single time, omitting the topic completely and instead focusing on a strategy for the upcoming general elections.[464] The effects of censorship are clearly on display here.

The February 1947 general strike ban may have surprised many observers but it was followed by other moves by SCAP and GHQ which demonstrated that the Americans' priorities in Japan had changed. In May 1947, Economics and Science Section of GHQ finished drafting a new policy paper in regards to the labor movement. The document, approved by the section head, General William Marquat, made countering communist influence in labor the primary objective.[465] Subsequently, SCAP sponsored a series of new legal proposals, limiting labor rights, first of which was made law in July 1947 (and later ones in 1948 and 1949).[466]

A new, skeptical (if not hostile) attitude toward labor was the first aspect of a broader, more complex policy change which partially stemmed from MacArthur's own decision-making, but in large part came from Washington. George Kennan, who since May 1947 worked as Directory of Policy Planning under Secretary of State George Marshall, became interested in Japan and that same year started advocating for a revision of occupation policy. In his view, the priority should be given to economic recovery that could help Japan regain her strong political position in Asia.[467] Japan occupied an important position in Kennan's strategy of containment (which shaped U.S. foreign policy in 1947-1949), being on a list of countries that Washington should not allow to fall into hostile hands for the sake of America's safety and national interest.[468] Shifting the goal of the occupation of Japan to economic rehabilitation would, in Kennan's opinion, transform the former enemy into an ally, laying ground for the future peace treaty.[469]

Throughout 1947, Kennan continuously lobbied for a policy change regarding Japan. His arguments seem to have shifted the dominated views in regards to Japan policy, at least in the Department of State. In a secret memorandum from 11 August 1947 John P. Davis, Jr., of the Policy Planning Staff mentioned that the new prevailing opinion inside the department is

[464] Hasegawa Hiroshi, "Rōdōsha kumiai to sōsenkyo" [Labor unions and the general elections], *Zen'ei* 14 (1947), pp. 4-5.
[465] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p. 323.
[466] Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, pp. 44-45.
[467] Ibid., pp. 87, 106.
[468] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 30.
[469] Ibid., pp. 38-39.

that a "drastic" commitment to democratization of Japan is no longer needed. The priority he argued, should rather be given to making sure that post-occupation Japan remains a stable ally of America and does not drift outside U.S. sphere of influence.[470]

Kennan visited Tokyo at the beginning of 1948, and several meetings with MacArthur. His impressions of both the Supreme Commander and the entire occupation apparatus could not have been much worse, however, as he came to consider them "parasites," feeding off Japan's impoverished society and squandering a large part of the enormous budget entrusted to them by Washington. Upon his return to America, Kennan started to call for further alliance with Japan's traditional elites and condemned the 1945-1946 progressive reforms as overly idealistic.[471] In a list of recommendations submitted to the Secretary of State in March 1948, he also called for the U.S. government to "make up its mind" about several issues related to Japan and consequently start exercising stricter control over the Supreme Commander.[472] Kennan's visit to Japan and his evaluation of the situation were instrumental in cementing the major shift in the White House's policy toward Japan.[473]

Introducing this change to the actual occupation policy was obstructed by the Japanese general election from April 1947, which was won by the Japan Socialist Party and resulted in the first socialist cabinet in Japan's history.[474] The new left-wing government had support of the most ardent GHQ "New Dealers," like General Whitney and Colonel Kades, determined to keep the progressive course of the occupation. When the JSP started to struggle to remain in power over major corruption scandals involving cabinet ministers, the GHQ officials attempted to censor all information pertaining to this matter. Their effort was ultimately sabotaged by a fellow member of MacArthur's general staff, Major General Charles Willoughby, head of G-2 (intelligence) both in Japan (under MacArthur) and in the entire East Asia (under the U.S. Department of Defense). Willoughby used intelligence officers to bypass censorship and spread the news of corruption, leading to the fall of left-wing government and its replacement by

[470] "Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davis, Jr., of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Kennan)," 11 August 1947, in *FRUS*, 1947, The Far East, Vol. VI, pp. 485-486 (Document 393).
[471] Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, pp. 125-126.
[472] "Report by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)," 25 March 1948, in *FRUS*, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Vol. VI, eds. Reid, David H. Stauffer (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 691-719 (Document 519).
[473] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp. 458-459.
[474] Fukui, "Postwar politics," p. 165.

Yoshida Shigeru in October 1948.[475] After coming back to power, Yoshida remained prime minister until December 1954, outlasting the occupation by more than two years.

Yoshida's case was not completely unique. When comparing Japan to the Western European countries, visible similarities can be identified in Italy and France, both of which were key American allies with a potentially high risk of internal capture by communist forces. In April 1948, the centrist Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana) won over the Soviet-backed Popular Democratic Front (Fronte Democratico Popolare) in Italian parliamentary elections.[476] At the same time in France, the French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français) had just recently been pushed outside of the ruling coalition and attempted to paralyze the country by supporting labor strikes and other measures directed against the unstable and often changing centrist governments.[477] Despite local differences, increased political polarization and high-profile strikes, both influenced by Cold War, constitute clear similarities to the political situation in Japan.

However, internal Japanese politics were complicated by the fact that MacArthur, despite his anticommunist views, did not want to allow Washington to dictate occupation policy directly, viewing it as infringing upon his own power.[478] He also did not consider communism in Japan such a threat that it should warrant any drastic changes.[479] In 1947 and 1948, despite being a vital actor responsible for the policy shift, he simultaneously tried opposing some of Kennan's ideas related to the economy. But when President Truman signed a directive on Japan in December 1948, MacArthur lost effective possibilities to resist. Truman's decision made Kennan's strategy of containment the basis of U.S. occupation—a culmination of the gradual change which had been taking place since the early 1947.[480]

The year 1948 saw further toughening of occupation policy. Even after the general strike ban of February 1947, many Japanese still thought of it as an ad hoc action by MacArthur. But in March 1948, General Marquat declared that the ban was a policy decision and any further

[475] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp. 467-468.
[476] Kaeten Mistry, *The United States, Italy, and the Origins of Cold War: Waging Political Warfare, 1945-1950* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 127-152,
[477] Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958*, trans. Godfrey Rogers (Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 112-150.
[478] Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, pp. 138-139
[479] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp. 477-478
[480] Ibid., pp. 468-469.

attempts at organizing a general strike will not be tolerated.[481] At the same time, SCAP started legal persecution of Koreans, who constituted a significant minority in postwar Japan.[482] Revoking the right of Koreans to separate education provoked a wave of protests led by labor unions and intellectuals. Members of the Korean minority, who became Japanese citizens as a result of the annexation of their country by Japan in 1910, were largely repatriated in 1945-1946 to the Korean Peninsula by the Americans. However, for various reasons, around 600,000 of the Koreans remained in Japan. They were mostly living in poor economic conditions and faced social ostracism from some Japanese, which in turn spurred many of them to engage in antigovernment or communist activity.[483] Under the occupation regime, Japanese intellectuals—to the extent that it was made possible by the occupation regime—made protecting the rights of Korean citizens one of their key issues.[484]

Public protests in defense of the Koreans prompted SCAP and the Yoshida government to issue a series of public order statutes, significantly boosting police capabilities of suppressing protests and riots.[485] The increased police force was sometimes supplemented by regular American military units. In August 1948, troops from the U.S. Eighth Army—including six armored vehicles, five tanks, and three aircraft—crushed a 1,500-people strong union strike in Tōhō Motion Pictures Studios (Tōhō Satsueijo 東宝撮影所) in Tokyo, which protested the illegal layoffs of employees by the company. The objective behind using such a disproportionate force against unarmed and non-violent protesters was to intimidate labor union federations, since they were considered sympathetic to communism.[486] These actions by the Americans echoed the earlier crackdown on Hollywood movie industry inside the United States, exemplified by a blacklist of left-wing screenwriters, directors, and actors to be removed from their jobs without pay. First version of this list, resulting from the work of the congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, was created in November 1947. The following years

[481] Ivan Morris, *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-war Trends* (Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 108-109.
[482] Choi Deokhyo, "Rethinking Imperial Legacies and the Cold War in Allied Occupied Japan." In *Reconsidering Postwar Japanese History: A Handbook*, ed. Simon Avenell (Amsterdam University Press, 2023), p. 13.
[483] Tsurumi, *An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan*, Chapter 7; Morris, *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan*, pp. 69-70.
[484] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 196.
[485] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp. 462-464.
[486] Ibid., pp. 465-466.

brought further persecution of persons suspected of holding communist views or sympathies in America.[487]

Washington's strategy regarding Japan also envisioned making the country economically sustainable and thus not reliant on continuous U.S. aid. To this end, MacArthur eventually gave up on his ambition to decentralize (decartelize) Japanese industry and in February 1949 GHQ brought Joseph Dodge as an economic advisor. Chairman of the National Bank of Detroit and a former advisor in occupied West Germany, Dodge effectively became the single most influential person in Japan on matters of economy. He presented a complex financial stabilization program, designed to curb Japan's hyperinflation, balancing the budget, and increase capabilities of exporting trade goods. Although Dodge's reforms accomplished their immediate objectives, it was done at a very high social cost of mass layoffs and severe economic recession.[488] In addition, delegating financial decision-making to an American banker not part of the occupation personnel effectively reduced democratic control over the economy almost two years after the new constitution came into force.

Dodge's plan constituted a significant change in postwar Japan's economic policy and was thus met with considerable commentary among Japanese intellectuals. In March 1949, almost immediately after the plan had been unraveled, *Chūō Kōron* published a *zadankai*, in which Watanabe Takeshi, Director-General of the Minister's Secretariat in the Ministry of Finance, as well as a person deeply involved in the realization of the Dodge Plan, met with four economists.[489] The discussion, however, was far from being a one-sided explanation of the policy objectives, even though Watanabe gave arguments in favor of the plan at various points during the debate. Other participants voiced their doubts: Tokyo University professor Arisawa Hiromi was not convinced by the framing of Dodge's Plan as a "road to Japan's independence."[490] Similarly, Hotta Shōzō, vice president of Sumitomo Bank (in 1948-1952 operating under the name "Osaka Bank"), signaled doubts regarding some of the specifics, such as the way in which Japan's national income is measured as part of the plan.[491] Although the general atmosphere of the *zadankai* remained more reserved rather than enthusiastic, the

[487] Dan Georgakas, "Hollywood Blacklist." In *Encyclopedia of the American Left*, eds. Mari Jo Buhle, Paul Buhle, Dan Georgakas (Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 323-327.
[488] Simon James Bytheway, "Money, Banking, and Fiscal Reforms in Allied Occupied Japan, 1945-1952." In *Reconsidering Postwar Japanese History*, pp. 31-34.
[489] Wakimura Yoshitarō et al., "Kyūgensoku o meguru Keizai saiken no shomondai" [Issues surrounding the nine-points economic reconstruction], *Chūō Kōron* 64, 3 (March 1949), pp. 4-15.
[490] Ibid., pp. 5-6.
[491] Ibid., p. 13.

participants were supportive of the general idea of the economic stabilization program. Similarly, Minobe Ryōkichi, a Marxian economist associated with Japanese political left, argued very strongly for the implementation of Dodge's plan in a separate article.[492] This last voice is particularly interesting since Minobe was closely associated with Japanese political left and critical of Yoshida's cabinet, but still put considerable faith in the American occupation and General MacArthur personally.[493] As remarkable as it was, *Chūō Kōron* as a magazine should also be seen here as an actor shaping the intellectual discourse. Its editorial office might have been more inclined to host such strongly pro-American views than the more progressive *Sekai*.

Simultaneously with Dodge's reforms, SCAP instructed the Japanese government to initiate a wide anticommunist campaign which came to be known as the "Red Purge" (*reddo pāji* レッドパージ). Despite MacArthur's earlier pronounced assuredness that communism in Japan is insignificant, the Americans and the Japanese government were both alarmed by the results of January 1949 general election. While giving the victory to Yoshida and allowing him to continue as prime minister, the election also awarded almost ten percent of the vote to the Japan Communist Party.[494] Beginning in April 1949 (though some accounts seek its antecedents in late 1948), the purge gradually extended its scope, targeting not only communists (understood as politicians or political activists), but also real or supposed communism-sympathizers in civil service, academia, mass media, literature and arts, as well as among union workers, Koreans, and teachers. By 1951, the total of over 27,300 people were removed from their jobs and positions. The Red Purge operated in an identical way and utilized the same apparatus as the 1945-1946 purge of nationalists and militarists.[495] This new situation thwarted careers of many intellectuals. For example, Marxist Umemoto Katsumi, who in 1949 was supposed to receive a tenure at the newly established Ibaraki University (which was a public university), was ultimately passed over for the job due to his affiliation with JCP—as per GHQ's instructions.[496]

That something very significant had changed in American occupation policy was evident already to the contemporaries and the shift came to be known as the "Reverse Course" (*gyaku kōsu* 逆コース). Its name originated from a series of articles in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, a major daily, which ran for one month between November and December of 1951. The articles

[492] Minobe Ryōkichi, "Keizai kyūgensoku no yōsei to genjitsu" [The demands and realities of the nine-point economic plan] *Chūō Kōron* 64, 3 (March 1949), pp. 16-22.
[493] Ibid.
[494] Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement*, p. 72.
[495] Kōda, *The United States and the Japanese Student Movement*, pp. 480-482.
[496] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, pp. 224-225.

illustrated how different aspects of public and everyday life in early postwar Japan had gradually become more and more reminiscent of wartime and prewar era. The series was published under a title "Reverse Course," which was a clearly pejorative label. An editorial from November 15 further elaborated on these changes, lamenting that the "reformist mood," which accompanied the promulgation of the new constitution, had largely disappeared.[497]

In scholarship, the Reverse Course is associated strictly with the realm of politics and is based upon the relatively undisputed conclusion that the progressive direction of early occupation reforms and social change was to some extent altered, or even reversed, during the later years.[498] What is, however, debatable, is the starting point of the Reverse Course. The traditional view identify its beginning in 1947; with MacArthur's general strike ban in January/February of that year serving as the earliest possible date.[499] Many scholars consider the events in 1947 early indications of the upcoming change, but push the actual beginning of the process later, arguing that the general policy shift occurred in 1948 (and that earlier the change was limited only to some aspects of public life).[500]

An authority on Japan's postwar history, Nakamura Masanori, wrote that Reverse Course constituted the policy decision made in Washington and reflective of the global Cold War. While this shift occurred in 1947-1948, it was in early 1949, when Yoshida's power grew after the election, that the Reverse Course became institutionalized into a "Reverse Course regime" (*gyaku kōsu taisei* 逆コース体制). As it would have been impossible to implement fully as a one-sided, American-only project, it thus rested heavily on collaboration between the United States and Japan's conservative government.[501] Agreeing with Nakamura only partially, Takemae Eiji, an expert on the inner workings of GHQ, casts doubt on whether the course really was "reversed," since it did not roll back any of the most fundamental reforms of 1945-1946, such as the constitution, women's rights, land redistribution, institutional reform, or social security. For him, it was a clear change of policy but not exactly a true reversal.[502]

[497] Choi, "Rethinking Imperial Legacies," p. 10.
[498] Kōda, *The United States and the Japanese Student Movement*, p. 2.
[499] Choi, "Rethinking Imperial Legacies," p. 4.
[500] Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, p. 51.
[501] Nakamura Masanori, "Senryō to wa nan datta no ka" [What was the occupation?] in *Nihon dōjidai shi* [Contemporary history of Japan], Vol. 2: *Senryō seisaku no tenkan to kōwa* [Occupation policy change and the peace treaty], ed. Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (Aoki Shoten, 1990), p. 240.
[502] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p. 473.

Despite Takemae's valid objections, the Reverse Course can still serve as an adequate term for the phenomenon if one takes into account that it describes how the occupation policy shift was perceived rather than the objective reality. Any factors potentially undermining the validity of the term relevant for political history may lose their significance when applied to intellectual history, which deals with a much different object of research. In his classic treatment of postwar Japanese intellectual discourse, Koschmann treats the Reverse Course as a matter of fact and considers the general strike ban of early 1947 as its beginning.[503] So does a prominent intellectual historian of a younger generation, Nick Kapur, who accepts both claims.[504]

As shown with the general strike ban, various milestones in the shaping and tightening of the Reverse Course during 1947-1948 often left limited possibilities for scrutiny or comment on the part of Japanese intellectuals. In spite of this (forced) silence, reflected in the magazines, their actions reveal a clear awareness of the situation, both at home and abroad. While often not able to respond directly to SCAP's decisions, Japanese intellectuals could engage in more productive forms of opposition. One of the best known postwar Japanese historians, Ienaga Saburō, started publicly speaking out in a direct response to the Reverse Course, being convinced that democracy in Japan had come under threat.[505] For many, especially on the left, the time constituted a "dark era" of postwar history, culminating in the year 1949, when SCAP and Yoshida initiated the Red Purge.[506] Still, there remained some leeway for the radical left in Japan, especially for those Marxists and communists who restricted themselves to intellectual activity. The foremost organization of Marxist historians, the Historical Science Society of Japan (Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai 歴史学研究会), or "Rekiken" 歴研, has radically increased its activity during 1948-1949 in reaction to the difficult political situation.[507]

Without a doubt, the Reverse Course served as a mobilizing factor for Japanese intellectuals. This is clearly visible when reading the transcript of a later discussion between Kuno Osamu, Tsurumi Shunsuke, and Fujita Shōzō. All three of whom belonged to the community of remorse but represented different generations. Looking back at the mood among intellectuals at the time, Tsurumi recalled that this new situation, while challenging, provided

[503] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 22.
[504] Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, p. 9.
[505] Robert N. Bellah, "Ienaga Saburō and the Search for Meaning in Modern Japan" in Jansen, ed., *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization*, pp. 402-403.
[506] Nakamura Masanori, *Sengo shi* [Postwar history] (Iwanami Shoten, 2005), p. 35.
[507] Tōyama Shigeki, *Sengo no rekishigaku to rekishi ishiki* [Postwar historiography and historical consciousness] (Iwanami Shoten, 2001), pp. 73-74.

them with a chance to atone for their past mistakes. Remorseful for not resisting during the war, they gladly received this "second" opportunity to resist the new political reality brought upon by the Reverse Course. In their perspective, Japan's Greater East Asian War has been substituted to Cold War.[508]

However, the Cold War reality also posed the biggest postwar challenge for unity and common objectives of the community of remorse. This was evidenced perhaps most clearly by the internal conflict in *Sekai*, which erupted in 1947.

3.3. Conflict in *Sekai* and the founding of *Kokoro*

The political environment surrounding Japan's intellectual life consisted of two dimensions—international and domestic. Both underwent significant change in the period between early 1947 and mid-1949. The international dimension, characterized by the global Cold War, was mirrored in domestic politics by the introduction of the Reverse Course. While Japanese intellectuals responded to the changing situation at home and abroad, at least to the extent allowed to them by the occupation regime, their position vis-à-vis this new environment was not merely reactive but also included new initiatives and attempts to reorient their group politically. This led to internal tensions inside the community of remorse, the most impactful of which was the conflict between the "young progressives" and "old liberals," which ran directly through the editorial office of *Sekai*.

When Iwanami Shigeo decided to launch *Sekai*, his friends from Dōshinkai probably did not expect him to name someone like Yoshino Genzaburō its editor-in-chief. Yoshino, who was a progressive rather than a liberal, invited to the magazine intellectuals of various ages and worldviews, true to the original intent of Iwanami. That this pluralistic amalgam of authors could work together, and even complement each other so well, was no doubt a personal success of Yoshino but, even more, a result of the shared vision of democratic Japan among intellectuals. As long as the sense of unity persisted, *Sekai* could hope to remain a unified platform for all proponents of democratic reforms.

Even though he became the editor-in-chief, Yoshino did not effectively possess full control over *Sekai* during the first year and a half. He supervised the daily operation of the

[508] Kuno, Tsurumi, Fujita, *Sengo Nihon no shisō*, pp. 134-135.

magazine and invited authors to contribute articles, but Abe Yoshishige remained a powerful presence at the office. This was due to both his close friendship with president Iwanami and his status as the head of Dōshinkai (which encompassed many of *Sekai*'s authors).[509] Yoshino had his own trustees, on opinions of whom he often relied: Shimizu Ikutarō, Nakano Yoshio, and Kawamori Yoshizō.[510] Kawamori was a professor of French literature at Tokyo Higher Normal School (a teachers college, in 1949 transformed into Tokyo University of Education), and Nakano was a professor of English literature at the University of Tokyo. All three were left-of-center progressives of similar age to Yoshino. While there was nothing unusual in their friendship with the editor-in-chief, their cooperation in the initial period of *Sekai* clearly signaled that Yoshino was willing to remain separate from Dōshinkai. Since the early *Sekai* articles of Dōshinkai authors featured prominently in the previous chapter, it is needed to look more closely at that group in order to understand the differences between its members and Yoshino's group.

Dōshinkai, which encompassed Abe Yoshishige, his colleagues from among intellectuals, and initially also the pro-peace foreign minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, was established in August 1945. The group itself did not constitute a formally-bound organization, being more similar to a social circle. After the war had ended, Dōshinkai became a purely intellectual group, without affiliation to any government officials. At some point at the end of 1945 or in early 1946, its members began to be called the "old liberals" (*ōrudo riberarisuto* オールドリベラリスト) by other intellectuals. This term became standard for the rest of the period and is often used in scholarship.

The adjective "old" has two meanings here, both of which are equally relevant. First, it refers to the fact that in the postwar period, Dōshinkai members were significantly older than most of their colleagues in the literary world, academia, and media. They represented a generation born in the 1880s, who had their academic or literary careers already well-established by the mid-1910s. In Japanese culture, seniority plays a very important role in all social situations, which meant that the over-sixty-year-old Dōshinkai members had precedence and strong position in discussions with fellow intellectuals, both privately and in public.

Additionally, the name "old liberals" denotes that in the eyes of their colleagues, they represented an old, and perhaps outdated, understanding of liberalism. Actually, if compared to

[509] Yoshino, "Sengo no sanjū nen," p. 255.
[510] Ibid.

the younger generation of liberals like Maruyama, Ienaga Saburō, or Miyagi Otoya, the difference is easily noticeable. Liberalism of Maruyama and others was progressive in a sense that they believed that the changing society requires new, constantly evolving ideas. Furthermore, it was not hostile to Marxism and interested in labor rights or social security.

There is valid question of whether the old liberals were actually conservatives. I will briefly explore this problem since it is linked to the nature of the conflict inside *Sekai*. Positioning the old liberals as conservatives in not uncommon among scholars and Tamamoto Masaru serves as a good example since he gives several arguments for such a designation.[511]

His main argument pertains to the situational role the old liberals occupied in postwar intellectual life. Since they were to the right of Marxists, progressives, and progressive liberals, that made them "conservative" in the changing ideological spectrum. Even if they were not conservative before or during the war, they became conservative once the framework had changed. Furthermore, their attachment to the ideals of Taishō democracy could be seen as conservative, since it was a thing of the past.[512] Another argument refers to the old liberals' involvement in the postwar sociopolitical order, which could be seen as further proof of their conservatism. Two of the group members (Abe and Tanaka Kōtarō) header the Ministry of Education in 1946-1947, although very briefly, and Abe was also president of the prestigious Gakushūin University for twenty years.[513]

However, neither of these arguments seems convincing enough to warrant categorizing the old liberals as conservative. Starting from the last one, it should be sufficient to point out that serving at important posts in early postwar Japan was hardly limited to this one group. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Morito Tatsuo, a prominent Marxist, also served as Minister of Education.[514] During the first postwar years, this same ministry frequently consulted Shimizu Ikutarō, one of the major progressive figures of the period.[515] Another Marxist, Ōuchi Hyōe, was an advisor to Prime Minister Yoshida despite their ideological differences.[516] All of this

[511] Oguma Eiji also views the old liberals as conservatives, but he does not elaborate on this issue as thoroughly as Tamamoto. In addition, his argument mostly relates to the "lifestyle" of the group members rather than their ideas. See Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* pp. 190-192.
[512] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 78.
[513] Ibid., pp. 100-101.
[514] "Morito Tatsuo." In *Nijū seiki Nihon jinmei jiten*. Cited after Kotobank: www.kotobank.jp/word/森戸辰男-142908. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[515] Shimizu, *Sengo o utagau*, p. 65.
[516] Hein, *Reasonable Men, Powerful Words*, p. 100.

happened during the initial postwar years of 1945-1947, but the term "old liberals" had already been coined in late 1945.

Looking back at a certain point in history, especially a recent one, and putting it on a pedestal, does not constitute a mark of conservatism. As before, counterexamples should be entirely sufficient as an argument. The old liberals might have been idealizing the Taishō democracy, but likewise did Maruyama when he looked at the early Meiji period and romanticized a return to that historical moment—in order to "reset" Japan's history and this time "make things right."[517]

Lastly, a change in political framework could perhaps serve as a convincing point if not for the fact that Tamamoto is wrong in identifying the old liberals as occupying the position of the right. Most of the actual Japanese right was either purged by MacArthur or ostracized by their colleagues, but they did not cease to exist and instead became marginalized. Ivan Morris's *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan*, written back in 1960, provides an excellent overview of intellectuals and political activists of the early postwar period, who formed the new nationalist right.[518] However, virtually all of them existed on complete margins of Japan's public discourse, lacking access to the major *sōgō zasshi* (and thus wider popular following).[519]

Conservatism in modern Japan constituted a distinct political and philosophic tradition, which arose in the late Meiji period. In the intellectual realm, it is often said to be embodied by Katō Hiroyuki, a scholar and statesman who lived and remained influential until the beginning of the Taishō period. Katō's thought accepted modernization and constitutional form of government with a parliament, but at the same time opposed further democratization (including universal voting rights), promoted statism (understood as the supreme authority of the state over individual rights of citizens), and espoused social Darwinism.[520] Virtually none of these ideas can be found when examining the thought of the old liberals. What is more, they opposed them throughout their prewar careers and their ideal of Taishō democracy itself was precisely what Katō had fought against. As tautological as it may sound, the old liberals were, in fact, liberal; they supported democratic political reforms, extending the suffrage, free market economy (advocated against by both socialists and nationalists), and pacifism, as well as argued strongly

[517] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 110.
[518] Morris, *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan*.
[519] It would not only be impossible to find any such figures publishing for *sōgō zasshi*; there did not even exist any general opinion magazine collecting contributions from nationalist intellectuals during the occupation period.
[520] Tanaka Hiroshi, "Western Political Thought in a Japanese Context: Hiroyuki Kato [sic] and Nyozekan Hasegawa," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies* 20, 1 (1988), pp. 18-20.

for alignment with the Anglo-Saxon world in international relations. They embraced the new vision of Japan promoted by *Sekai* and constituted the group behind the magazine's founding. For these reasons, it is hard to see them as anything other than liberal. However, Koschmann's observation is of importance here since it helps understand why the categorization of the old liberals remains such a controversial topic. He notes that the strong progressive shift which took place in Japan immediately after the war gave the idea of democracy a new meaning as an active, continuous effort to create a free and equal civil society. It contrasted with the more traditional concept of democracy, understood primarily as institutionally established democracy.[521] The latter was closer to what the old liberals had in mind, leading to potential disagreements with the proponents of a more proactive and progressive vision of democracy.

Since much of Abe's authority in the *Sekai* editorial office rested on his personal ties to Iwanami, it would have been expected for this authority to erode after the latter's death at the end of April 1946. However, the situation did not really change and for the next year and a half, Abe continued his coexistence with Yoshino despite significant personal differences. The changing political environment of 1947, signified by the general strike ban at home and the Truman Doctrine abroad, became the factor responsible for the further worsening of the ties between the two men. Toward the end of the year, Yoshino wrote an article for *Shinchō* 新潮 (*New Tide*) magazine, where he laid out his vision of the position Japanese intellectuals should take vis-à-vis Cold War.[522] It is intriguing that this important piece of writing was published in a different *sōgō zasshi* instead of Yoshino's *Sekai*. While he himself did not provide any explanation for this action, it seems possible that he may have wanted to evade a controversy in which his subjective opinion might have been taken for his magazine's official position since he was the editor-in-chief. However, it would also mean that even in late 1947 Yoshino still did not have the full control over *Sekai* and could not shape the editorial line without regard to Abe and others.

In the *Shinchō* article, Yoshino noted the radical erosion of economic status of most Japanese intellectuals who, as salaried workers, suffered immensely due to the postwar inflation. As a result, the vast majority of them could no longer be considered part of the upper class. This had brought Japanese intellectuals closer to ordinary people and they ought to accept it as new reality, argued Yoshino, in which their collective interests are aligned with those of working

[521] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 15.
[522] Yoshino, "Chishikijin no chi'i ni tsuite," pp. 2-8.

class citizens. He observed that most progressive intellectuals had already come to this realization; however, there remained some who continued to cling to older notions of identity and entitlement.[523]

According to Yoshino, his generation amassed a tremendous amount of historical experiences, witnessing such events as World War I, revolution in Russia, Great Depression, Manchurian Incident, war with China, World War II, rise and fall of Hitler, as well as Japan's military defeat and occupation. This alone makes people who witnessed these events responsible for utilizing this wisdom effectively. Yoshino noted that this is especially important in the face of current circumstances, since the postwar political status quo is very likely to collapse and a new war is practically inevitable.[524] This was not his view alone: when Cold War began, many intellectuals thought that another war involving Japan is a tangible prospect.[525] As can be seen in the case of Yoshino, this realization made them more willing to act in defiance of the status quo.

Even though the terms "old liberals" or Dōshinkai do not come up throughout the text, and neither do any of their members' names, Yoshino clearly intended it as a subtle critique of his older peers. For him, they were too isolated from ordinary people and did not engage sufficiently with current political events.[526] However, a more direct attack would be considered extremely inappropriate due to the difference in age, experience, and prestige; this last factor also played an important role. When writing about his conflict with the old liberals several years later, Yoshino referred to them with utmost respect, calling them "masters" (*taika* 大家).[527] This goes to explain the difficulty and his reluctance to engage in any confrontation with them—much to the frustration of Hanawa Sakura, an employee of Iwanami Shoten, who advised Yoshino to oust the old liberals after the death of the company's president.[528] Haniwa was a JCP member who joined Iwanami in 1945 and later became the head of the company's official labor union. For many years, he was a strong presence at the *Sekai* editorial office and a proponent

[523] Ibid., pp. 7-8.
[524] Ibid., p. 8.
[525] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, pp. 16-17.
[526] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "Yoshino Genzaburō."
[527] Yoshino, "Sengo no sanjū nen," p. 257.
[528] Takeuchi, *Kakushin gensō*, p. 91.

of a strong left-wing realignment of the magazine.[529] Yoshino, however, did not heed to this advice and instead preferred to try modifying the editorial line gradually.

Another key point is understanding Yoshino's position in the emerging debate on the intellectuals' responsibility regarding Cold War is his firm belief in an upcoming new great war.[530] Over the course of 1947 Yoshino came to believe that Cold War necessitates a fundamental change in attitude among Japanese intellectuals who should strongly respond to the new political situation. His main accusation against the old liberals was that they preferred to remain apolitical and focused on ideas and ethics.[531] An attitude very similar to theirs had been responsible for allowing militarism to gain power in Japan not long ago, argued Yoshino in his *Shinchō* article. If the greatest sin of the Japanese intellectuals was their lack of resistance against the war during the 1930s and 1940s, abstaining from political involvement in the face of a new war would constitute a repetition of that same sin.[532]

Regardless of whether his argument was truly convincing or not, the attitude taken by Yoshino in late 1947 shows that he was an actor who tried making Japanese intellectuals participants of the global Cold War. Had he succeeded at that time, *Sekai* would take a strong Cold War stance consistent with the 1947/1948 global lines of polarization, making the case of Japanese intellectuals much more similar to the intellectuals in West Europe and America. Even though Yoshino eventually succeeded in shifting the editorial line of *Sekai*, he managed to do so only gradually. Aside from Haniwa Sakura, most *Sekai* staff members and contributors seem to have stayed within a general notion of Japan's democratization rather than changing their position due to Cold War. By late 1947, the sense of community seemed stronger than Cold War polarization.

The first visible sign that Yoshino managed to have his way in the editorial office and started pushing *Sekai* to the left, occurred at the beginning of 1948, when a *zadankai* was organized under the magazine's auspices. The discussion was held under the title of "Subjectivity in Historical Materialism" ("Yuibutsu shikan no shutaisei" 唯物史観の主体性) and its transcript found its way into the February issue of *Sekai*.[533] Though perhaps a bit

[529] "Hanawa Sakura." In *Nijū seiki Nihon jinmei jiten*. Cited after Kotobank: www.kotobank.jp/word/塙作楽-1652741. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[530] Yoshino, "Chishikijin no chi'i ni tsuite," p. 8.
[531] Yoshino, "Sengo no sanjū nen," p. 257.
[532] Yoshino, "Chishikijin no chi'i ni tsuite," pp. 4-5.
[533] Shimizu Ikutarō et al., "Yuibutsu shikan no shutaisei (zadankai)" [Subjectivity in historical materialism (round-table discussion)] *Sekai* 26 (II 1948), pp. 13-43.

eccentric from the viewpoint of today's reader, the topic actually related to one of the most popular public debates of early postwar Japan, particularly on the left.[534] In short, the debate attempted to decide who, either individually or collectively, possesses agency in historical process (understood in Hegelian way as a progressive, linear movement toward the single goal, determined from the very onset). There has been significant attention devoted to the specifics of the debate on subjectivity by scholars, especially by Koschmann.[535] But what is important here is how it connects to the conflict in *Sekai*.

Despite the topic of subjectivity being generally dominated by thinkers associated with Marxism, it nevertheless left some possibility, at least theoretically, to be discussed also by representatives of other viewpoints. However, the *Sekai* roundtable was framed explicitly in the Marxist terms, treating historical materialism as a go-to paradigm of reflecting on the past. Unsurprisingly, not a single member of the old liberals took part in the discussion. Instead, participants included three Marxist philosophers, Kozai Yoshishige, Matsumura Kazuto, and Mashita Shin'ichi, progressives Shimizu Ikutarō and Miyagi Otoya, as well as the up-and-coming stars of postwar discourse, Maruyama Masao and Hayashi Kentarō. These last two belonged to the youngest generation of intellectuals (born in the Taishō period) and the oldest participants of the *zadankai* were in their early forties, still significantly younger than the old liberals.[536] All of the participants were either Marxists or non-Marxists involved in the Marxist discourse.[537]

The starting point of the debate was the publication of an article by James D. Marshall in *The American Scholar* magazine under the title "Freud and Marx at UNESCO" in summer of the previous year.[538] In occupation-era Japan, intellectual magazines from the United States were more accessible than those from European countries and American social sciences in general enjoyed considerable popularity in early postwar Japan, even on the left.[539] In his article, Marshall claimed that both material (Marxian) and psychological (Freudian) factors are necessary in order to explain historical events such as war.[540] Because psychoanalysis pointed to individual agency, it would typically seem impossible to reconcile with the collectivist

[534] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectiity*, p. 1.
[535] Ibid.
[536] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "Yoshino Genzaburō."
[537] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 99.
[538] James Marshall, "Freud and Marx at UNESCO," *The American Scholar* 16, 3 (1947), pp. 304-311.
[539] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Introduction, "Musabori-yomareta 'Shakaigaku kōgi.'"
[540] Marshall, "Freud and Marx at UNESCO," pp. 305-307.

approach of Marx's socioeconomic analysis—and that was the point which prompted Japanese intellectuals to initiate the discussion in *Sekai*.[541] Most participants tried to conceptualize the problem from the standpoint of their individual understanding of Marxism. Some of them, especially Miyagi and Mashita, presented an interpretation different from the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.[542] Maruyama went into an interesting direction by criticizing what he considered to be an overuse of the terms such as "historical necessity" or "laws of history" in postwar Japan since he believed that utilizing such vocabulary takes the responsibility for own actions away from individual subjects.[543] By calling for more emphasis on ideas rather than materialist factors (and thus distancing himself from Marxism), Maruyama found agreement with Mashita who pronounced an interpretation of Marxism as ideology rather than science.[544] In this potentially iconoclastic statement, Mashita did not represent merely his own views but also those of Umemoto Katsumi, who had recently risen to become one of the most influential thinkers on the Japanese left.[545]

An early historian of postwar Japan, Tōyama Shigeki, saw this as significant development in the early postwar intellectual discourse. For the first time since its arrival in Japan at the turn of the twentieth century, Marxism began to be treated as ideology even among many Marxists themselves and people sympathetic to Marxism.[546] Tōyama's reasons for evaluating this as a notable development were tied to his individual views on Marxist methodology. But this occurrence could be considered important also for another reason.

Among several different dimensions of Cold War, ideological conflict is often considered the primary one.[547] For decades, Japanese left-wing intellectuals treated Marxism purely as a "scientific approach" (even if they held socialist or communist ideas), a paradigm—denying any possibility that it could also carry certain values.[548] However, a realization that besides providing a method of socioeconomical analysis, Marxism also constitutes a distinct ideology, can be seen as key to self-identification with one of the sides of the global ideological struggle. It would be impossible to become fully engaged in this type of conflict without accepting that such a conflict actually exists. The "Subjectivity in Historical Materialism"

[541] Shimizu et al., "Yuibutsu shikan no shutaisei," p. 13.
[542] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, pp. 199-200.
[543] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, pp. 100-101; Tōyama, *Sengo no rekishigaku*, p. 53.
[544] Shimizu et al., "Yuibutsu shikan no shutaisei."
[545] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 200.
[546] Tōyama, *Sengo no rekishigaku*, pp. 54-55.
[547] Westad, *The Global Cold War*, p. 1.
[548] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, pp. 100-101.

symposium can be treated as one of the signs of Japanese intellectuals' evolving perception in relation to Cold War.

Aside from that, the symposium was clearly a major success on the part of Yoshino and signaled his growing influence in the magazine. *Sekai* might have been a strongly pluralistic magazine which involved many left-wing intellectuals from the very beginning, but nevertheless it would be hard to imagine such an event without even a single member of the old liberals, had Abe's position still been as strong as it originally was.

But a decisive moment occurred several months later, in summer 1948, at the time when the government, together with SCAP, cracked down on labor protests with more intensity than before. The increasing political tensions in Japan must have seemed to prove true Yoshino's earlier predictions about the closeness and certainty of the upcoming war. In June 1948, the old liberals decided to part ways with *Sekai* and established their own magazine under the name *Kokoro* 心 (*Heart*), with Abe Yoshishige as its editor-in-chief.[549] There seems to have been no immediate, direct reason for parting ways—rather, the decision had evidently been pondered for at least some time. The quickness of the old liberals leaving *Sekai*, establishing a new magazine, and publishing its first issue all in the same month indicates that they had prepared for this step in advance. Yoshino commented that the parting was natural process due to a difference of opinions.[550] There was no mention of the occurrence either in *Sekai* or even in *Kokoro*, which did not feature any article describing the circumstances of its establishment in the first or in any other issue.

The old liberals, who had been instrumental in the creation of *Sekai*, did not try to replicate its form in their new magazine. *Kokoro*, while certainly a general opinion magazine, presented itself as a "cultural magazine." Analysis of various issues and their contents shows more closeness to literary magazines like *Bungei Shunjū*. Contrary to *Sekai*, which was overloaded with sociopolitical commentary, treating other sections as secondary, the essence of *Kokoro* was culture. Articles directly referencing current events appeared regularly but never constituted the majority of any issue. Authors who contributed most frequently included Abe himself, Mushanokōji Saneatsu, Nagayo Yoshirō, Tatsuno Yutaka, Tanaka Kōtarō, and Amano

[549] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "Yoshino Genzaburō."
[550] Yoshino, "Sengo no sanjū nen," p. 255.

Teiyū with occasional contributions of such esteemed figures as writer and literary critic Takeyama Michio or anthropologist Yanagita Kunio.

Another way, in which *Kokoro* differed from *Sekai*, was the magazine's ownership. After the passing of Iwanami, the old liberals lost much of their influence in the company and did not seek to further associate with it. Neither did they try to come under the wings of any other major publishing house. Instead, they opted for self-publishing format and financed their magazine from their own assets as well as donations from readers and associates. This effectively made *Kokoro* a "self-published magazine" (*dōjin zasshi* 同人雑誌), format well-known and developed through Japan's modern history. It gave Abe and his colleagues full control over both contents policy and publication process (aside from general censorship restrictions). At the same time, it placed effective limitations on the magazine's scope. Despite the renown of its contributors, a non-profit, self-funded magazine was obviously no match for the big competition. Yet if pure readership numbers were the main objective, the old liberals would not have chosen the *dōjin* format.

In an article titled "In the Fourth Year of the Postwar Period," in October 1948, Abe, now the editor-in-chief, offered the three main points that could be seen as reflecting the magazine's (and, subsequently, the old liberals') political position. First of them was the constatation that Japan can only rebuild herself through the efforts of the Japanese citizens and neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will do it for her. Abe argued for maintaining a distance from both superpowers, even though the reality of occupation obviously necessitated fostering a good relationship with the Americans.[551]

The second point called for protecting the absolute pacifism enshrined in the new constitution and abandoning any attempts to alter or override it.[552] Already at the time, that is late 1948, Washington had started pushing for creating some sort of a quasi-military force in Japan. Even though MacArthur was opposed to this idea, the chief of his G-2, General Willoughby, had been seeking allies among Japanese nationalists and former officers of the Imperial General Staff—under the direct instructions of the Pentagon.[553] The topic of possible remilitarization appeared in Japanese public discourse later, around 1949-1950, and in late 1948

[551] Abe Yoshishige, "Sengo dai-yon shūnen ni" [In the fourth year of the postwar period], *Kokoro* 1, 4 (X 1948), pp. 2-3. It is important to note that the author counts the years (*shūnen* 周年) inclusively, which means that the title can also be translated as "On the fourth anniversary of the war's end." I did not use this translation in the main text in order to avoid confusion.
[552] Ibid., p. 3-4.
[553] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, pp. 488-489.

Abe probably did not yet know about the backstage efforts of Willoughby. However, there was a widespread fear among the Japanese public of the time, shared by many intellectuals, that in the case of World War III (which was deemed very probable) a new Japanese military force will be created and sent to fight along the Americans.[554] Abe's insistence on pacifism should probably be viewed in connection to this fear.

The third point was democratization, which, according to Abe, should become a part of the nation's social life rather than being limited only to political reforms. He made a stipulation, however, that even though national sovereignty now resides within the people rather than within the monarch, the Emperor should be respected as an important symbol of Japanese culture.[555] These three points reflect a liberal-democratic—though certainly not progressive—outlook with some attachment to traditionally-defined patriotism and the imperial institution.

Oguma writes that founding *Kokoro* meant a complete separation of paths between the authors who remained at *Sekai* and the old liberals.[556] However, this is not true, as some of the latter continued to contribute to the magazine, even if only occasionally.[557] This shows that the fallout was not absolute and that both groups still considered themselves parts of the same community. What is more, the next month, in August 1948, *Sekai* published a record of *zadankai* with participation of the old liberals. Held under the title "On Generational Differences: Criticism and Countercriticism of Progressive Thought" ("Sedai no sai o megutte: Shinpoteki shichō no hihan to hanhihan" 世代の差異を巡って：進歩的思潮の批判と反批判), it pitted Abe, Watsuji Tetsurō, and Amano Teiyū against four younger intellectuals: Takakuwa Sumio, Matsumura Kazuto, Tsuru Shigeto, and Isoda Susumu.[558] While described as members of the "younger generation," all of them were strongly progressive with a varying degree of association with Marxism—with Matsumura being the most far left and known for "safeguarding" Leninist orthodoxy in Japanese Marxism.[559]

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[554] Tamamoto, *The Unwanted Peace*, pp. 164-165.
[555] Abe, "Sengo dai-yon shūnen ni," p. 4.
[556] Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* p. 198.
[557] Examples include: Amano Teiyū, "Eikyū heiwa e no netsugan" [Ardent desire for permanent peace], *Sekai* 52 (1950 IV), pp. 14-17; Watsuji Tetsurō, "Watashi no shinjō" [My convictions], *Sekai* 59 (1950 XI), pp. 52-61; Abe Yoshishige, "Zenmen kōwa ronsha wa tandoku kōwa teiketsu ni kanshite dō kangae dō shosuru ka: Sekai to Ajia to Nihon to no heiwa no tachiba kara" [What do the full peace proponents think and how they react to the conclusion of the separate peace: From the standpoint of peace in the world, in Asia, and in Japan], *Sekai* 70 (1951 X), pp. 62-67.
[558] "Sedai no sai o megutte: Shinpoteki shichō no hihan to hanhihan" [On generational differences: Criticism and countercriticism of progressive thought], *Sekai* 32, 8 (VIII 1948), pp. 14-41.
[559] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p .110.

At the start of the event, Abe identified himself as responsible for organizing the debate, pointing to the fact that he had become "intrigued" by the February *zadankai* on historical materialism and, since then, wanted to confront its participants directly and debate them. He also admitted to asking the staff at the *Sekai* editorial office to arrange a suitable opportunity.[560] However, since a year had passed before such opportunity materialized, Takeuchi Yō is probably right to identify Yoshino as the person responsible.[561] This time, different to the February *zadankai*, the editor-in-chief did not personally participate. Instead, he bequeathed the moderator role to Shimizu Ikutarō. When opening up the debate, Shimizu presented Abe, Watsuji, and Amano in a very laudatory tone, but immediately underlined the significant differences between them and the "younger generation." He stressed that the objective is to understand each other's intellectual positions rather than to agree on every issue.[562]

It would probably be right to assume that Yoshino decided on the *zadankai* in order to mitigate any animosity that could possible arise when the old liberals departed *Sekai*—even though it also meant that he finally became free of their influence over the magazine. Despite trying to move *Sekai* to the left, he clearly did not want to alienate it from other intellectuals: inviting occasional contributions from the old liberals over the subsequent years serves as proof of that intent. A surprising aspect of the whole arrangement is that Abe needed a special opportunity in order to be able to even meet with younger, progressive-minded intellectuals despite all of them writing for the same magazine and operating mostly in and around Tokyo. When interpolated on general relationship among Japanese intellectuals, this fact makes roundtable discussions especially significant as a form of communication.

Despite, or perhaps owing to, Shimizu's skills as moderator, the intergenerational debate took a spontaneous character and covered several themes. However, three core issues can be identified, each of them provoking divergent opinions from participants: the meaning of patriotism, evaluation of the working class, and subjectivity. Since neither was dictated by Shimizu, they can be thought of as topics which naturally came to divide the two generations.

With regard to patriotism, what spurred the discussion was Abe's claim—with which Amano and Watsuji both agreed—that its deficiency in contemporary Japan constitutes the main obstacle on the path to the country's reconstruction, since different groups choose to fight

[560] "Sedai no sai o megutte," p. 15.
[561] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "Yoshino Genzaburō."
[562] "Sedai no sai o megutte," pp. 14-15.

only for their particular interests rather than give priority to the good of the nation at large. Furthermore, Abe understood the "true patriotism" as an attitude arising from the hearts of citizens themselves and not from any top-down ordinances issued by military or bureaucrats, like before 1945. Such patriotism need not necessarily be completely opposed to group interests of any social class, but requires that these groups do not ignore interests of the whole country.[563] Asked by Takakuwa whether this meant giving priority to nation over class, Abe responded that particular interests (whether of a group or an individual) always come first, since this is a natural way of thinking, but patriotism means that national interests should not be excluded from this thinking.[564] For him, a negative example of an attitude lacking patriotism, was the contemporary labor movement, which he deemed "egotistical" and "unrestrained" (*hōshi* 放恣) in its demands.[565]

The younger participants strongly protested this framing of patriotism as well as accusations addressed toward the labor movement. Isoda argued that there is nothing unrestrained about Japanese workers fighting for their most basic economic needs—an opinion which led him to clash with the old liberals on the interpretation of the recent political events.[566] Matsumura seconded this and added that "true patriotism" means the well-being of possibly highest number of ordinary people rather than any abstract notions like "country," "nation," or "the Emperor." Since the working class encompasses vast majority of the Japanese, its interests should be viewed as identical with the interests of Japan.[567]

Although both sides of the debate generally remained polite, there were moments of tensions. Watsuji suggested that his younger colleagues are too much emotionally invested in contemporary issues to be able to look at postwar Japan more broadly.[568] Abe accused them (not personally but in more general terms, as a generation) of servilism and lack of criticism toward the present political trends, which favor the left, mirroring a supposedly similar lack of assertiveness on the part of those pre-1945 intellectuals who had actively supported the military.[569] According to Amano, this servilism, whether before or after 1945, was due to the insufficient development of individual character and subjective consciousness among many

[563] Ibid., pp. 15-16.
[564] Ibid., pp. 26-27.
[565] Ibid., p. 16.
[566] Ibid., pp. 21-24.
[567] Ibid., pp. 25-26.
[568] Ibid., p. 32.
[569] Ibid., pp. 16, 30

intellectuals, which resulted in them being "drawn in" by the objective reality, be it militarism or progressivism.[570]

The stance of the old liberals shown here might be interpreted as reflecting their belief in the role of self-cultivation (*kyōyō*), popular in the 1920s under the influence of the European *Bildung* movement.[571] For the younger generation, however, the self-cultivation philosophy was a mistake stemming from elitism of older intellectuals.[572] Tsuru Shigeto admitted that servilism is strongly present among Japanese intellectuals but suggested that it is a wider problem of Japan's society in general. In his view, this tendency arose as a result of the deeply-flawed modern education system, which, already since the Meiji period, favored learning knowledge instead of skills, was completely detached from practical experience, and rested on imported ideas which were oftentimes not properly understood even by the educators themselves.[573] Takakuwa further explained that the modern education system only served to conserve "feudal" aspects of Japanese culture. The contemporary younger people might seem frantic and chaotic at times, he admitted, but they are nevertheless the first post-Meiji generation willing to shed these "feudal" remnants and create something new in the difficult environment left by the preceding generations.[574]

Arguably the most intense moment of the debate occurred when the participants briefly touched the subject of communism. Watsuji criticized the lack of any detailed political program on the part of Japanese communists, as well as the fact that Marxist intellectuals in Japan had not yet engaged in any "serious" research on the Soviet Union's economic policy that would make it possible to analyze possible results of introducing communism in Japan.[575] Both Isoda and Matsumura replied to that comment. Isoda brought the topic of wartime repressions against communists and questioned Watsuji's own compliance vis-à-vis the military at the time. Matsumura accused Watsuji of not really believing in any meaningful democratization process and instead idealizing Japan's old political system; being opposed only to militarism and nothing more.[576]

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[570] Ibid., pp. 19-20, 37.
[571] Harry D. Harootunian, "Introduction: A Sense of an Ending and the Problem of Taishō." In *Japan in Crisis*, p. 15.
[572] Bronson, *One Hundred Million Philosophers*, p. 31
[573] "Sedai no sai o megutte," p. 30.
[574] Ibid., pp. 30-31.
[575] Ibid., p. 32.
[576] Ibid., pp. 32-34.

But perhaps the most significant among the mutual accusations was Abe's constatation that the younger intellectuals are the ones who try to bring Cold War into Japan. Instead of distancing themselves from both sides of the global conflict, they either fully embrace the American or the Soviet narrative; they either naïvely believe that the United States is the defender of freedom or "worship" the Soviet Union. Abe's proposed alternative was to "think in a Japanese way."[577] Although any blindly pro-American intellectuals were certainly not present at the discussion, he clearly had in mind his younger, progressive colleagues when mentioning the pro-Soviet attitude. What is perhaps telling is that Abe's interlocutors did not protest against these words or did not try to explain themselves out of being "pro-Soviet."

Regardless of a few personal attacks, the debate was relatively peaceful and both sides showed at least some degree of willingness to understand their adversaries. In his analysis of the debate, Oguma highlighted its obvious points of contention, linked especially to the generational divide of participants.[578] Common points seemed to be very clear: a negative evaluation of wartime Japan, a belief in responsibility of intellectuals to "lead the people," a highly critical view of current Japanese political elites, including the ruling party, and dedication to continuous democratization and pacifism (regardless of Matsumura's earlier imputation against Watsuji). The old liberals were willing to compromise on some of their positions, like Amano admitting that the methods employed by the contemporary labor movement are somewhat understandable and that in Japan's current economic situation more radical solutions, advocated by socialists, are perhaps worth trying out.[579] Shimizu concluded the debate by stating that he is content with its results: a degree of understanding of each other's position has been successfully reached and, ultimately, the main objective is the same for everyone, that is—the rebuilding of Japan.[580]

Thus, despite a relatively turbulent falling-out between the authors in *Sekai*, resulting in the departure of the old liberals from the magazine and the establishment of *Kokoro*, the conflict ended in a way enabling future cooperation. The debate in August 1948 demonstrated that differences in political opinion among both sides were not unsurmountable and a common ground could be agreed on.

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[577] Ibid., p. 18.
[578] Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* p. 203.
[579] "Sedai no sai o megutte," p. 20. Interestingly, in the later part of this statement, Amano admits that what bothers him are not radical means themselves but the fact that ideologies employed are imported and had not come from any creative intellectual process on part of the Japanese.
[580] Ibid., p. 41.

3.4. The Peace Problem Discussion Group

Political events in late 1948 such as the fall of the coalition government and Yoshida's return to premiership did not help to ease Cold War tensions in Japan, but instead accelerated the Reverse Course. Although the divide between the progressives (who now came to dominate *Sekai*) and intellectuals skeptical of Marxism might have been expected to deepen in these circumstances, a new initiative contributed to a temporary relaxation of these tensions.

In June 1948, UNESCO, a U.N. agency dedicated to education and culture, organized a summit of eight prominent social scientists on the subject of world tensions. The participants were invited by UNESCO to Paris and included specialists in psychology, sociology, philosophy, and psychiatry from different European countries. Deliberations resulted in a joint statement which declared that war is not an inevitable phenomenon from the standpoint of either human society or psychology, and that for this reason, any conflict can potentially be avoided. If a war breaks out, full responsibility always rests on the countries involved (their leadership, media, etc.) rather than on "human nature" or any type of sociohistorical necessity.[581] The event was held in response to worsening international relations. The participants mostly represented Western European nations, but also involved a scientist from the other side of the Iron Curtain, a Hungarian sociologist Alexander Szalai.[582]

Even though it is impossible to adequately judge the impact of such events, the summit in Paris did not spark any significant reactions in either communist or non-communist countries. Even in the July 1948 issue of the *UNESCO Courier*, which described the meeting and published the full contents of the declaration, the news did not even make the front page. The entire coverage of the summit was not particularly long and did not extend beyond a single page.[583] But perhaps surprisingly even to its organizers, the event came to play an important role in Japan's intellectual life.

This was due to a decision of the GHQ Civil Information and Education Section, which sent the UNESCO statement to Yoshino with a request that he publish it in *Sekai*.[584] Although

[581] "Social Scientists Issue Joint Statement on War Tensions," *UNESCO Courier* 1, 6 (July 1948), p. 3.
[582] Ibid.
[583] Ibid.
[584] The UNESCO statement, translated into Japanese, was published in *Sekai* in January 1949: "Heiwa no tame ni shakai kagakusha wa kaku uttaeru: Sensō wo hikiokosu kinpaku no gen'in ni kanshite, hachinin no shakai

obviously intended as a way to use *Sekai* as a tool of American soft power, this move inspired Yoshino to go far beyond what was expected from him by the Americans and simply publishing the Paris statement. With the help of Shimizu Ikutarō and Kuno Osamu, he envisioned a group of Japanese intellectuals of different specializations and opinions, who would come together and respond to European intellectuals by writing a follow-up of the UNESCO statement.[585] Yoshino was impressed by Szalai's presence at the Paris meeting, interpreting it as a sign that the unity of intellectuals can be stronger than Cold War polarization.[586] Together with Shimizu, he started sending invitations to prominent intellectuals from different parts of the country, not only Tokyo. He refrained from inviting those who had been too deeply involved in Japan's wartime militarism as well as those who were active politicians.[587]

There is no information indicating how many people agreed to join relative to how many were asked to, but the final member count at the end of 1948 reached fifty-three (not counting Yoshino, who organized the initiative but did not officially join).[588] There were at least some refusals, however, since Koizumi Shinzō later admitted to having refused (despite his friendship with Yoshino) since he had feared that the meeting about "peace" with participation of people from the left will inevitably turn "pro-Soviet."[589] Economist and longtime president of Keiō University, Koizumi belonged to the same generation as the old liberals and shared some of their views (like prewar brand of liberalism). For this reason he is sometimes counted among them, for example by Oguma.[590] However, he was not involved in either Dōshinkai or *Kokoro*, and in 1948 already started to distance himself from elements that could be deemed procommunist.

The group was officially established in November 1948 as the Peace Problem Discussion Group (Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai 平和問題談話会), commonly shortened to

kagakusha ni yotte nasareta seimei" [Social scientists' appeal for peace: A statement by eight social scientists on the causes of tensions that lead to war], *Sekai* 37 (January 1949), pp. 16-22.

[585] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 176.

[586] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p . 18.

[587] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai."

[588] "Heiwa mondai tokushū ni tsuite" [About the special issue on the problem of peace], *Sekai* 39 (March 1949), p. 5.

[589] Koizumi Shinzō, "Watashi no heiwa-ron ni tsuite" [About my theory of peace], *Sekai* 77 (May 1952), pp. 251-252. According to Koizumi's own explanation over three years later, he had initially refused to attend the first meeting only due to health reasons, but observing how the initiative unfolds made him skeptical and he did not join even after recuperating.

[590] Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* p. 190.

"Heidankai" 平談会.[591] Its members were of varied background but most lived and/or worked in Tokyo or Kyoto. Heidankai began by holding local meetings of members belonging to local committees in order to work out ideas on how to respond to UNESCO.[592] Overall, there were seven local committees, each of them comprising between five and ten members. Three members did not join any committee.[593]

A general meeting intended to gather all of the ideas, discuss them, and combine into a joint statement took place on 12 December 1948, in Tokyo. Over forty members attended, together with Yoshino and a representative of Iwanami Shoten. Among those present were Yoshino's close acquaintances Shimizu and Kuno, some of the old liberals, a number of prominent Marxists, as well as several progressive liberals. The group varied by age. Participants sat around tables arranged in a square with the oldest members seated at the top.[594] The meeting began by electing Abe Yoshishige as the association's president. While this may come as a surprise since many of the members were to the left of Abe, it should be seen as a mostly symbolic act since Abe was the oldest person in the room. What is perhaps more important is that the members then proceeded to elect Ōuchi Hyōe as vice-president.[595] As a non-communist left-wing economist, Ōuchi was probably the choice that best represented the views of most attendees.

After electing the leadership, representatives of local committees read reports of their conclusions.[596] Although all groups had worked with the similar objective in mind, their ideas differed from each other due to the fact they considered different aspects of the UNESCO statement to be of the most importance. For example, Tokyo economics committee (including such figures as Ōuchi, Tsuru Shigeto, and Yanaihara Tadao) focused on the unequal distribution of resources as the primary factor behind war in human societies; Kyoto law and political science committee (including Suekawa Hiroshi and Tsunetō Kyō) similarly focused on more economic aspects of the Paris declaration, equating removal of war with removal of social

[591] Initially, the group used two very similar, but slightly different variants of the name, Heiwa Mondai Kondan Kai 平和問題懇談会 and Heiwa Mondai Tōgi Kai 平和問題討議会 (which have roughly the same meaning). In historiography, however, the group is primarily known by its later name, Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai—and for the sake of clarity only this second name will be used here.
[592] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai."
[593] "Heiwa mondai tokushū ni tsuite," p. 5.
[594] Midorikawa Tōru, "Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai to sono ato" [Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai and after], interviewed by Yasue Ryōsuke, *Sekai* 477 (June 1985 Special Issue), p. 61.
[595] "Heiwa mondai tokushū ni tsuite," p. 2.
[596] Ibid.

exploitation. Tokyo cultural committee (including Abe and Watsuji but also Takeda Kiyoko and Tsurumi Kazuko, the only two female members of Heidankai), on the other hand, gave priority to psychological aspects of war, such as group emotions stirred by imperialism or nationalism.[597]

While the reports already indicated significant differences of perspective, it was the subsequent discussion that revealed them in full. Controversies started almost from the very beginning, when Hani Gorō, a famous far-left historian, declared that, as a group, Japanese intellectuals lack moral integrity necessary to reply to UNESCO's declaration since in the past so many of them lacked courage to oppose the war. If the Japanese declaration is to have any worth, it should include a confession of guilt.[598] Hani's argument in large part rested on the fact that he was an icon of wartime opposition who was twice imprisoned: in the 1930s and during the war.[599] Likewise, other participants also did not shy from voicing their strong opinions, making it very difficult to reach any consensus, especially since the local reports had already introduced a plurality of perspectives. As a result, the meeting took much longer than it had been planned, exceeding eight hours in total.[600]

The fact that attendants managed to reach any consensus at all can largely be contributed to Shimizu. Already during the regional meetings, he traveled extensively between Tokyo and Kyoto, conversing with every committee.[601] At the general meeting Shimizu acted as the informal leader and prepared a draft that attempted to incorporate the main points of every regional report as well as the most significant concerns raised during the discussion. This feat was possible owing to his personality and connections. While he was well acquainted with older, more prominent members, he also enjoyed considerable authority among the younger ones. Many among the latter group were figures he had personally invited to the Institute of the Twentieth Century, back in 1946. As per Miyagi Otoya's personal recollection, the younger members, like Maruyama or himself, addressed Shimizu as *oyabun* 親分, which is a Japanese word for a "boss" in male hierarchical groups (with connotations of the criminal underworld).[602]

[597] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, pp. 60-61.
[598] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai."
[599] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 68.
[600] "Heiwa mondai tokushū ni tsuite," p. 2.
[601] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 61.
[602] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai."

Through the subsequent months, the draft was further consulted between committees before reaching its final form that was signed by most members.[603] Published in *Sekai* in March 1949, the statement also featured an official English version titled "A Statement by Scientists in Japan on the Problem of Peace."[604] Aside from small differences arising from translation, both versions can be said to be identical. Overall, the declaration consisted of ten points preceded by a preamble. Despite being a compromise between many viewpoints, the text gives the impression of clarity and reads comprehensively—no doubt thanks to Shimizu's skillful editing.

The preamble, which serves to ground the ten points in a historical perspective, contains a clear admission of guilt on the part of Japanese intellectuals, described as a belief that they could have done more to stop the war. Almost simultaneously, however, it showcases the new constitution with its pacifism as a positive counterexample. Thus, Japan is presented as responsible for both the war and the unprecedented efforts toward achieving world peace.[605] Such a framing is very consistent with the vision of the constitution characteristic of the community of remorse and showcased earlier when analyzing the 1946 article by Tanaka Jirō. Even by mid-1949, the view emphasizing that the constitution, even though "granted" from above by GHQ, could in fact be seen as consistent with the will of the Japanese people, was still prevalent—as evidenced by a *zadankai* featuring Kainō Michitaka, Satō Isao, Fujita Tsuguo, and Hani Setsuko, published in *Chūō Kōron* in May 1949, two months after Heidankai's first declaration.[606]

The declaration also explicitly condemned racism and nationalism, along with any notions of objective group superiority.[607] It revealed a firm belief in social progress as the force capable of putting an end to all wars; peace is framed not as status quo, but as a continuous change toward democracy and equality, characterized by fair redistribution of resources and ending human exploitation.[608] Such a progressive understanding of peace could probably be

[603] "Heiwa mondai tokushū nit suite," p. 3.
[604] Original Japanese version: "Sensō to heiwa ni kansuru Nihon no kagakusha no seimei," *Sekai* 39 (March 1949), pp. 6-9. English version: "A Statement by Scientists in Japan on the Problem of Peace," *Sekai* 39 (March 1949), pp. 16-19.
[605] "Sensō to heiwa ni kansuru…," p. 6.
[606] Kainō Michitaka et al., "Kenpō wo kokumin no mono e" [Make the constitution belong to the people], *Chūō Kōron* 64, 5 (May 1949), pp. 27-35.
[607] "Sensō to heiwa ni kansuru…," p. 8.
[608] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

considered a compromise between a social revolution advocated by the Marxists and more traditional framing of peace and democracy characterizing the old liberals.

Heidankai's joint statement did not engage in any polemic with the one released by UNESCO. Instead, it explicitly voiced its full agreement with the Paris statement. Similarly, it declared its full support for the worldview promoted by the United Nations as well as the organization's further advancement.[609] Progress of science and education, considered crucial by the Japanese declaration, was linked to the special role of scientists who possess a moral obligation to combat inequality, both internationally and domestically, especially in "backward" countries.[610] This mirrors very strongly Japanese intellectuals' sense of mission and their belief in persistence of "feudal" elements in Japan's society. Without a doubt, most of them considered Japan to be among such backward countries mentioned in the statement.

What is perhaps the most significant about the Japanese declaration on peace is the very straightforward way in which it addressed Cold War. The existence of "two worlds" was explicitly acknowledged. However, the statement firmly rejected any notions of inevitability of the conflict, either on political, ideological, or economic grounds.[611] This ran in direct opposition not only to the American narrative of a "communist threat," but perhaps even more importantly—it stood against the old Marxist-Leninist conviction (championed by Vladimir Lenin, Stalin, and many prewar and postwar communists around the world) that any long-term cohabitation between capitalism and socialism is simply impossible due to the inherent contradictions between them.

The statement, often retrospectively referred to as "Heidankai's first declaration," has received mixed reactions, having been both lauded and criticized by contemporaries and historians. For the pro-American right, the statement was "pro-Soviet" since it did not denounce the U.S.S.R. and instead called for progressive socioeconomic reforms. For communists—at least those who were active JCP politicians and did not participate in Heidankai—the group constituted an unproductive discussion club.[612] Evaluation of the Japanese declaration on peace differs by scholar. A popular consensus, however, is that while the authors did not accomplish full unity (which was supposedly reflected in ambivalent or insufficiently precise wording of

[609] Ibid., pp. 7-8.
[610] Ibid., p. 9.
[611] Ibid., p. 8.
[612] Takeuchi, *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, pp. 99-100.

the document), the establishment of Heidankai and its ability to gather so many prominent intellectuals for a common initiative, is highly notable and contributed to the development of peace movement in Japan.[613]

While the general evaluation is very much on point, scrutinizing the declaration for insufficient political edge does not seem like a valid critique. As shown above, its text reveals a very clear vision of Japan, one that is progressive and dedicated to peace, as well as oriented toward international cooperation. It did not shy away from explicitly referencing the contemporary political situation and provided arguments that were certainly no less concrete than the ones in the earlier UNESCO statement. Moreover, when compared to the Paris summit, in which a single "token" East Central European scientist took part to make the initiative seem more pluralistic, Heidankai gathered a much more ideologically and professionally varied group of intellectuals. If one attempts to find a unifying factor among them, it is a shared commitment to keeping Japan a demilitarized nation that continues its democratization process despite the rapidly changing international environment. The only clearly absent groups were the ardent anticommunists (like Koizumi Shinzō, Fukuda Tsuneari) as well as the most radical Marxists (like Matsumura Kazuto, Odagiri Hideo).[614]

Heidankai must not be detached from the broader context in which it was established. The UNESCO meeting on peace took place in June 1948, while the resulting statement was published in the UNESCO Courier in the next month. Heidankai began its operation in November, while the general meeting occurred at the end of the year. But there was one more major event of similar nature which happened in the meantime. In August 1948, several hundred intellectuals from around the world, many of them famous, attended the World Congress of Intellectuals in Defense of Peace (Światowy Kongres Intelektualistów w Obronie Pokoju) in Wrocław, Poland, organized under the auspices of the Soviet Union. The meeting, ostensibly intended to promote world peace and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, served as an important tool in fostering the image of communism (and Stalin personally) as anti-war, as well as attacking the United States.[615] While the Soviets fully controlled its affiliated cultural organizations, such as the 1949 World Congress of Partisans of Peace (in 1950 renamed to the

[613] Ibid., pp. 102-104; Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, pp. 175-176; Seki, "Heiwa no seijigaku," pp. 109-110; Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, pp. 8-16; Tōyama, *Sengo no rekishigaku*, pp. 85-86.
[614] Takeuchi, *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, p. 120.
[615] Geoffrey Roberts, "Averting Armageddon: The Communist Peace Movement, 1948-1956." In *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism*, ed. Stephen A. Smith (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 323-324.

World Peace Council), the Americans possessed a different modus operandi, preferring to supply funds and organizational support to potentially useful individuals and groups. Such was the case of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, established in 1950 with the U.S. backing, which published its own magazine, *Encounter*, intended for the anti-Stalinist left.[616] The initiative on the part of GHQ's CIE section to urge Yoshino to organize a Japanese response to the UNESCO declaration on peace could be seen as a similar attempt, intended to mobilize intellectuals in Japan for a pro-American initiative. In some way it succeeded, since Heidankai fully embraced UNESCO's position. However, Japanese intellectuals went further than possibly expected by GHQ officials and formulated their own statement, which ran contrary to the one-sided understanding of the international conflict promoted by the Americans.

Even though it was established with the sole purpose of providing an answer to UNESCO, Heidankai did not cease to exist after the publication of its declaration on peace. Its structure had been developed enough to sustain a permanent organizational structure and the group remained, at least for the time being, as the primary gathering of prominent Japanese intellectuals wishing to cooperate above Cold War divisions. Acknowledging the existence of the Cold War division, Heidankai articulated a form of principled neutralism distinct from both American containment and Soviet belief in inevitable conflict.

[616] Tokarski, *W cieniu katastrofy*, pp. 28-31.

Chapter 4. Disintegration of the intellectual community, 1949-1952

The Red Purge, which started around April 1949, could be seen as a culmination of the Reverse Course in U.S. occupation policy and Japanese domestic politics. This development, however, was but the beginning of a longer series of momentous events which managed to shake up postwar Japan's intellectual life to a significant degree. Each of them constituted a manifestation of the global Cold War. These events did not merely intensify polarization; they redefined the very conditions under which intellectual cooperation had previously been possible.

Two of them happened outside Japan. In December 1949, Mao Zedong's communist forces seized full control of mainland China, prompting the Nationalist forces to retreat to Taiwan, which was heavily protected by American troops. And in June 1950, the first proxy war of the Cold War era broke out on the Korean Peninsula between the two Korean governments. Since the United States military intervened in the conflict as part of the broad United Nations coalition—under the supreme command of General MacArthur—Japan became indirectly involved.

Ultimately, in October 1951, after many months of negotiations and public debate, the representatives of Japan signed a peace treaty with the World War II Allies at a conference in San Francisco. But the treaty did not include the Soviet Union or Communist China. The American occupation ended on 28 April 1952, bringing this very distinct era of Japanese history to an end. But the intellectuals, who entered the postwar occupation as a largely unified community, ended this era in a state of intense internal antagonisms, disarray, and resignation.

4.1. The influence of China

The Chinese Civil War—the conflict between the Kuomintang-led Republic of China and the CCP, which ruled over various autonomous, local soviets (workers' councils)—started already back in 1927. After the 1937 Japanese invasion of China, both sides of the civil war agreed on an armistice and formed a united front against the foreign aggression, based on a broader Sino-Soviet agreement.[617] Small-scale hostilities continued throughout the entirety of the war with Japan, but the formal agreement fell apart in June 1946, ushering in the second phase of the

[617] Polit, *Gorzki triumf*, pp. 159-161.

civil war.[618] Capitalizing on popular support in the countryside, as well as the widespread corruption and mismanagement characterizing the areas under Kuomintang control, Mao Zedong led the People's Liberation Army to victory over the next four years. The year 1949 served as a point of breakthrough, with the Communists seizing most of the major cities, including Taiyuan, Chongqing, Beijing, and Chengdu. Capitalizing on these victories, on 1 October 1949, Mao proclaimed the People's Republic of China. Even though the Nationalists evacuated to Taiwan in December 1949, already by the fall of that year their defeat had seemed inevitable to many international observers.[619]

Japanese media regularly reported on the situation in China.[620] The position of Japan regarding the East Asian neighbor was complicated by several factors. At least formally, the Empire of Japan never considered itself to be at war with the Republic of China. The Emperor's 15 August 1945 speech announcing the intent to surrender did neither mention China by name nor allude to that country in any way.[621] As per the will of President Truman, who wanted to avoid strengthening the CCP, the Americans instructed Japanese forces on the Asian mainland to surrender only to the Kuomintang.[622] However, this did not mean that Japan possessed any political or diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan). After the war ended, there were no ties or agreements between the Japanese government and either side in the Chinese Civil War.[623] Regardless of the practical inability to conduct foreign policy under occupation, Japan's politicians seemingly did not consider the issue of Sino-Japanese relations as a top priority at the time.

Initially, Japanese intellectuals were similar in this regard. Chapter 3 showed how closely many of them followed international developments, with the progressives, like Yoshino

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[618] Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), pp. 487-491.
[619] Ibid., pp. 511-513. On more details about the circumstances surrounding the Nationalist defeat in China see Parks M. Coble, *The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War* (Cambridge University Press, 2023), pp. 203-211.
[620] Reporting in major newspapers like *Yomiuri Shimbun* or *Asahi Shimbun*, although frequent, was of course tightly monitored by GHQ. However, more detailed reports still made its way into occupied Japan, partially owing to the Chinese (Taiwanese) minority living in the country. See He Yilin [Ka Girin], "GHQ senryō-ki ni okeru zainichi Taiwanjin no media keiei to sono genron kūkan" [Media management and the public discourse of the Taiwanese living in Japan during the GHQ occupation period], *Nihon Taiwan Gakkai Hō* 17 (2015), pp. 110-127.
[621] "Daitōa sensō shūketsu ni kan-suru shōsho: go-shomei genpon, Shōwa nijū nen, shōsho hachigatsu jūyokka," 14 August 1945, 御-28610100, Gyōsei Bunsho, NAJ, www.digital.archives.go.jp/file/en/1744405. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[622] "President Truman to General Marshall," 15 December 1945, in *FRUS*, 1945, The Far East, China, Vol. VII, eds. Ralph R. Goodwin et al., (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 770-773 (Document 558).
[623] Kokubun Ryōsei et al., *Japan-China Relations in the Modern Era*, trans. Keith Krulak (Routledge, 2017), pp. 32-34.

Genzaburō, calling for more direct engagement in political affairs, particularly in world politics.[624] Yet in the 1945-1948 period, the topic of China did not really appear in the intellectual discourse outside of brief mentions. This changed with a string of communist victories in 1949, particularly in the later part of that year. In the eyes of many, the Chinese Communist Revolution demonstrated that a different type of modernization, unique to Asia and separate from the West, was possible. The foremost intellectual representative of this perspective was Takeuchi Yoshimi.

Around thirty-seven years old in 1949, Takeuchi was a literary critic and expert on modern Chinese literature. His work focused on the early twentieth-century writer Lu Xun, who was highly regarded by the Chinese left wing. Takeuchi dedicated his life to researching Lu Xun's ideas on "East Asian culture" and using these ideas to develop his own critique of contemporary Japanese society. His connection to China was not purely theoretical, as it had originated in the years 1943-1946, which he spent as a Japanese soldier mobilized to fight on the Chinese front.[625]

Takeuchi rose to prominence in Japan's intellectual life in April 1948 with an essay titled "What Is Modernity? The Case of Japan and China" ("Kindai to wa nani ka: Nihon to Chūgoku no baai" 近代とは何か：日本と中国の場合).[626] Delving into history, culture, and philosophy, the essay argued that the very concept of "modernity" was occidental and alien to Asia, and that by accepting the premise of modernization theory and attempting to modernize themselves, East Asian nations like China or Japan could do nothing more than copy the West. Utilizing metaphors of an "honor student" (who diligently follows all the teacher's instructions but is unable to move beyond them) and a slave, Takeuchi likened modernizing Japan to both. What was perhaps the most controversial aspect of his position was that he did not see much difference between pre-1945 and contemporary, postwar Japan in this regard, scrutinizing them almost equally.[627]

Establishment of the People's Republic of China became perhaps the most important event of Takeuchi's life and prompted him to vigorously pursue a comparative study of Chinese

[624] Yoshino, "Chishikijin no chi'i ni tsuite," pp. 4-5.
[625] "Takeuchi Yoshimi." In *Nijū seiki Nihon jinmei jiten*. Cited after Kotobank: www.kotobank.jp/word/竹内好-93016. Accessed 21 September 2026.
[626] It has been translated into English and featured as part of Takeuchi's selected writings: *What Is Modernity? Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi*, ed. and trans. Richard F. Calichman (Columbia University Press, 2005).
[627] Ibid., pp. 53-81.

and Japanese Marxism.[628] Already in 1949, he started arguing for the former's superiority. The latter, in his view, was "objectivist"—assigning too much importance to objective economic factors—and thus rigid and impractical. It led the Japanese to believe in their superiority vis-à-vis China based on a "higher level" of economic development; in the same way that modern West was thought to be superior to "stagnant" Asia. In contrast, Chinese communism, or Maoism, did not try to "slavishly" replicate Marxism in the way it had been developed in Europe, and instead combined it with East Asian thought. According to Takeuchi, this flexibility allowed Mao to subjectively conceptualize the overcoming of Japanese imperialism despite China's supposed economic inferiority, making it possible to resist Japan's invasion in the late 1930s and 1940s.[629]

Although undoubtedly a highly original thinker, Takeuchi did not develop his ideas in isolation. While not a member of Heidankai, he nevertheless contributed to major *sōgō zasshi* (like *Tenbō* or *Shin-Nihon Bungaku*) and remained a part of the intellectual community.[630] His work on modernity and Chinese Marxism inspired other intellectuals, often very influential, like sociologist Tsurumi Kazuko. Educated at American universities (Vassar College and Columbia University) and only twenty-seven when the war ended, she was a key voice calling for fellow intellectuals to become closer to ordinary people instead of educating them from a privileged position.[631] While Takeuchi's affirmation of Maoism served as her inspiration, she became independently interested in Chinese communism, believing it to be superior to American-style democracy.[632] Also, differently from Takeuchi, she was a member of Heidankai.[633]

But Takeuchi, being an important proponent of Maoism in postwar Japan, was always an enthusiast of Chinese culture, even before the war, when Japan was hostile to the government of China. In light of this early fascination, his post-1949 occupation with Communist China can hardly be surprising. But a similar reaction can also be seen among other intellectuals. Many of them were Marxist and belonged either to Minka or to Rekiken. The latter was especially influential on the postwar Japanese left, although it leaned much more strongly toward Soviet-

[628] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 120.
[629] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 228.
[630] For example: Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Dentō to kakumei: Nihonjin no Chūgoku-kan" [Tradition and revolution: The Japanese people's view of China], *Tenbō* 45 (September 1949), pp. 5-12; Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Ro Jun to Mō Takutō" [Lu Xun and Mao Zedong], *Shin-Nihon Bungaku* 1, 9 (September 1947), pp. 24-27.
[631] Bronson, *One Hundred Million Philosophers*, p. 91.
[632] Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, pp. 51-53.
[633] "Heiwa mondai tokushū ni tsuite," p. 5.

style Marxism-Leninism than Minka or other similar organizations.[634] At the Rekiken 1949 annual conference, for the first time, many of the presented papers touched upon the topic of the Chinese revolution.[635] This was the beginning of a new trend in which Maoism gradually became the leading influence within Rekiken. Inspired by Mao Zedong's writings and experiences, society members returned to the problem of ethnic nation (*minzoku* 民族). They associated it with a bottom-up democratic (in a communist sense) revolution and contrasted with the wartime and prewar statist (*kokkashugi* 国家主義) notions of nationhood.[636]

Left-wing *minzoku* thinkers from Rekiken, as well as more independent figures like Hani Gorō, utilized this concept to attack the key postwar reforms, such as the new, much more politically restricted role of the emperor, whom the 1947 constitution referred to as the "symbol emperor." This new, democratic understanding of Japanese monarchy rested on the idea that the nation (*kokumin* 国民) of Japan was primarily a political entity and the emperor, as the formal head of state, represented the nation without exercising any power over it, thus purely as a symbol. It was formulated as a way of reconciling monarchy with democracy and supported by leading liberal intellectuals, both progressive (like Nanbara Shigeru) and conservative (like Tanaka Kōtarō).[637] However, the *minzoku* thinkers argued that the Japanese nation is ethnic (*minzoku*) rather than political (*kokumin*), as they connected ethnos with native, grassroots (rather than top-down bureaucratic) culture. If the people of Japan are an ethnic nation, then the emperor of Japan is something alien to them and their culture—and his role as their symbol is effectively undermined. For this reason, the *minzoku* thinkers considered the new political regime installed in Japan post-1945 to be not fully democratic and resting on a false notion of political community, reminiscent of the pre-1945 idea of the "family state" (*kazoku kokka* 家族国家). They referred to it as the "symbol emperor system" (*shōchō tennō-sei* 象徴天皇制).[638] It was a direct callback to the earlier "emperor system" (*tennō-sei* 天皇制), which is how Japanese Marxists pejoratively called the prewar monarchy.[639]

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[634] For the views typical of Rekiken see for example: Miki Wataru, "Heiwa no rekishi no kadai" [On the topic of the history of peace], *Rekishigaku Kenkyū* 155 (January 1952), pp. 35-40. The author positions the Soviet Union as a historical emanation of the global peace movement.
[635] Tōyama, *Sengo no rekishigaku*, p. 78.
[636] Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai Iinkai, "Heiwa-hansen undō to sono hatten no tame ni" [For the pacifist-antiwar movement and its development], *Rekishigaku Kenkyū* 146 (July 1950), pp. 51-52; Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, pp. 203-205.
[637] Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* p. 130; Nakamura, "Sengo Nihon no 'bunka kokka,'" p. 150.
[638] Tōyama, *Sengo no rekishigaku*, pp. 32-33.
[639] On the term itself and the problems it presents for historiography see Itō Takashi, "Shōwa seiji-shi kenkyū e no ichi shikaku" [A perspective on the study of Shōwa period political history], *Shisō* 624 (June 1976), pp. 949-962.

This trend of political philosophy was primarily inspired by witnessing the success of the Chinese Revolution but also by the Indonesian War of Independence.[640] The latter broke out immediately after Japan's surrender and concluded in late December 1949, when the Netherlands agreed to transfer sovereignty over the islands to the newly formed Indonesian state.[641] The war was both nationalist and anticolonial in character, led by a longtime freedom fighter, Sukarno, and, despite not being communist in character, was often perceived as being in line with Soviet interests in the region.[642]

While the idea of *minzoku* enjoyed popularity already in 1945, the cases of China and Indonesia led many Japanese Marxists to become convinced that a revolution can only be ethnonational and must be preceded by a struggle against the colonial regime.[643] This framework, also reflected in the anticolonial thought of Mao Zedong, began to be increasingly utilized in relation to the situation of Japan, despite differences separating her from the East and South-East Asian neighbors, including her own role of a colonial power. In this framework, the U.S. occupation became Japan's "colonial phase."[644] This, in turn, resulted in a drastic change of how the occupation was evaluated on the Japanese left. Even after General MacArthur and Prime Minister Yoshida started implementing the Reverse Course, the criticism of occupation reflected its supposed "betrayal" of initial ideals rather than its very nature. Starting from 1949, however, the entirety of the occupation came to be evaluated negatively by those intellectuals that chose to engage with the Maoist framework of historical progress and "Chinese-style modernization."

Chinese influence also affected views regarding the role of intellectuals. Chapter 2 showed how members of the community of remorse conceptualized their self-ordained mission as both an atonement for the war and the fulfillment of the "true" democratic modernization that had been left unfinished in the Meiji period. This role was primarily educational, realized through monthly magazines, public lectures, and initiatives like the Institute of the Twentieth Century. Intellectuals saw themselves as the anointed ones, the elite who, by virtue of their

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[640] Curtis Anderson Gayle, *Marxist History and Postwar Japanese Nationalism* (Routledge, 2003), pp. 76-77.
[641] Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years* [sic] *Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945-1965* (Duta Wacana University Press, 1990), p. 15.
[642] Robert J. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-49* (Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 157-158.
[643] See for example: Takayama Gorō, "Minzokushugi to heiwa: Ajia nashonarizumu no kihon mondai" [Ethnonationalism and peace: The fundamental problems of Asian nationalism], *Sekai* 72 (December 1951), p. 30.
[644] Curtis Anderson Gayle, "Progressive Representations of the Nation: Early Post-war Japan and Beyond," *Social Science Japan Journal* 4, 1 (2001), pp. 9-10.

grasp of normally unavailable knowledge and understanding of world affairs, confers enlightenment upon the ordinary people. While some, like Fukuda Tsuneari, were criticizing this "sense of superiority," and others, like Hani Gorō at the Heidankai general meeting, doubted the moral high-ground of most intellectuals, such an attitude was overwhelmingly common among members of the community of remorse, as evidenced by most articles and discussions analyzed up to this point. Even Tsurumi Kazuko, who by 1951 began advocating for a new, more "democratic" approach, during the 1945-1950 period mostly promoted her ideas in a top-down manner—an attitude she herself later publicly criticized.[645]

The Chinese example provided a radically different model. Already in his 1920s and 1930s writings and speeches, Mao underlined the need to gather knowledge and experience directly from the people. During the late 1940s, this idea provided the basis of the "mass line" (*taishū rosen* 大衆路線) method, promoted by the CCP as the main organizational theory for training new cadres. The mass line dictated that intellectuals should confront their received education with the life experience of ordinary people by joining them in everyday life. Only after spending a significant amount of time among the people could they proceed to formulate their ideas.[646]

The mass line method entered Japanese intellectual life along with other elements of Maoism in the aftermath of Mao Zedong's victory. Although its popularization and practical implementation by some Japanese intellectuals began by the early and mid-1950s, this was yet another influence of the left-wing fascination with China which had emerged in 1949.[647] The idea that an intellectual ought to educate themselves based on the experiences of the masses instead of enlightening them from a higher perspective could hardly be described as anything less than a radical break with the earlier concept of who an intellectual ought to be. When he wrote for *Shinchō* in 1947, Yoshino Genzaburō did envision intellectuals as part of the ordinary people, but this did not include any change to their role vis-à-vis the masses. In this way, the newly entering Chinese thought began severely altering the fundamental beliefs of some members of the community of remorse.

It would be wrong to assume that this only affected the left. Aside from Japanese Marxists, there was a significant number of pro-American intellectuals who were drawn to

[645] Bronson, *One Hundred Million Philosophers*, pp. 140-141.
[646] Yamamoto, *Grassroots Pacifism in Postwar Japan*, p. 7.
[647] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 224.

Chinese ideas. The great example is the Institute for the Science of Thought (Shisō no Kagaku Kenkyūkai 思想の科学研究会), established in May 1946 by a group of Japanese scholars who wanted to popularize American pragmatism in the social sciences and social psychology.[648] Despite having their own magazine, titled *Shisō no Kagaku* 思想の科学 (*Science of Thought*), they also frequently contributed to other *sōgō zasshi* and remained a part of the mainline intellectual discourse.[649] From the very beginning, the Institute possessed strong ties to the United States, and most of its founding members had studied abroad.[650] As the global tensions intensified in the late 1940s, the group entered the Rockefeller Foundation's orbit of interest. Ostensibly aimed at supporting the global development of societies, the Foundation became a key instrument of Cold War psychological warfare.[651] Through its grants and scholarships, it funded pro-American initiatives around the world.[652] With regard to Japan, the Rockefeller Foundation strove for the reorientation of the Japanese intellectual community by bringing it closer to the United States. In order to achieve this objective, it supported projects aimed at bringing the Japanese scholarship, including the social sciences, closer to the American model and ending the long-standing ties to the European scholarship.[653]

A query at the Rockefeller Foundation Archive Center reveals that most of the organization's programs for Japan were initiated after 1952, particularly during the late 1950s and early 1960s.[654] Nevertheless, there were a number of initiatives targeting Japan during the final years of the occupation. In 1949, the Institute for the Science of Thought received a large grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The American sponsors probably did not know, however, of the budding interest of the Institute's members in China—or, if they knew, they might have wanted to counter this influence. Fascination with Communist China was part of the general trend in Japanese intellectual life, which saw many intellectuals substituting the United States with China as the model of modernization. When Minami Hiroshi, one of the

[648] Matsuno, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai,'" p. 70.
[649] Maruyama Masao, Tsuru Shigeto, and Takeda Kiyoko are among the key members of the Institute who frequently contributed to other magazines, e.g. *Tenbō*, *Sekai*, *Kaizō*.
[650] Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, p. 35.
[651] Anna Mazurkiewicz, *Uchodźcy polityczni z Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w amerykańskiej polityce zimnowojennej (1948-1954)* [Political exiles from East-Central Europe in the U.S. Cold War policy (1948-1954)] (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej-Uniwersytet Gdański, 2016), pp. 87-92.
[652] Álvaro Morcillo Laiz, "The Cold War Origins of Global IR: The Rockefeller Foundation and Realism in Latin America," *International Studies Review* 24, 1 (2022), pp. 6-8.
[653] Marek Skurski, "Jerzy Lerski in Japan: Cold War Mission of a Polish Political Exile," *Polish American Studies* 82, 2 (2025), p. 101.
[654] This is evident when looking through Series 609, Record Group 1.2, Projects (Grants), Rockefeller Foundation Records, Rockefeller Archive Center [hereafter: RAC], Sleepy Hollow, NY.

Institute's key members alongside Tsurumi Shunsuke, traveled to Communist China in the early 1950s and even represented the Institute at the Beijing Peace Conference in October 1952, the Rockefeller Foundation broke off all its ties to the group.[655] After spending the 1940-1947 period in the United States, Minami brought very positive impressions from the newly established Chinese People's Republic, and his experience became the subject of much attention among Japanese intellectuals of that time.[656] As early as 1949 China became an alternative example of modernization for many Japanese intellectuals who up to this point had been focused on the United States—and the Institute for the Science of Thought is only one such example.[657]

In the scholarship, 1949 in Japan is most commonly associated with further escalation of the Reverse Course, symbolized by the Red Purge and the economic rehabilitation program. In this context, events in China are interpreted as increasing Cold War tensions in East Asia, which in turn influenced Japan's domestic politics.[658] But for the Japanese intellectuals at large, the year 1949 constituted a milestone in the growth of Chinese ideological influence, which prompted many of them to seek a reevaluation of their previously held opinions both on modernization and their role in society. As such, it was an important development in the chain of events leading to the erosion of the Japanese intellectual community.

4.2. Between the "full" and "partial" peace

None of the documents foundational to the Allied occupation of Japan contained any indication of its intended duration, even in the vaguest terms. According to the Potsdam Declaration, it was supposed to continue until "a new order (…) of peace, security and justice (…) is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed" and that the Allied military "shall be withdrawn as soon as (…) there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government."[659] The "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy" and specific military directives from 1945 likewise did not give any additional details pertaining to this matter.[660]

[655] Bronson, *One Hundred Million Philosophers*, p. 63.
[656] Ibid., pp. 137-138.
[657] Ibid., p. 137.
[658] Kōda, *The United States and the Japanese Student Movement*, p. 24.
[659] "Potsdam Declaration," p. 413.
[660] "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," pp. 423-426.

The end of the occupation did not constitute a prominent topic during the initial years, and most of the Japanese public seemed to have resigned themselves to a long period of American military control. Similarly, the U.S. was clearly not in a hurry to proceed with a peace treaty, as evidenced by what General John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, told George Atcheson on 12 February 1947. Hilldring stated that while the State Department had begun preparing a draft of the treaty, progress was very slow and the treaty was not considered a priority. He also assured Atcheson that no communication with governments of other powers regarding the peace treaty would be initiated without prior consultation with General MacArthur.[661] Later that same year, however, a significant change occurred regarding the topic, as MacArthur himself began publicly suggesting that the end may not be far away. He did so while commenting that the democratization process in Japan was proceeding smoothly and, so far, successfully. He also suggested that Japan should join the United Nations after regaining independence.[662] However, MacArthur's occasional remarks did not coincide with any political developments. Furthermore, the Reverse Course and subsequent Red Purge policies ostensibly left the Supreme Commander preoccupied with different matters than the democratization process.

New developments occurred only after the further escalation of Cold War in East Asia, culminating in the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950. The conflict directly spurred a change in priorities in Washington regarding the occupation. As of mid-June 1950, the State Department was still relatively unhurried regarding the treaty and entertained doubts as to what attitude it should take toward the Soviet Union on this issue. The department's position was criticized by MacArthur in his memorandum of 14 June 1950, in which he called for an immediate peace treaty, even if that would mean disregarding the Soviets and China.[663]

With firmly pro-American Prime Minister Yoshida dominating Japanese domestic politics, Washington was assured that Japan would remain an ally of America even after the occupation. Thus, the preparation for a peace treaty with Japan significantly sped up. The single most influential person through the entirety of this process was John Foster Dulles, a close

[661] "Mr. George Atcheson, Jr., to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur," 12 February 1947, in *FRUS*, 1947, The Far East, Vol. VI, p. 448 (Document 367).
[662] Tsuru Shigeto, "Tai-Nichi kōwa to sekai heiwa" [Peace treaty with Japan and the world peace], *Sekai* 70 (October 1951), p. 6; Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 174.
[663] "Memorandum by the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (MacArthur)," 14 June 1950, in *FRUS*, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Vol. VI, eds. Neal H. Petersen et al. (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 1213-1221 (Document 721).

advisor to President Truman, particularly on the matters pertaining to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region.[664] During the subsequent years, Dulles visited Japan several times to meet with Yoshida, most importantly in June 1950, January 1951, and April 1951.[665] The main issue with the peace treaty was that while it was Washington that hurried to bring about the end of the occupation on terms favorable to America, the occupation was still formally conducted in the name of all World War II Allies. Thus, the peace treaty had to be consulted on with other members of the Far Eastern Commission or at least with the three powers who, along with America, were members of the Allied Council for Japan: Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China (Taiwan).

Without going into details of the negotiations or the drafting process, since September 1950 the United States had started handing out memoranda with the proposed outline of the treaty to other members of the Council, with the Soviets receiving theirs last, in late October.[666] The proposal was mostly an outcome of consultations that occurred between the Americans and Japanese throughout most of 1950.[667] The Soviet Union was not against the idea of the peace treaty itself but opposed its shape, particularly due to the exclusion of Communist China as well as the provisions that would leave parts of Japan's territory, such as Okinawa, under American trusteeship. It made its opposition known through diplomatic notes, such as the one from May 1951.[668] Beijing likewise voiced its protest.[669]

The United States, however, mostly ignored these complaints, and proceeded with drafting the treaty. The process culminated in the international conference in San Francisco, in September 1951, which saw the treaty signed by forty-nine countries. This was an impressive number when compared to the Paris peace treaties from 1947 with other Axis powers: Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Finland—all of which had between ten and twenty

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[664] Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, p. 28; Li, *The Cold War in East Asia*, p. 40.
[665] John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience* (Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 383, 390-392.
[666] "Unsigned Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State," 11 September 1950, in *FRUS*, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Vol. VI, pp. 1296-1297 (Document 757).
[667] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 193.
[668] "Russian note," May 7, 1951, in *Nihon gaikō bunsho: Heiwa jōyaku no teiketsu ni kan-suru chōsho* [Documents on Japanese foreign policy: Records related to the conclusion of Treaty of Peace with Japan], Vol. 1 (Gaimushō, 2002), pp. 369-375.
[669] Zhang Shengfa, "The Soviet-Sino Boycott of the American-led Peace Settlement with Japan in the Early 1950s," *Russian History* 29, 2-4 (2002), p. 405. See the rest of the article for the details on the Sino-Soviet position in regards to the treaty.

signatories.[670] Among those present at the San Francisco Peace Conference, the Soviet Union, along with its two satellites, Poland and Czechoslovakia, refused to sign the treaty. Neither the Chinese People's Republic nor the Republic of China (Taiwan) were invited, and the same was true of both governments of Korea. The Treaty of San Francisco ended the legal state of war between Japan and the Western Allies, coming into effect on 28 April 1952.[671] This became the end date of the occupation.

The Cold War aspect of the peace treaty was more than apparent since, simultaneously, a new treaty regarding Japanese-American relations was signed, bringing Japan firmly into the American bloc by allowing a U.S. military presence on her territory.[672] In addition, Japan's relations with the Soviet Union were left without any resolution, creating a long-standing diplomatic issue between the two countries—an issue which outlasted even Cold War itself.[673] The treaty ignored both China and Korea, making it difficult to establish diplomatic relations with any of the governments locked in the contest for legitimacy inside these two countries.[674] Several territorial disputes were also left unresolved, involving the Kurils (with the Soviet Union), the Senkaku Islands (with China), and the Takeshima Island (with Korea). The fact that none of these conflicts has so far been resolved is a direct consequence of the Treaty of San Francisco.[675] Since Japan was the main power in East Asia before 1945, the nature of its peace treaty significantly affected every country in the region. For this reason, scholars refer to the post-1951 geopolitical settlement in East Asia as the "San Francisco System" and consider it both a product of as well as a defining aspect of Cold War in the region.[676]

The political process behind the Treaty of San Francisco had very remarkable consequences for the intellectual community. As with the impact of the Chinese Revolution, here also the year 1949, particularly its later part, marks a turning point. The debate over the

[670] Ellinor von Puttkamer, "Peace Treaties of 1947." In *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, ed. Rudolf Bernhardt, Vol. 3, Part 2, (Elsevier, 1997), pp. 953-960.
[671] "Treaty of Peace with Japan," September 8, 1951, in *Nihon gaikō bunsho: San Furanshisuko heiwa jōyaku: chōin, hakkō* [Documents on Japanese foreign policy: Treaty of Peace with Japan: Signing and entry into force] (Gaimushō, 2009), pp. 167-191.
[672] "Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America," September 8, 1951, in ibid., pp. 218-220.
[673] Richard Sims, *Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation, 1868-2000* (Palgrave, 2001), pp. 276-277.
[674] There is no mention of China in the document, while Korea is referred to in a very ambiguous way. See "Treaty of Peace with Japan," pp. 167-186.
[675] For the general overview of these disputes in relation to the Treaty of San Francisco see Hara Kimie, *Cold War Frontiers in the Asia Pacific: Divided territories in the San Francisco System* (Routledge, 2007).
[676] Ibid., p. 3.

UNESCO declaration, which occurred a year earlier and was concentrated in Heidankai, did not tie directly to the peace treaty, but introduced the problem of peace to the broader debate.

A good example of how this problem was conceptualized in late 1949, just before the discussions surrounding the peace treaty gained full momentum, is an article by Kuno Osamu, which found its way into the November 1949 issue of *Sekai*. The author, a progressive philosopher, had stood at the center of postwar Japan's intellectual life from the very beginning. He was an important member of the Institute for the Study of Science, a close associate of Shimizu Ikutarō, a member of the Institute of the Twentieth Century, as well as one of the originators of Heidankai.[677]

In his article from November 1949, titled "The Logic of Peace and the Logic of War" ("Heiwa no ronri to sensō no ronri" 平和の論理と戦争の論理), Kuno attempted to answer, based on both contemporary events and historical examples, what viable possibilities existed for resisting war. Building upon the negation of the sociopsychological necessity of war, which had been argued for back in the UNESCO declaration, Kuno remarked that realizing this fact was insufficient since in light of the historical experience of humanity it was peace that could be considered the aberration, not war.[678] Rather than resting on ideas or preconceptions, the "logic of war" was embedded in the system of human organizations.[679] In order to overcome the conflicts between nations, it was necessary to internally promote non-violent means of opposition, such as civil disobedience or general strikes, changing the very way in which social actors operate.[680] At the same time, the economic conditions for the war would also need to be reformed, but the blueprint for that has already been developed by socialism.[681]

This type of argumentation is very representative of the intellectual discourse on peace on the eve of the treaty debate. When the latter started, most discussions on the problem of peace began to orbit around the issue of the future peace treaty, in which Heidankai took active part. Initially created only to respond to the statement of European scholars invited by UNESCO, it did not dissolve. Its extensive organizational structure, consisting of several regional

[677] Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, p. 31. Later, in 1960, he would come to write a very influential essay on civil society in Japan: Kuno Osamu, "Shiminshugi no seiritsu" [The formation of civil ethos], *Shisō no Kagaku* 19 (July 1960), pp. 9-16.
[678] Kuno Osamu, "Heiwa no ronri to sensō no ronri" [The logic of peace and the logic of war], *Sekai* 47 (November 1949), p. 26.
[679] Ibid., pp. 27-28.
[680] Ibid., pp. 31-33.
[681] Ibid., p. 36.

committees in the areas of Tokyo (the Kantō region) and Kyoto (the Kinki region) remained in place, under the informal patronage of Iwanami Shoten and with ties to the leading Japanese scholars and journalists. Thus, perhaps naturally, Heidankai became the crux of the intellectual debate on the peace treaty.

On 21 December 1949, the organization held a general meeting, one year after the inaugural one. Its format remained essentially the same, with Abe Yoshishige and Ōuchi Hyōe serving as chairman and vice-chairman respectively. Participants included thirty-five members, two non-members, and more than ten outside observers.[682] Capitalizing on the popularity of its "Declaration on the Problem of Peace" from March 1949, Heidankai wanted to repeat the formula and issue a similar type of statement. Unlike the year before, however, this time the general meeting did not gather to conclude earlier, local meetings, but instead inaugurated them. A preliminary document was drafted based on discussions held on 21 December, and copies of it found their way to the local committees, which debated its contents throughout January 1950.[683] Based on their feedback, the final version was completed on 15 January 1950, and was subsequently published in *Sekai* in March of that year under the title: "Peace Problem Discussion Group's Declaration on the Problem of the Peace Treaty" ("Kōwa mondai ni tsuite Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai no seimei" 講和問題について平和問題談話会の声明), often referred to simply as "Heidankai's second declaration."[684]

The document consisted of two parts. The main body was a general elaboration on the topic of the peace treaty, which largely corresponded to the flow of discussions during the December 1949 general meeting and was made up of three arguments. What followed were four points, each very concise, which were added after the general meeting and reflected the opinions of local committees.

The main part began by underlining that the future peace treaty, along with its consequences, constituted the most fundamental problem of contemporary Japan. It also mentioned a difference in political views among the group's members, which had nevertheless been able to overcome their particular positions and take common stance. The message of unity among intellectuals reverberated very strongly throughout the entire document. Unlike the first declaration, the Cold War context was immediately clear upon reading the second one. The

[682] "Kōwa mondai ni tsuite Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai seimei" [Declaration of Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai regarding the peace treaty problem], *Sekai* 51 (March 1950), pp. 60-61.
[683] Ibid., p. 61.
[684] Ibid. The actual declaration covers the pages 62-64.

document admitted the key role of American forces in Japan's postwar democratization. However, it also stated that in order for this process to continue, the people of Japan would have to see to it by themselves, taking from the occupation authorities the responsibility for the process of democratization.[685] Although this phrasing may seem relatively non-antagonistic, it clearly suggested that the Allied occupation no longer performed its role as a progressive, democratic force.

The authors stressed that what they desire for Japan is only a "comprehensive peace" (*zenmenteki kōwa* 全面的講和), since only such peace could be considered a fulfillment of the Potsdam Declaration (which Japan had accepted upon signing the Instrument of Surrender in September 1945). It would contribute to a de-escalation of the world tensions, instead of making them even worse. This was tied to the desire for world peace enshrined in Japan's new constitution.[686] In this way, Heidankai's second declaration framed Japanese intellectuals as representing the people of Japan (who accepted the problem of the peace treaty as their own responsibility) and as working against the Cold War polarization by refusing to accept a non-comprehensive peace treaty.

The declaration went into more detail on why a "partial peace" (*tandoku kōwa* 単独講和)—as it referred to the treaty proposed by the United States—would be a bad idea for Japan and the world. It explained that without Communist China (in the document referred to simply as "China") among the signatory nations, Japan's future relationship with its biggest neighbor would be left crippled. Without a strong economic partnership with China, Japan would be unable to prosper as an independent, peaceful country. Furthermore, a full peace would help alleviate mounting differences and conflicts between the "two worlds" (*futatsu no sekai* 二つの世界) in international relations and the "two camps" (*futatsu no jin'ei* 二つの陣営) inside Japan.[687] What is important here is that the Heidankai intellectuals explicitly admitted the existence of two, conflicting sides inside Japan's society and linked their antagonism directly to the basic Cold War divide between the two worlds led by America and the Soviet Union.

The final argument against the partial peace given in the main body of the declaration was that the two great aspirations of the Japanese people after regaining independence—the continuation of the "inviolable neutrality" (*chūritsu fukashin* 中立不可侵) and admission to

[685] Ibid., p. 62.
[686] Ibid, pp. 62-63.
[687] Ibid., p. 63.

the United Nations—would be made very difficult if Japan were to accept anything less than a full peace.[688] The four points at the end essentially summarized the argumentation of the main text.[689]

Although it was not its main theme, the declaration highlighted one more topic, which quickly grew in importance to the point of being considered the most important part of the document.[690] This topic was the so-called problem of military bases (*gunji kichi mondai* 軍事基地問題). The Treaty of San Francisco created a legal framework that allowed for American troops to remain in Japan even after the occupation. They were supposed to remain in designated military bases, ostensibly to provide protection to Japan, but also to serve as a foothold for American interests in the region, particularly vis-à-vis its East Asian Cold War enemies: China and North Korea.[691] Regarding this issue, the second declaration clearly stated that the presence of any foreign military bases on Japanese soil, regardless of the reasoning behind them, would be unacceptable and standing in clear violation of the postwar constitution (both its Preamble and Article 9). This statement was included in the main text of the declaration and reiterated in the summarizing points at the end.[692]

Next month, in April 1950, the regular issue of Sekai was accompanied by a supplement in the form of a separate booklet (*bessatsu furoku* 別冊附録). It contained, both in Japanese and English, the original UNESCO declaration and both Heidankai declarations along with an extensive, seven-part analysis titled "Discussion Points of the Peace Treaty Problem" ("Kōwa mondai no ronten" 講和問題の論点). It built upon the original document by further elaborating on its key points and supplying additional context.[693]

Heidankai also tried to popularize its second declaration through several initiatives, demonstrating it as a united voice of Japanese intellectuals. It sent copies in English to the offices of United Press and Associated Press, two big American news agencies with a worldwide presence. In Japan, two public events were held with the assistance of Gakushūin University (where Abe Yoshishige served as president) and *Asahi Shimbun*, a major liberal

[688] Ibid., pp. 63-64.
[689] Ibid., p. 64.
[690] See Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, pp. 193-194.
[691] Kōda, *The United States and the Japanese Student Movement*, p. 8.
[692] "Kōwa mondai ni tsuite," p. 64.
[693] "Kōwa mondai no ronten" [Discussion points of the peace treaty problem], *Sekai* 52 (November 1950) Special Issue, pp. 18-27.

newspaper. Furthermore, various Heidankai members gave speeches about the declaration at universities and labor union meetings around Japan.[694]

More than simply making their statement publicly known, including outside Japan, they intended to present it as a votum separatum to the official pro-treaty position of the Japanese government. If given enough publicity and popular backing, the Heidankai declaration on peace could hope to delegitimize the government position. In order to signal the dissent, Shimizu Ikutarō even succeeded in giving an English copy of the declaration to Dulles during the latter's visit to Japan.[695] Through these and other activities, the declaration became "extremely influential" in shaping the public debate around the peace treaty.[696]

A firm opposition to American military presence as well as Japan's remilitarization, characteristic of Heidankai's second declaration, can be viewed as reflecting the relatively high degree of idealism on the part of Japanese intellectuals. It was their wish that after regaining independence Japan should neither possess military power nor host any allied troops on her territory. What it meant was that independent Japan would effectively become defenseless and in close proximity to potentially hostile governments of the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, and North Korea. While many Japanese intellectuals seemed almost surprisingly strong in their conviction that this would not pose a problem due to the declared neutrality and pacifism of Japan, it is not hard to see that such views might have seemed highly controversial to conservative Japanese politicians, American policymakers, and perhaps even some segments of Japan's public.

That the Americans worried about the highly critical attitude of many Japanese intellectuals regarding the peace treaty is evident when looking at the Rockefeller Foundation during 1950-1952. When Dulles visited Japan once more in November 1951 to discuss with Yoshida the details of the post-independence relationship and the question of China, he took John D. Rockefeller III, head of the Foundation, as a member of his delegation.[697] Rockefeller's participation was connected to the establishment of the International House of Japan (Kokusai Bunka Kaikan) in Tokyo, for which the preparations were made mostly throughout 1951 and early 1952, and which was opened in August 1952, shortly after the end of the occupation.

[694] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 180.
[695] Ibid., p. 181.
[696] Hein, *Reasonable Men*, p. 119.
[697] "John D. Rockefeller III to Chester Barnard," 26 December 1951, Japanese-United States Cultural Relations, box 1, Series 609, Record Group 1.2, Projects (Grants), Rockefeller Foundation Records, RAC, pp. 1-3.

Ostensibly intended as a center for cultural and academic exchange, the real objective of the house was to foster a pro-American intellectual environment in the immediate aftermath of the Treaty of San Francisco.[698] In a letter from December 1951, Rockefeller stated that the initiative, though funded by his institution, should be presented as a Japanese initiative and the presence of American influence—concealed as much as possible.[699] True to this intent, among the seventeen members of the committee responsible for establishing the House, only three were Americans and the rest—Japanese intellectuals, including famous names like Koizumi Shinzō, Tsuru Shigeto, and Nanbara Shigeru.[700] While the presence of Koizumi is understandable, the presence of the latter two, especially Tsuru, a prominent left-wing figure, suggests that not all Japanese members may have known about the political objectives behind the International House. This would present a situation similar to the Congress for Cultural Freedom. During its early meeting in November 1950, the U.S.-funded organization also included many intellectuals of varied political and ideological backgrounds, some of which were not fully aware of its character (or, in some cases, had even been signed up for its membership without their knowledge).[701]

Regardless of efforts on the part of the United States and its Cold War instruments such as the Rockefeller Foundation to foster a more pro-American attitude among Japan's cultural elite, the critical attitude toward American foreign policy remained an important aspect of Japanese intellectual life during the final years of the occupation. While Heidankai represented its most influential and mainstream current, there were also other prominent forces which involved themselves in the peace treaty debate. One of them was a non-communist faction of the Congress of Industrial Unions of Japan (Zen-Nippon Sangyō-betsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi 全日本産業別労働組合会議), or "Sanbetsu" 産別 a large federation of Japanese trade unions. The faction seceded from the main body of the organization in 1949, creating a split-off group, the National Federation of Industrial Organizations (Zenkoku Sangyō-betsu Rōdō Kumiai Rengō 全国産業別労働組合連合), commonly shortened to "Shin-Sanbetsu" 新産別 ("New Sanbetsu").[702]

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[698] "Proposal for a Cultural Center and Student International Houses," 1 October 1951, Japanese-United States Cultural Relations, RAC, pp. 1-9.
[699] "John D. Rockefeller III to Chester Barnard," p. 1.
[700] "Proposed Cultural and Student Centers," 15 November 1951, Japanese-United States Cultural Relations, RAC, [p. 7].
[701] Grémion, *Konspiracja wolności*, pp. 26-27.
[702] During the transformation period, it briefly existed under the name Sanbetsu Minshuka Dōmei (Alliance for the Democratization of Sanbetsu).

In December 1949, during the first congress of Shin-Sanbetsu, the organization issued a statement on its political program. It consisted of the following points: 1) support for a comprehensive peace treaty that would include the Soviet Union and Communist China; 2) neutralism in international relations; 3) opposition to American military bases in Japan; and 4) opposition to remilitarization.[703] The statement involved several pro-union intellectuals and politicians of the Japan Socialist Party and was soon thereafter adopted by the main left-wing union federation, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyō Gikai 日本労働組合総評議会), abbreviated to "Sōhyō" 総評.[704] For this reason, it could be seen as a general position of the non-communist left regarding the peace treaty proposal. Although demanding the involvement of the Soviet Union and Communist China, it remained separate from procommunist organizations.[705]

The most radical part of Japan's intellectual community, gathered in the procommunist Rekiken, took a very similar approach regarding the peace treaty. The organization had consistently kept its distance from *Sekai* due to distrust of the old liberals. In April 1950, it issued its own statements on the peace treaty and American military bases.[706] Despite this distance, in July 1950, the Rekiken board members commended Heidankai's declarations and stated that owing to these efforts the pro-peace movement in Japan grew strong and became a wider phenomenon.[707]

Returning to Heidankai's second declaration, there are several points warranting attention, particularly when compared to the statement released one year before. While the latter was written in response to an external factor—the UNESCO statement on peace—the declaration on the peace treaty emerged as an original idea of Japanese intellectuals. Furthermore, it was not a fully standalone document, since some aspects of its contents drew on research conducted by two Heidankai members, Ōuchi Hyōe and Tsuru Shigeto, who had been working on Japan's post-occupation economic independence since 1949.[708]

At first glance, the process behind the second declaration seems smoother than was the case with the first one, when Shimizu Ikutarō was hardly able to bring together all the different

[703] Yamamoto, *Grassroots Pacifism in Postwar Japan*, p. 47.
[704] Ibid., p. 55.
[705] Ibid., p. 52.
[706] Issued under the aegis of the Rekiken-affiliated Kagakusha Heiwa Mondai Kondan Kai 科学者平和問題懇談会 ("Scientists' Peace Problem Discussion Group").
[707] Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai Iinkai, "Heiwa-hansen undō to sono hatten no tame ni," pp. 50-51.
[708] Hein, *Reasonable Men*., pp. 126-129.

opinions and local committee reports to form a coherent statement. This time, no such heated arguments occurred and local committees were able to work on the document after the main discussion. However, this sense of general agreement among the Heidankai members proves to be only an illusion if one also reads the introductory comments preceding the statement. They contain a peculiar disclosure, informing the reader that the fact that the listed members of Heidankai had signed the declaration does not mean they entirely endorse all of its contents and take full responsibility for it. Even though they were not recorded by name, a number of members were mentioned to have voiced opposition to some parts of the declaration.[709] Particularly its first point, contrasting the proposed shape of the treaty with an ideal full peace, remained to some extent ambivalent, since it had proved impossible to reach an agreement during the general meeting.[710] Among the members, old liberals remained less enthusiastic about the declaration than the progressive side, even though they agreed on the basic premise that an incomplete peace would not be beneficial for Japan.[711] Differently than a year before, the internal tensions had not been fully overcome—as evidenced by the peculiar disclaimer at the beginning.

Nevertheless, the intellectuals involved were still able to retain at least a semblance of unity. But Rikki Kersten is right to note that it was also the idealism that had perished in the time between the two declarations.[712] The 1950 statement on the peace treaty was much more down-to-earth and politicized, constituting an attempt to influence international politics by challenging the official position of the Yoshida government. Yet the declaration's impact, however significant during the first few months of 1950, suddenly lost its momentum when in June of that year the Korean War suddenly broke out.

4.3. Impact of the Korean War

After the defeat of Japan, Korea was divided into two occupation zones, controlled by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively, separated by an artificial line drawn along the thirty-eighth parallel. In November 1947, the United Nations established a Temporary Commission on Korea, intended to oversee the organization of democratic elections that would provide a basis for a unified legislature and government of Korea. However, the emerging Cold War

[709] "Kōwa mondai ni tsuite," p. 61.
[710] Ibid., p. 62.
[711] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 177.
[712] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, p. 182.

tensions rendered any efforts at peaceful reunification practically impossible. Consequently, the U.N.-overseen elections were held only in the southern part of the peninsula, in May 1948, while elections usurping to be representative of all-Korean voice were held in the North in August 1948.[713] The same year saw both the American and Soviet forces ending their respective military occupations and withdrawing. Effective control was transferred to the newly created political structures: the authoritarian (though ostensibly liberal democratic) pro-American Republic of Korea in the south (hereafter: "South Korea") and the communist Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north (hereafter: "North Korea"). Initially intended only as a temporary solution, the division of Korea proved durable, with both sides dissatisfied and willing to change the status quo, even by military force.[714]

North Korea was the first to attempt this solution. On 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army (KPA) crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, invading the South. Their advantage prompted a military intervention by a number of United Nations member states, most notably the United States, in defense of South Korea. The coalition not only managed to push back the KPA's invasion, but even launched a successful counterattack on DPRK territory, prompting Communist China to intervene in defense of the North. However, the Chinese involvement remained unofficial and Chinese forces participated in the war only as "volunteers." Neither did the Soviets officially join the conflict, although they continued to provide significant financial and material support to North Korea throughout the entirety of the war. Combat lasted for three years, ending with an armistice in July 1953.[715] The conflict constituted the first major proxy war of Cold War, pitting the U.S.-led coalition against communist North Korea and, eventually, China, with substantial Soviet support. It also led to the dismissal of General MacArthur from his position as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on 11 April 1951, in part due to a personal conflict with President Truman. General Matthew Ridgway succeeded MacArthur as SCAP, taking full control of the latter's responsibilities in Japan.[716]

The impact of the Korean War in Japan was profound. It radically altered the country's economic policy, which, since February 1949, had mostly depended on the advice of Joseph Dodge, who promoted a restrictive financial policy to combat inflation. Heavy American

[713] Waldemar Dziak, *Korea: Pokój czy wojna?* [Korea: Peace or war?] (Świat Książki, 2003), pp. 54-56; Peter Lowe, *Wojna koreańska* [Korean War] (Bellona, 1995), pp. 75-79.
[714] Steven Hugh Lee, *Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), pp. 11-14.
[715] Li, *The Cold War in East Asia*, pp. 81-90.
[716] Dziak, *Korea*, pp. 108-112; Lee, *Outposts of Empire*, pp. 94-95, 112; *The Yoshida Memoirs*, pp. 45-46.

involvement in the war and the proximity of the Korean Peninsula meant that Japan now became the single most important base of operations for the U.S. military in the conflict. This connection was further deepened by the fact that General MacArthur, as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, took command of American forces in the war and focused most of his attention on Korea.[717] The conflict required constant supplies of munitions, as well as technical support to service and repair damaged military assets, such as vehicles, aircraft, and warships. This meant an enormous rise in demand for Japan's heavy industries, which at the time suffered from underinvestment and insufficient procurement. Overall, the Korean War became a powerful stimulus for the stagnant Japanese economy, helping it get on the track of fast growth—the trend which would last for the decades to come.[718] Commenting on the positive economic effects of the war for Japan, Prime Minister Yoshida famously called it a "gift from the gods" (*kami-sama no okurimono* 神様の贈り物).[719]

But the economy was hardly the only dimension in which the Korean War affected Japan. The Red Purge, which had begun in early 1950, was further intensified with the start of the war. Since the U.S. military became engulfed in an armed conflict with communist forces in Korea, the American command wanted to make sure that a communist uprising would not occur behind its back, in Japan. Furthermore, since Japan's industry was now engaged in armament production and servicing for the U.S. military, any labor strikes became tantamount to sabotage. In June 1950, SCAP ordered a purge of the Japan Communist Party, which, up to this point, had wielded considerable influence in Japanese society and thus started to be perceived as a threat to the American-dictated status quo. Twenty-four members of the JCP Central Committee were arrested along with seventeen other figures, including the personnel of the party newspaper, *Shinbun Akahata*.[720] As a consequence, the party transferred much of its activities to the underground and some of its leaders, like Nosaka Sanzō, escaped to Beijing.[721]

The Korean War prompted further efforts on the part of the GHQ to increase Japan's defensive capabilities, including a partial rollback of the earlier demilitarization. Already in August 1950, the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai 警察予備隊) was established by

[717] Lowe, *Containing the Cold War in East Asia*, pp. 31-32.
[718] Ogura Shinji, *Banking, the State and Industrial Promotion in Developing Japan, 1900-1973* (Palgrave, 2002), p. 60.
[719] Choi Deokhyo, "Fighting the Korean War in pacifist Japan: Korean and Japanese leftist solidarity and American Cold War containment," *Critical Asian Studies* 49, 4 (2017), p. 3.
[720] Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement*, pp. 84-85.
[721] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, pp. 221-222.

the Japanese government, based on MacArthur's idea. It consisted of 75,000 equipped infantrymen and constituted a de facto military force modeled after the U.S. Army and under the direct command of MacArthur's G2.[722] The National Police Reserve would outlive both the Korean War and the occupation, transforming into the Japan Self-Defense Forces (Nihon Jieitai) in 1954.[723]

Several high-profile intellectuals took a stand against the Red Purge. Despite not being a communist himself, Shimizu Ikutarō criticized the recent actions of GHQ and Japan's government. In an article featured in the July 1950 issue of *Asahi Hyōron* 朝日評論 (*Morning Review*)—a short-lived (1946-1950) *sōgō zasshi* affiliated with the major daily newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*—he went as far as stating that Japanese communists are the "salt of the people" (*minshū no shio* 民衆の塩).[724] Another prominent intellectual, women's rights activist Hiratsuka Raichō, wrote an open letter to Dulles, which she managed to hand him personally during her visit to America, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War. The letter called for a comprehensive peace treaty that would allow Japan to participate in the international order on its own terms, without a forced inclusion in the pro-American bloc. It contained a vision of a perfectly neutral Japan serving as an intermediary between the two worlds. The letter was co-signed by other female writers and activists: Uemura Tamaki, Jōdai Tano, Gauntlett Tsuneko, and Nogami Yaeko.[725]

The Red Purge created significant turmoil among left-wing and progressive intellectuals. Some of the purged members of the JCP or procommunist organizations such as Minka migrated to the Institute for the Science of Thought in 1950-1951. Despite markedly boosting the organization's membership, this outcome eventually led to internal struggles. Some of the new, ex-JCP members attempted to oust Tsurumi Shunsuke, one of the Institute's founders, from the position of leadership.[726] It is worth remembering, however, that while from the perspective of such communist-affiliated intellectuals Tsurumi was perhaps considered too moderate or pro-American, at the time he had already distanced himself from the U.S. Cold

[722] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p. 487; *The Yoshida Memoirs*, p. 180.
[723] Sims, *Japanese Political History*, pp. 272-273.
[724] Shimizu Ikutarō, "Unmei no kiro ni tachite" [Standing at the crossroads of destiny], *Asahi Hyōron* 5, 8/9 (August/September 1950). Cited after Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4.
[725] Yamamoto, *Grassroots Pacifism in Postwar Japan*, p. 145.
[726] Bronson, *One Hundred Million Philosophers*, p. 181.

War policy and wanted to draw more influence from Communist China, similarly to Takeuchi Yoshimi.[727]

In light of the Korean War, an increasing number of liberal intellectuals began advocating for the partial peace treaty from the standpoint of political realism. They also perceived communism as the main threat to the newly established postwar Japanese democracy.[728] A key figure embodying this trend was Hayashi Kentarō, an intellectual of the younger generation, who, right after the war, had been considered one of the rising stars of Japanese intellectual life.[729] A lifelong liberal critical of wartime Japan, Hayashi played an important role in the community of remorse, being a member of the Institute of the Twentieth Century, taking part in the February 1948 debate on historical materialism in *Sekai*, and finally signing both Heidankai declarations. Personally, he was a close friend of Maruyama Masao, with whom he shared a dorm room in high school, and later participated alongside him in common initiatives. Both men started their intellectual careers as liberals, remained critical of Japan's wartime regime, and experienced being drafted into the Japanese armed forces during the war.[730]

However, growing differences between the two became apparent in the second half of 1950. Around August or September of that year, Maruyama received a letter from Hayashi, in which his longtime friend essentially rebuked him for not taking a stand against international and domestic communism. While Hayashi's letter had been sent privately, Maruyama penned his response in the form of an open letter, published in September 1950 in *Sekai*. Titled "Letter to a Certain Liberal" ("Aru jiyūshugisha e no tegami" ある自由主義者への手紙), it was both a defense of his position regarding communism and a full-fledged critique of Hayashi. Maruyama did not disclose his friend's name and instead referred to him as "K."[731]

The letter should not be seen, however, as a publicized personal quarrel between two well-known intellectuals, but rather as an embodiment of a broader conflict which engulfed Japan's intellectual community in the wake of the Korean War. Hayashi's argumentation was representative of not only himself, but also of an increasingly large number of intellectuals who

[727] Avenell, *Making Japanese Citizens*, p. 39.
[728] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 214.
[729] He was considered as such by Shimizu Ikutarō when the latter invited Hayashi to join his Institute of the Twentieth Century. See Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "Nijū seiki kenkyūjo."
[730] Matsuno, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai,'" p. 80.
[731] Maruyama Masao, „Aru jiyūshugisha e no tegami" [Letter to a Certain Liberal], *Sekai* 57 (September 1950), pp. 27-38.

understood the Soviet- and China-supported invasion of South Korea by the communist North as evidence that Japan should remain a steadfast ally of the United States and thus, accept the proposed peace treaty, "incomplete" as it may be. On the other hand, Maruyama mentioned in the letter how Hayashi's criticism was typical of much criticism directed against most progressive intellectuals. He also noted that he himself had been waiting for some time for an occasion to publicly respond to these attacks.[732]

Hayashi's argument against Maruyama (and, by extension, against other progressive intellectuals) was as follows. During the war, many liberties, such as freedom of opinion, had been severely restricted and both Hayashi and Maruyama wished for the wartime Japanese regime to fall and for democracy to develop in Japan. This sentiment was shared by many liberal, progressive, and left-wing intellectuals. After the war, democracy was finally brought to Japan and successfully installed through the occupation-era reforms. But in the current international situation, this new democracy has found itself endangered by totalitarianism in the form of communism, which attempts to violently trample over elemental freedoms. Thus, an intellectual who, like Maruyama, is not Marxist and who values these freedoms, ought to take a stand against communism instead of remaining an aloof scholar.[733]

Hayashi's argument that intellectuals should become more politically engaged because of external circumstances mirrors almost the same argument used by Yoshino Genzaburō two years earlier. While in December 1947 Yoshino formulated his critique of intellectuals from a progressive standpoint and directed it against the old liberals, now in late 1950 it was Hayashi, an anticommunist liberal, who formulated similar arguments against his progressive friend. In both cases, one side clearly acted as an agent of the Cold War polarization, attempting to bring Japanese intellectuals more in line with the logic of international struggle between communism and anticommunism.

It could be helpful to examine Hayashi's position in more detail. He considered himself ideologically liberal and politically realist. His realism amounted to a pessimistic view of international relations which, he believed, were inescapably dominated by military and economic power. For this reason, it is naïve and detrimental for any country, argued Hayashi, to willingly renounce military force and nuclear arms as well as distance itself from participation in international relations. Instead, for the sake of protecting democracy and

[732] Ibid., pp. 28-29.
[733] Ibid., p. 28.

people's rights, it would be in Japan's best interest to firmly ally, both politically and militarily, with the most powerful democratic forces of the world.[734] While sometimes this view is perceived as "conservative," especially in the context of Japan's postwar politics, Kenneth B. Pyle is right to argue that it should be called "liberal-realist" instead.[735]

What was Maruyama's response to Hayashi's criticism in the "Letter to a Certain Liberal"? A significant portion of it was dedicated to a self-explanation of Maruyama's own conduct as a scholar, where he explained that he only made judgements on concrete cases rather than on general issues and avoided linking his judgements to ideology. He cast doubt on the moral grounds of many politicians and journalists who accuse the left of siding with communism against democracy. On what basis do these people claim to represent democracy, he asked, adding that anticommunism in itself is by no means an indicator of one's democratism. The logic of these people would dictate that figures like Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Francisco Franco, or Tōjō Hideki were splendid democrats—an absurd notion to Maruyama.[736]

He also challenged the opinion that democracy in Japan had been successfully established. According to Maruyama, Japan was still very far from a Western-style liberal democracy. For this reason, calls for "defending democracy" were not relevant in the case of contemporary Japan. What is more, the democratization process could be pushed further only by progressive forces. While several such forces existed in Japan at the moment, the Japan Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party were the most progressive among them. For this reason, instead of attacking Japanese communists on ideological grounds, their activity should be allowed, as it is beneficial for the growth of democracy in Japan.[737]

Hayashi did not leave Maruyama's open letter without a response. Likewise, he published his reply in the next issue of *Sekai*, in October 1950, titled "The Good Sense of Contemporary Intellectuals: A Non-Critical Critique of Maruyama Masao" ("Gendai chishikijin no ryōshiki: Maruyama Masao ni taisuru hihihanteki hihan" 現代知識人の良識：丸山真男に対する非批判的批判).[738] While Maruyama's open letter never gave away the interlocutor's full name, Hayashi apparently did not feel a need to anonymize his response. While his letter-

[734] Kenneth B. Pyle, "The Future of Japanese Nationality: An Essay in Contemporary History," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 8, 2 (1982), pp. 247-250.
[735] Ibid., p. 250.
[736] Maruyama, "Aru jiyūshugisha e no tegami," p. 29.
[737] Ibid., pp. 30-36.
[738] Hayashi Kentarō, "Gendai chishikijin no ryōshiki: Maruyama Masao ni taisuru hihihanteki hihan" [The good sense of contemporary intellectuals: A non-critical critique of Maruyama Masao], *Sekai* 58 (October 1950).

turned-article was generally kept in a polite, if not friendly, tone, he doubled down on his opinions and criticism of Maruyama and other progressive intellectuals. While noting that Maruyama himself and many others were not politically communist, he identified their way of thinking about Japan's history as drawing heavily on prewar Marxist historiography.[739] Hayashi was not mistaken in this, as Maruyama really took much inspiration from the *Kōza-ha* school of Marxism with regard to prewar Japan.[740] However, by focusing on this fact in his letter, Hayashi was de facto casting his intellectual adversary as a representative of the "communist camp," despite the fact that for many years the two shared much of their experiences as members of the same community of remorse.

Comparing the background of Hayashi and Maruyama, both of whom served in Japan's wartime military, Matsuno Yasuko, a scholar of the community of remorse, argues that the divergence of their paths was a result of different experiences during compulsory military service during the war, which profoundly shaped their opinions on many issues.[741] This, however, does not seem to be a probable explanation since the divergence between Hayashi and Maruyama occurred not in 1945 or 1946, but much later, in the second half of 1950. Up to that point, they both participated in the same community alongside each other. When Maruyama received an invitation from Shimizu Ikutarō to join the Institute of the Twentieth Century, he first consulted with Hayashi.[742] Maruyama himself mentioned that while neither contacted the other very frequently throughout 1946-1950, each busy with his work, they remained on very good terms.[743] That is why, rather than the two of them going down different paths based on their wartime experience, the Korean War seems a much more likely reason for their ultimate divergence in the second half of 1950.

While this is only a case of two individuals, both Maruyama and Hayashi were representative of a large number of postwar intellectuals, who had started from the point of aversion toward the old, "semi-feudal and fascist," Japan, but came to side with opposing political forces in the subsequent years. Just like America and the Soviet Union were fellow signatories of the Potsdam Declaration and thus formal patrons of Japan's democratization in

[739] Ibid., p. 99.
[740] Oguma, *"Minshu" to "aikoku,"* pp. 72, 80.
[741] Matsuno, "Sengo chishikijin to 'kaikon kyōdōtai,'" p. 80.
[742] Takeuchi, *Shimizu Ikutarō*, Chapter 4, "Nijū seiki kenkyūjo."
[743] Maruyama, "Aru jiyūshugisha e no tegami," p. 27.

1945-1946, many intellectuals were also part of the same community dedicated to that same democratization.[744]

The Korean War provided Japanese intellectuals with a radically changed international and domestic environment, sending many of them and their organizations into a flurry. Heidankai, the largest among them, was no different. Its second declaration, much like the first one, rested on the assumption that coexistence between the two worlds was possible. It was owing to this belief, shared by the old liberals and the progressives alike, that the Japanese intellectual community was able to retain its unity in the face of the Cold War ideological and political pressures. The Korean War, however, severely undermined this assumption, essentially making much of the argumentation of both declarations void. Thus it should not come as a surprise that Heidankai, trying to deal with the new international reality, hurried to initiate work on a new document that would constitute an adequate response to the changing circumstances.

Not long after the Korean War broke out in late June 1950, Heidankai's local committees began to work. The draft of the new declaration was finished in September 1950 and the document, titled "For the Third Time About Peace" ("Mitabi heiwa ni tsuite" 三度平和について), found its way to *Sekai* in December 1950.[745] However, it is not difficult to notice some important differences when compared to the two previous statements released by Heidankai. First of all, the document was subtitled as a "Peace Problem Discussion Group research report" ("Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai kenkyū hōkoku" 平和問題談話会研究報告) rather than a "declaration" (*seimei* 声明)—as it was the case previously.[746] It refers to itself as a *seimei* in the text, but not in the name of the document.[747] Secondly, the document made use of a first-person pronoun in the plural form, *ware-ware* 我々, indicating that it was intended as a collective voice of the organization's members, but no list of these members was given.[748] While it was suggested that the document represented Heidankai as a whole, the absolute lack of any names of signatories or authors made it unclear whether the "report" really spoke for all the members. Since any statement on a public issue would usually require some sort of enumeration of persons on behalf of whom it has been formulated, presenting the declaration

[744] The fact that the Soviet Union was not the side executing that democratization is of secondary importance. The Soviets were part of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan and thus formally responsible for the entire occupation policy. Moreover, the left wing in Japan perceived them as patrons of democratization—as evidenced by the JCP appeal from 10 October 1945. For details see Chapter 2, section 2.1.
[745] "Mitabi heiwa ni tsuite" [For the third time about peace], *Sekai* 60 (December 1950), pp. 21-52.
[746] Ibid., p. 21.
[747] Ibid., p. 23.
[748] Ibid., p. 52.

as a research report could perhaps be seen as a means of avoiding the need to list anybody's name.

The size of the document was also significantly larger than before, at thirty-one pages. Such a length was much more suitable for an analysis rather than a clear statement on public matters—and, indeed, the "third declaration" reads as an analysis. Beginning with an introduction calling back to the origins of Heidankai and the UNESCO declaration, it consisted of four chapters, covering the general understanding of the peace problem, the coexistence of the two worlds theory, the possible foreign and security policies post-independence in light of the constitution, as well as Japan's internal politics. While the Korean War had provided the reason for issuing the document, it was formulated more as a broader analysis of Japan's current situation. Much of its contents referred back to Heidankai's earlier statements and work. It did not break with the organization's past views on any issue. Among several points that it made, the most important one seemed to be that despite the ongoing military, political, and ideological conflict, the two worlds need not destroy one another and could still coexist—and regardless of the international tensions, such tensions still would not justify either remilitarization or an incomplete peace treaty.[749]

According to Seki Hiroharu, the contents of the third declaration constituted the pinnacle of Heidankai's thought and played a key role in shaping Japan's future peace movement as well as political studies of peace (*heiwa no seijigaku* 平和の政治学), remaining relevant at least until the 1970s.[750]

Despite being presented as arising from the work of Heidankai's subcommittees, the third declaration was actually the work of only four people: Maruyama, Shimizu, Tsuru Shigeto, and Ukai Nobushige—although Maruyama played the leading role.[751] It reflected their view of the current situation rather than being a summary, or compromise, of various positions held by the entire group, as had previously been the case.[752] Kersten sees the contents of the third declaration as consistent with Maruyama's thought, both at the time and later.[753] In reality, the document lacked the widespread support of Heidankai members that its predecessors had enjoyed.[754] Its formulation as supposedly representing the general outlook of Heidankai

[749] Ibid., pp. 32-34.
[750] Seki, "Kōwa no seijigaku," pp. 104-109.
[751] Tokura, "'Sekai' ni okeru Shimizu Ikutarō no shakaigaku," p. 911.
[752] Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 213; Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 195.
[753] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, pp. 186-187.
[754] Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 195.

members was thus, at least to some extent, a façade, or *tatemae* 建前, adopted for the sake of appearances. It was a statement written in the name of an organization by one of its members rather than a statement representing the organization's members as a collective.

The elaboration on the ideas of peace, demilitarization, and the two worlds coexistence theory in the third declaration certainly followed the reasoning of Heidankai's earlier statements. In the meantime, however, the Korean War altered the views of many intellectuals who no longer thought it possible to distance themselves both from the United States and the Soviets. Even if they were not conservative in the strict sense of the word and had represented a liberal, reformist direction in Japanese thought after 1945, in 1950 they moved visibly to the right, forming an intellectual backbone of postwar conservatism in Japan.

When the third declaration was published in December 1950, Heidankai had already become an internally conflicted body—just like the intellectual community it aspired to represent. After 1950, the organization's role in Japan's intellectual life eroded and its activity and membership both declined significantly, never again to return to a level comparable with the period of 1948-1950, when it served as Japan's most impactful intellectual organization.[755]

4.4. Toward the end of occupation

The topic of the American-proposed peace treaty dominated the entire period from late 1950 to September 1951, when the San Francisco Conference took place, and extended even further. Unlike the earlier, more abstract discussions about possible scenarios and the shape of a potential peace treaty, this time the public debate revolved around the concrete aspects of the American draft. Japanese intellectuals featured prominently in this debate, but their involvement was less organized and much more hectic as they attempted either to support or thwart the American proposal by influencing public opinion and domestic politics.

The voices against the "partial peace" were built upon the ideas of Heidankai's second declaration. Many arguments were pragmatic in nature and referred to the stability of the region, economic standing of post-occupation Japan, and ineffectiveness of a partial peace.[756] Legalistic arguments called for the fulfillment of the Potsdam Declaration and doubted the

[755] Kersten, *Democracy in Japan*, pp. 175-176; Tamamoto, *Unwanted Peace*, p. 20.
[756] Satō Naotake et al., "Kōwa mondai no haigo" [Behind the peace treaty problem], *Chūō Kōron* 65, 1 (January 1950), pp. 35-36 (Hasegawa and Rōyama's parts); Mutai Risaku, "Miesuita gijutsu" [Transparent trickery], *Tenbō* 69 (September 1951), pp. 22-23.

treaty's consistency with the postwar constitution.[757] Often they were accompanied by ideological arguments, resting on pacifism, Japan's "unique destiny," or moral obligations regarding China and Korea.[758] There was also a number of patriotic arguments, calling for protection of Japan's sovereignty and avoiding subservience to America.[759] Furthermore, many commentators were pointing out that if—contrary to America's intentions—the Soviets and Communist China were to be included, then such a comprehensive peace treaty would not only avoid the risk of sparking a new world war (which was believed to be very tangible), but would significantly contribute to bringing down international tensions.[760] In general, the arguments opposing the American treaty proposal were very much consistent with the ideas of Heidankai's three declarations as well as other past voices calling for a full peace.

Differently than before, however, the number of voices either supporting or in some way justifying the U.S.-proposed peace grew significantly among Japanese intellectuals. Up to the Korean War, these voices mostly came from among politicians and fringe figures of Japan's public life. The new supporters of the American treaty did not present their views as a major shift or reversal, however. Often they would still identify themselves as full peace proponents, at least in name, while attempting to justify the partial peace. Let us examine some examples.

Yokota Kisaburō, a Heidankai member who had earlier taken part in the Tokyo Trials, defended American military bases in Japan, arguing that their presence would not be contrary to Japan's pacifism or the postwar constitution. In order to make peace possible, Japan ought to ally itself with strong democratic nations, such as the U.S. What is more, he argued, passivity in the face of a possible foreign invasion, without protecting the wellbeing of citizens and the nation's independence, is immoral and does not constitute a "sound pacifism" (*kenzen'na*

[757] Shimizu Ikutarō, "Kōwa kaigi ni yosu" [A message to the peace treaty conference], *Sekai* 70, p. 82; Nawa Tōichi, "Heiwa ni tai-suru bōtoku" [Blasphemy against peace], *Sekai* 70 (October 1951), p. 90; Imanaka Tsugimaro, "Kōwa to Nihon no shinro" [The peace treaty and Japan's course], *Sekai* 72 (December 1951), p. 45; Tabata Shinobu, "Gunji kyōtei no teiketsu" [Conclusion of the military agreement], *Sekai* 70, pp. 124-126.

[758] Kamei Katsuichirō, "Dai nijūroku-jō e no gimon" [Doubts regarding Article 26], *Tenbō* 69 (September 1951), p. 26; Suekawa Hiroshi, "Nihon kokumin to shite no setsujitsuna negai" [Sincere wish of a Japanese citizen], *Sekai* 70, p. 69; Tsuru Shigeto, "Tai-Nichi kōwa," pp. 11-12; Kuwabara Takeo, "Henka-shita jōken no naka demo heiwa o" [Peace even under changed conditions], *Sekai* 70, p. 88.

[759] Takashima Zen'ya, "Zenmen kōwa no genjitsusei" [Reality of a comprehensive peace], *Sekai* 52 (April 1950), p. 29; Uehara Senroku, "Kōwa mondai no honshitsu wo mioroshite wa naranai" [We must not overlook the true nature of the peace treaty problem], *Sekai* 70, p. 79; Akamatsu Kaname et al., "Zenmen kōwa-ron to tandoku kōwa ron no tairitsu" [Conflict between the full peace theory and the partial peace theory], *Chūō Kōron* 66, 11 (November 1951), p. 116 (Nawa's part). Take note that oftentimes a single article simultaneously included several types of argumentation.

[760] Takahashi Masao, "Takahashi sōan" [Takahashi's proposal], *Tenbō* 69 (September 1951), p. 24; Tsuru Shigeto, "Tai-Nichi kōwa," p. 5; Tsunetō Kyō, "Wakai no kōwa jōyaku to iu koto ni tsuite" [About the treaty to end the war], *Sekai* 70 (October 1951), p. 73.

heiwashugi 健全な平和主義).[761] He also stated that only one side (America) represents actual democracy in the worldwide conflict.[762]

Another Heidankai member, Tsunetō Kyō, who had made a significant contribution to the development of the peace theory in 1949, now, in 1951, professed his deep disappointment in the absence of the Soviet Union and China. Although opposed to remilitarization, Tsunetō stated that even such an incomplete peace was nevertheless a positive outcome for Japan.[763]

Rōyama Masamichi, who never took part in Heidankai but was a prominent progressive voice in postwar Japan (and for whom Maruyama had vouched to the GHQ in 1947), expressed his regrets over the Cold War circumstances, which forced Japan to accept a partial peace, but he nevertheless regarded this outcome as inevitable and, in the face of Japan's current weakness, desirable.[764] A year earlier, in a *zadankai* in *Chūō Kōron*, which also involved Hasegawa Nyozekan, Satō Naotake, and Suzuki Mosaburō, Rōyama was much more insistent on the necessity of a full peace, agreeing on this issue with his fellow debaters.[765]

Watsuji Tetsurō, a Heidankai member and one of the old liberals, argued that neither Japan nor America can do very much to make the peace treaty comprehensive. Everything rests on the Soviets who can decide to either come to the table or sabotage the agreement.[766] Regarding Communist China, he justified its absence as only natural since there were currently two contending Chinese governments.[767] Framing the treaty problem in such a way was fully consistent with the American Cold War position, which pronounced that the Soviets are to blame for their lack of cooperation, even though the drafting process completely ignored any feedback from Moscow.

It would be a mistake, however, to interpolate Watsuji's views to other old liberals. Abe Yoshishige provides a good example. Despite all of his skepticism toward the Soviets and his general anticommunism, he remained committed to his earlier belief that remilitarization,

[761] Yokota Kisaburō, "Chūhei wa mitometemo saigunbi wa sakeneba naranu" [Even if we accept the stationing of troops, remilitarization must be avoided], *Sekai* 70 (October 1951), pp. 127-128.
[762] Ibid., p. 129
[763] Tsunetō, "Wakai no kōwa jōyaku," pp. 72-73.
[764] Rōyama Masamichi, "Kokusai kiki-ka no kōwa mondai. Daresu enzetsu no kōan" [The peace treaty problem in the midst of an international crisis: The ideas in Dulles's speech], *Chūō Kōron* 66, 3 (March 1951), pp. 58-60.
[765] Satō et al., "Kōwa mondai no haigo," p. 36.
[766] Watsuji Tetsurō, "Sovieto no sekinin" [Responsibility of the Soviets], *Sekai* 70 (October 1951), p. 77.
[767] Ibid., p. 75.

American bases, and the American-proposed treaty, even after the Korean War.[768] Him and the rest of the former Dōshinkai members could be seen as moving into conservatism during the new decade, but that was a longer process, occurring naturally through the 1950s and also included intellectuals involved with *Bungei Shunjū* magazine more generally.[769]On the other hand, younger liberals like Hayashi Kentarō and his colleague, Inoki Masamichi, took a visibly pro-American, anti-Soviet stance from the Korean War onward, becoming Japan's "neoconservatives" for the rest of their intellectual careers.[770] They were joined in this attitude by increasingly anti-left Fukuda Tsunari.[771]

Neither the staunch, largely unified opposition of Japanese intellectuals before June 1950, nor the significantly weaker in number, but still significant later protests were able to stop the Treaty of San Francisco from materializing. During the peace conference—carefully monitored and commented on by the Japanese press—Dulles delivered a long speech, which provided rationale for the treaty based on America's Cold War optics. He also referred to the idea of a full peace without the controversial provisions allowing U.S. military bases to remain in Japan. He said as follows: "That kind of a peace, in this present kind of a world, would be a fraud. To give a sovereignty which cannot be defended is to give an empty husk. Indefensible sovereignty is not sovereignty at all. An undefended and indefensible Japan would be so subject to the menace of surrounding power that Japan would not in fact be able to lead an independent existence."[772]

Since the "empty husk" mentioned by Dulles was rendered as *shinkū* ("vacuum" 真空) in unofficial Japanese translations circulating in the press, the entire concept began to be referred to in Japan, somewhat condescendingly, as the "vacuum theory" (*shinkū riron* 真空理論). This "theory"—which consisted of only four sentences, thus much more an argument than a theory or a concept—was vehemently attacked by the intellectuals advocating for the full peace. The next month, in October 1951, Koizumi Shinzō, one of the most prominent defenders of the treaty, provided an elaboration of the "vacuum theory" in *Kokoro*. He warned that the

[768] Abe Yoshishige, "Sekai to Ajia to Nihon to no heiwa no tachiba kara" [From the standpoint of peace between Japan, Asia, and the world], *Sekai* 70 (October 1951), pp. 62-67.
[769]
[770] Pyle, "The Future of Japanese Nationality," pp. 247-248.
[771] George R. Packard III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 277.
[772] "Kugatsu itsuka no Daresu Bei-daihyō no enzetsu (eibun)" [Speech of U.S. representative Dulles on September 5 (in English)], September 5, 1951, in *Nihon gaikō bunsho: Heiwa jōyaku no teiketsu*, Vol. 4 (Gaimushō, 2002), p. 286,

post-occupation Japan will become "empty" of soldiers and if this dangerous vacuum is not quickly filled with either its own troops or America's (under a new defense treaty), this emptiness could serve as an invitation for a hostile military force, namely the Soviets.[773] Koizumi reiterated his argumentation in *Bungei Shunjū* in January 1952.[774]

The "vacuum theory," as framed by both Dulles and Koizumi, was attacked by several intellectuals, first Yamakawa Hitoshi, and later, in March 1952, by Tsuru Shigeto and Sugi Toshio. All three published their repudiations in *Sekai*. Koizumi responded, however, also in *Sekai* and the discussion evolved into a more personal, and rather aggressive, polemic between him and Tsuru. Though ostensibly an argument about the post-treaty future of Japan in light of American military presence in the country, both sides quickly resorted to typical Cold War narratives, with Koizumi criticizing Tsuru by attacking the Soviet Union, and Tsuru responding by attacking the United States and accusing his adversary of "Sovietophobia."[775] It is worth noting that both disputants were very high-profile figures of Japanese intellectual life. It would be difficult to find a more telling example of Japan's intellectual debate deteriorating into a reproduction of the global patterns of Cold War opposition.

Sekai, which had been established by Iwanami Shigeo in late 1945 to provide a platform for Japanese intellectuals united by their pro-democratic stance, and later championed Heidankai as a pluralistic pro-peace initiative, in 1951 became basically an outlet for largely one-sided argumentation against the treaty. When looking through the October 1951 issue, entirely dedicated to the discussion on the Treaty of San Francisco, one can be very surprised by how small, or even negligible, the differences of opinion between most of the featured voices were—and that is despite their very high number. The year 1951 clearly marked the full transformation of *Sekai* into a magazine with a visible leftist political agenda—something that was coming perhaps from 1947, as shown in the preceding chapter, but reaching full realization during the peace treaty debate.

What is interesting regarding this relatively long process is that following the analysis conducted by Takeuchi Yō, the peak of *Sekai*'s popularity (in terms of the number of copies sold relative to other monthlies) occurred in 1946 and lasted until 1948.[776] It was the time when

[773] Koizumi Shinzō, "Heiwa-ron" [The peace theory], *Kokoro* 4, 6 (October 1951), pp. 6-13.
[774] Koizumi, "Heiwa-ron" [The peace theory], *Bungei Shunjū* 30, 1 (January 1952), pp. 64-79
[775] Tsuru Shigeto, "Heiwa-ron no zenshin no tame ni: Kasanete Koizumi-hakase ni to'u" [For the advancement of peace theory: A further question to Dr. Koizumi], *Sekai* 78 (June 1952), pp. 33-38.
[776] Takeuchi, *Kakushin genshō no sengo shi*, p. 82.

the magazine was still representative of the broader intellectual community. The discussions surrounding the peace treaty, which occurred mostly in 1950-1951, mark a visible decline in sales—a long-lasting trend which made *Sekai* permanently fall behind the more moderate *Chūō Kōron*, despite retaining a strong position on the market.[777] This negative tendency was not helped by occasional sales spikes surrounding certain issues of the magazine, such as the December 1950 issue containing Heidankai's third declaration or the October 1951 issue dedicated to the Treaty of San Francisco.[778]

Takeuchi Yō sees this process as reflecting the general mood of the populace. While in 1946-1948 *Sekai* represented the opinions of the majority of the educated middle class, especially students, teachers, university professors, and the younger generation in general, from around 1950-1951 onward it shifted to represent only those among them who held firm left-wing opinions and supported the Japan Socialist Party or the Japan Communist Party.[779] Takeuchi also refers to a popular survey conducted in 1951 by *Asahi Shimbun*, according to which approximately 71% of the Japanese public supported some form of remilitarization.[780]

Whether the evolution of *Sekai* between 1947 and 1951 was what Yoshino Genzaburō had in mind when trying to take control of the magazine from the old liberals in mid-1947, is of course debatable, but when reading through the later reminiscences of either himself or other key *Sekai* figures, like Maruyama, this transformation seems to be entirely absent—as if from the very beginning *Sekai* was supposed to be a strongly progressive journal sympathetic to the left. This is was not the case, as proven in Chapter 1. However, it is entirely possible that historical actors involved in this process did not clearly perceive the change from their position as engaged participants. Nor did those who supported the Treaty of San Francisco seem to perceive the process in the same way: for them, *Sekai*'s reorientation was simply a matter of left-wing radicalization, while they themselves did not seem to notice their own transformation into proponents of an increasingly pro-American orientation in Japan. This twofold process can be regarded as the ultimate victory of Cold War in the Japanese intellectual life.

[777] Ibid., pp. 100-101.
[778] Ibid., p. 64; Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity*, p. 213.
[779] Takeuchi , *Kakushin gensō no sengo shi*, pp. 111-112.
[780] Ibid., pp. 52-54.

Conclusion

The end of World War II in Japan witnessed the formation of a new intellectual community, encompassing most publicly active scholars, journalists, and writers.

The first stage of this community's existence spanned from late August 1945, when the occupation began, to early 1947, when the Cold War tensions started to become visible in Japan. During this year-and-a-half period, Japanese intellectuals devoted themselves to the objective of transforming Japan into a peaceful and democratic nation, which they themselves perceived both as their mission and as a moral obligation. The specific tasks included in this mission, as well as the envisioned details of the new Japan, varied depending on each individual's outlook and political orientation. Yet all shared a common ideal of Japan as a demilitarized, democratic "culture state" devoted to fostering sound international relations. They supported the new constitution, despite it being largely imposed by the Americans, due to its progressive character and attempted to educate the people of Japan about their roles as citizens in the new political system.

The contemporary label "community of remorse," devised by Maruyama Masao, aptly reflects the group's origins in the shared wartime experience and trauma that united its members around common sentiments. However, the community could not have taken shape—at least not with the breadth and cohesion it achieved—without the external circumstances created by the Allied occupation. The policy pursued by GHQ under General MacArthur to modernize and democratize Japan along New Deal ideals attracted even those intellectuals whose sympathies lay with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the expected and gradually implemented purge removed many intellectuals affiliated with the former regime, excluding them from public life and thereby amplifying the relative influence of the community of remorse.

The first phase of in the history of the postwar intellectual community is symbolized by *Sekai*, one of the newly established *sōgō zasshi*. It was founded by Iwanami Shigeo and a group of prewar liberals and pacifists, such as Abe Yoshishige, to provide a shared platform for intellectuals of diverse backgrounds, united by a shared commitment to democratize Japan. The second objective of the community of remorse was tied to another important symbol of this period: the Institute of the Twentieth Century. Founded by Shimizu Ikutarō, it sought to promote higher education among the general populace along with the ideals of civic society. More than

a mere educational institution, it brought together an extraordinary range of scholars, nearly all of whom would go on to become some of postwar Japan's most influential intellectual figures. While *Sekai* was the foremost medium of the community of remorse, its members also gathered around older opinion magazines, like *Chūō Kōron*, and newer ones, like *Tenbō*.

Aside from intellectuals who were active in the community and those who, due to various reasons, remained on the sidelines, there was also a number of those who occupied ambivalent positions, standing at the boundaries. Most of them were far-left intellectuals, associated either with the Japan Communist Party (with its own periodicals, like *Zen'ei*, and societies, like Minka or Rekiken), or the "proletarian literature" movement. The latter was focused around literary magazines, mainly *Kindai Bungaku* and *Shin-Nihon Bungaku.* Their authors cast doubt on the legitimacy of mainstream intellectuals by questioning whether they were morally qualified to lead the public due to their war responsibility. Although voicing many important arguments, ultimately their efforts proved ineffective, as evidenced by their failure to "purify" the mainstream intellectual community of those deemed unsuited because of their wartime conduct.

Other figures at the boundaries of the community of remorse, though much less numerous, were intellectuals who interacted with the community while simultaneously keeping their distance. A good example of such an attitude was Fukuda Tsuneari, who, as a liberal, supported the postwar democratization, but remained highly critical of the feeling of "moral superiority" on the part of many progressive intellectuals. Yet despite his harsh opinions, he was still well-acquainted with many of the people he criticized, participating in the Institute of the Twentieth Century and publishing in major magazines. This shows the high degree of internal pluralism within the intellectual community, which extended even to those who willingly distanced themselves from some aspects of the group's identity.

Despite occasional tensions and ambiguities pertaining to the details of how the new Japan ought to be or how responsible individual figures were for their wartime actions, the intellectual community of early postwar Japan was a group possessing a significant level of cohesion, based on a dedication to common political objectives. As long as these objectives were clear and as long as the occupation policy, conducted by the Americans in the name of all of the Allies, remained satisfactory for most intellectuals, they were willing to cooperate with one another. To what extent this cohesion depended on external conditions, and to what extent it reflected conscious, volitional choice, was revealed with the emergence of Cold War.

Cold War in Japan symbolically began when General MacArthur made the decision to ban the general strike planned on 1 February 1947. This constituted a significant change in American occupation policy, up to that point very supportive of Japanese labor unions. It was also the first in a chain of events which came to be known as the "Reverse Course," and which altered Japan's domestic politics on a fundamental level. Progressive objectives of the occupation, such as social reform, had to give precedence to economic stabilization and containment of communist influence. This new course, implemented by SCAP and the conservative government of Yoshida Shigeru (who lost the premiership in May 1947, but returned to power a year later), culminated in the "Red Purge" of communists and people believed to be communist sympathizers from public life, institutions, and even private companies. In spite of these hurdles, however, the Japan Communist Party reached an unprecedented level of public support, achieving almost 10% of the total vote in the January 1949 general elections. Japan clearly found itself in a state of intensifying polarization along political and ideological lines consistent with the global Cold War division.

This process also engulfed Japan's intellectual life. *Sekai*, a key magazine of the community of remorse, found itself in the middle of a struggle over its editorial line. On one side, Yoshino Genzaburō, the editor-in-chief, wished to turn the magazine more to the left and directly engage with contemporary political events. Against him stood Abe Yoshishige, who acted as an informal leader of the so-called "old liberals:" a group encompassing prominent prewar liberals who opposed the war and supported postwar democratization, but increasingly found themselves at odds with the more Marxist-leaning younger generation of intellectuals. Abe's position in *Sekai* was initially very powerful due to his personal connection to Iwanami Shigeo, president of the publishing company. After the latter's death, Abe's influence gradually eroded, making it possible for Yoshino to push the magazine into a more progressive direction. A key moment occurred in February 1948, when Yoshino organized a debate under on historical materialism under the auspices of *Sekai*—a debate which featured many Marxist intellectuals but not a single representative of the old liberals.

In July 1948, Abe and his colleagues finally parted ways with *Sekai* and moved to a new magazine, *Kokoro*, which they created and started publishing on their own. Regardless of what might have been expected, the new magazine did not lean strongly to the right, and instead tried to distance its political commentary from the contemporary left-right (pro-Soviet/pro-American) division. A month after the old liberals left *Sekai*, Yoshino organized a debate

between them and a group of younger, more progressive intellectuals (such as Maruyama or Hayashi Kentarō) as an attempt to reach mutual understanding among the two sides. The discussions took a mixed, at times polite, at times intense, form, and did not yield any practical results or new ideas. However, the debate revealed that a certain sense of community persisted and that both sides were still willing to engage with each other and even compromise on some of their positions.

Around the same time, in summer 1948, Yoshino, along with his friends, Shimizu and Kuno Osamu, spearheaded the creation of a new organization, the Peace Problem Discussion Group, referred to by its shortened Japanese name, "Heidankai." Its purpose was to gather the most prominent and respected Japanese intellectuals who would compose and sign a joint statement on peace. The declaration was designed as a reply to a similar document, issued by a group of European scientists under the auspices of UNESCO earlier that same year. Both the original UNESCO statement and the Japanese one, were intended as a tool to breach the Cold War divide through a common initiative of intellectuals dedicated to peace and human progress. The creation of Heidankai was a major success, with several local committees being installed in November 1948 in Tokyo and Kyoto, and the general meeting taking place the next month. Intellectuals who gathered for the symposium included a number of progressive liberals of the younger generation, Marxists, as well as the old liberals. After a lengthy discussion, the participants were able to create a draft which, after many corrections and consultations, reached its final form and was published in *Sekai* in March 1949. The Heidankai declaration on peace constituted a compromise between intellectuals of varied political leanings and ideologies, united by a belief in the possibility of harmonious coexistence between the "two worlds" in the name of shared commitment to peace and democracy.

The major turn in Japan's domestic politics from democratization to containment was clearly an effect of Cold War. Yet the continuous insistence of the former on the part of a large number of prominent Japanese intellectuals can be seen as opposition against not only the changes to American policy, but also to the manifestation of Cold War logic in Japan. Likewise, the unwillingness of many Japanese Marxists to see all non-communist forces as "capitalistic," "bourgeoisie," and opposed to social reforms, was revealed by their support for suprapolitical initiatives such as Heidankai.

The reluctance of the Japanese left in the face of Cold War polarization can perhaps be seen best in the hitherto described actions of Yoshino. At the time when he worked on changing the editorial line of *Sekai* and wrote about the need for intellectuals to directly engage in contemporary problems and conflicts, Yoshino clearly acted as an agent of Cold War polarization in Japan. However, in mid- and late 1948, when organizing a debate with the old liberals and creating Heidankai, he played the role of a "reverser" of this polarization. He was supported in the latter efforts by figures like Shimizu, who, despite his own very strong opinions on sociopolitical matters, above all seems to have wanted to create a united front of intellectuals dedicated to peace. This, however, would not have materialized if these intellectuals were not willing to cooperate with one another; if Abe, for example, had declined to participate in the same initiative as the radicals he feared so much; or if Hani Gorō, a far-left thinker, had refused to sign the same declaration as Abe. A great many of the intellectuals had to make personal compromises in order to achieve unity in a situation where neither SCAP nor the current government, nor the Japan Communist Party with its many backers, desired any sort of common ground.

Not all, of course, took part. Prominent absentees among Heidankai members included anticommunist liberals like Koizumi Shinzō or Fukuda Tsuneari, along with a few orthodox Marxists like Nakano Shigeharu, Matsumura Kazuto, or Odagiri Hideo. Nevertheless, the final lineup of the declaration's signatories was impressive, as it revealed a number of well-known scholars and people of culture with differing political sympathies. While the Cold War influence, present in Japan from 1947 onward, certainly managed to significantly disturb the unity of that community, it evidently did not manage to shatter it completely, at least not yet as of early 1949.

From late 1949 to the end of the occupation, Japan's intellectual community underwent a significant change. The victory of the communists in China, already assured as of the fall of 1949, drew the attention of intellectuals in Japan to their East Asian neighbor. As the United States engaged in supporting the Reverse Course, many of them became disillusioned with America and started looking for alternative models of modernization. The new China provided such a model. The thought of Mao Zedong, or Maoism, propagated in Japan by a number of thinkers such as Takeuchi Yoshimi and Tsurumi Kazuko, gained significant popularity and influenced how the social role of an intellectual was perceived by the intellectuals themselves. Previously, the dominant concept of an intellectual in the community was that of an educator, who would teach and lead society toward the path of democratic modernization. This concept

had been occasionally criticized for its elitism and isolation from ordinary people. But it was Maoism that presented a fully developed concept of a "democratic intellectual." Regardless of how much this concept was actually applied and whether or not it remained only in the sphere of ideas, it contributed to the erosion of shared self-identification among the members of the community of remorse.

Another external factor which decidedly influenced the Japanese intellectual community in this period was the acceleration of American efforts to end the occupation. The necessary prerequisite, a peace treaty between Japan and the World War II Allies, became the new topic of public debate from late 1949 onward, simultaneously with the developments in China. The topic, centered around the problem of whether Japan would be granted a "comprehensive" or only "partial" peace, also involved two controversial questions: Would post-occupation Japan remilitarize? And—would the U.S. military bases remain on Japanese territory after the treaty?

In order to address all of the above, Heidankai released its second declaration in March 1950. It expressed commitment to a full peace, involving Communist China and the Soviet Union, warned against negative consequences of the American-proposed partial peace, and strongly criticized any notions of a possible continued U.S. military presence in Japan and remilitarization. While the declaration was sharp in its wording and signed by all regular members of Heidankai, it also included a peculiar mention that not every signatory necessarily agreed with the entirety of the document. This reflected the growing difference of opinion among Japanese intellectuals, with an increasing number of them willing to compromise on some aspects of the peace treaty problem.

In early 1950, the disagreement was still kept below the surface for the sake of manifesting the unity of the intellectual community. But after the Korean War broke out in June of that year, these internal tensions suddenly became very evident. For many liberals, both younger, like Hayashi Kentarō, and older, like Watsuji Tetsurō, as well as for some socialists, like Rōyama Masamichi—all of whom had previously subscribed to the community of remorse—the war served as a definite case demonstrating that the two sides of Cold War were not equal. Thus, Japan ought to clearly align itself with America, despite reservations these intellectuals still held about Washington's policy. Simultaneously, the left and progressive liberals doubled down on their opposition to the peace treaty, preferring Japan to remain under occupation than to accept the U.S.-backed partial peace.

In these circumstances, a new declaration by Heidankai became practically impossible, at least in a format similar to the previous documents. Nevertheless, the organization attempted to overcome this impasse by releasing a statement dubbed as a research report, ostensibly in the name of the entire Heidankai, but without any names of signatories. Published in December 1950, the document was actually written by only four people, with Maruyama Masao as the primary author, who elaborated on international relations in a manner consistent with his own line of thinking. This third Heidankai statement lacked a message of unity among intellectuals which had previously constituted the very core of the organization.

The following year was dominated by increased controversy around the Treaty of San Francisco, which was ultimately signed in September 1951. The public debate, both before and after the peace conference, revealed an unbridgeable difference of opinions regarding the treaty. The intellectuals on both sides employed argumentation consistent with the typical patterns of West versus East, liberal vs. communist, or pro-American vs. pro-Soviet polemics. Gradually, the Japanese intellectual discourse became integrated into the international Cold War discourse, fueled by ideological opposition between the two worlds—the final stage of a long process, that began back in February 1947, in which various external agents and factors exerted influence over Japan's intellectual life. It is impossible to identify one, exact moment at which the community of remorse ceased to exist as its decline constituted a longer process throughout the years 1950-1951. What is certain, however, is that by late 1951, it was already gone.

This dissertation proves that the decline and eventual disintegration of the community of remorse was tied to the influence of Cold War in Japan. Simultaneously, however, the project revealed an almost surprising durability of that community (when compared to European or American intellectuals) in the face of ideological polarization, political pressure, and global divide consistent with the bipolar framework of international relations. Despite the persistence of American censorship and attempts at top-down manipulation, intellectual life in occupation-era Japan was rich and possessed an impressive ability to not only produce original ideas, but also give rise to common initiatives, oftentimes running in contrary to the political will of both the occupation authorities and the U.S.-aligned Japanese government. It took over five years for the community of remorse to collapse; its social activities, ideas, and political aspirations exerted influence over Japan for most of the occupation period.

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Abstract

This dissertation deals with the problem of intellectual community of early postwar Japan. Over the course of four chapters it traces the history of this community during the occupation era (1945-1952), focusing on its evolving relation to the Cold War polarization.

Intellectuals in early postwar Japan constituted a social group which to a large extent had been united by a common war experience and shared objectives regarding Japan's future. These objectives primarily consisted of a commitment to democratization under the auspices of American occupation. The intellectual community which emerged in Japan in late 1945 is typically referred to as the "community of remorse." How long did this community last? At what point in time did it break down? And as a result of what factors? These are the main research questions informing this project, which belongs to the subdiscipline of intellectual history. The primary sources consist of archival records, published documents, diaries, and magazines—with the latter serving as the main basis of research. This is due to the fact that opinion monthlies served as the main medium of the Japanese intellectual community.

The internal coherence of the community of remorse was tied to the common acceptance of the United States as the patron of democratization among liberals, progressives, and Marxists alike. However, with the emerging Cold War, this became increasingly difficult, especially since the Americans shifted their priorities from progressive reforms to anticommunism and economic stabilization in early 1947. Nevertheless, most Japanese intellectuals continued to adhere to their initial postwar values and attempted to overcome the new political reality. Despite several drawbacks, they managed to keep their unity at least to the mid-1949 by launching common initiatives, such as the Peace Problem Discussion Group.

However, the Red Purge as well as the communist victory in China during the latter part of 1949 significantly shook up the community. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 brought it into a state of severe internal conflict, exemplified during the public debate around the San Francisco Peace Treaty (signed in September 1951). When the occupation of Japan ended in April 1952, the community did no longer exist.

The analysis conducted in this dissertation has demonstrated, for the first time in scholarship, what was the collective response of Japanese intellectuals to the Cold War polarization, which factors and individuals played the most important roles in resisting the emerging bipolar framework, and how the new lines of division among intellectuals developed.

The study has also demonstrated the significance of *sōgō zasshi*—not only as a central medium of public debate, but also as a tool. In the hands of the Americans: for the purpose of anti-Soviet psychological warfare; in the hands of the Japanese themselves: as a forum and foundation for suprapolitical initiatives aimed at overcoming the Cold War polarization.

Streszczenie

Wspólnota intelektualistów w Japonii i jej stosunek do zimnowojennej polaryzacji, 1945-1952

Japonia zakończyła swój udział w II wojnie światowej kapitulacją (ogłoszoną publicznie 15 sierpnia, a podpisaną 2 września 1945 r.), wskutek której znalazła się pod okupacją państw sprzymierzonych. Chociaż formalnie okupacja sprawowana była kolektywnie w imieniu Aliantów, w praktyce Japonia znalazła się pod wyłączną kontrolą Stanów Zjednoczonych. Dowodzący siłami amerykańskimi na miejscu generał Douglas MacArthur rozpoczął wdrażanie programu reform, których naczelnym celem była demilitaryzacja i demokratyzacja Japonii.

Przeważająca część Japończyków zareagowała na klęskę wojenną swojego kraju głębokim szokiem, smutkiem i rozczarowaniem. Wyróżniała się na tym tle reakcja japońskich intelektualistów, spośród których wielu przyjęło postawę optymistycznego wyczekiwania na zmiany polityczne zapowiedziane przez Amerykanów. Liberałowie i socjaliści, wrogo nastawieni do dominacji wojskowych oraz autorytarnego aparatu państwowego, jakie charakteryzowały Japonię do 1945 r., pożądali demokratyzacji na wzór zachodni. Także i komuniści, poddawani represjom i więzieni, dostrzegli w Stanach Zjednoczonych potencjalnego rzecznika rewolucji społecznej wiążąc nadzieje z faktem, iż Związek Sowiecki znajduje się wśród mocarstw sankcjonujących okupację i jej cele. Skutkiem tego, większość aktywnych publicznie intelektualistów zdecydowanie poparła Amerykanów oraz ich cele okupacyjne.

Intelektualiści ci zyskali miano „wspólnoty żalu" (*kaikon kyōdōtai*), do dzisiaj funkcjonujące w literaturze przedmiotu. Nazwa ta odnosi się do faktu, że czynnikiem, który zjednoczył japońskich liberałów, socjalistów i komunistów zaraz po zakończeniu wojny było wspólne im poczucie żalu: nad losem Japonii, która w latach 30. opuściła wspólnotę międzynarodową, weszła na drogę ekspansji, zaangażowała się w agresywne wojny w Chinach i na Pacyfiku, a ostatecznie walkę tę przegrała, obracając się w ruinę; ale także nad własną niezdolnością do stawienia skutecznego oporu, a często i prywatnym oportunizmem. Wyrażając te uczucia również publicznie, członkowie wspólnoty żalu potraktowali wsparcie dla progresywnych reform, które miały zostać zrealizowane pod egidą Stanów Zjednoczonych, jako rodzaj pokuty, a zarazem społecznej misji, do której są powołani jako najlepiej

wykształceni członkowie społeczeństwa. Jednakże misję tę skomplikowało wyłonienie się konfliktu zimnowojennego pomiędzy USA a ZSRS. Nowa sytuacja międzynarodowa nie tylko zintensyfikowała w Japonii polaryzację polityczno-ideologiczną, ale także doprowadziła do zmiany priorytetów po stronie amerykańskiej, która osłabiła prodemokratyczny i reformatorski wymiar polityki okupacyjnej na rzecz ekonomicznego pragmatyzmu i walki z komunizmem. Japońska wspólnota żalu w okresie okupacji i jej konfrontacja z narastającymi wpływami zimnej wojny stanowi przedmiot niniejszej pracy.

O ile sama wspólnota żalu jest dobrze rozpoznana w literaturze naukowej, a jej powstanie i funkcjonowanie na początku okupacji w zasadzie nie wzbudza żadnych kontrowersji wśród specjalistów, dotychczas nie powstała żadna praca po polsku, angielsku czy japońsku, która prześledziłaby jej losy, odpowiadając na pytanie o to, kiedy i dlaczego przestała istnieć. Chociaż hipotetyczne wskazanie na wpływ zimnej wojny jako przyczyny rozpadu wspólnoty może wydawać się naturalne, oczywistość danej odpowiedzi nie stanowi dowodu ani nie może zastąpić badań naukowych. Celem tej pracy było zmierzenie się z problemem przyczyny rozpadu wspólnoty żalu poprzez prześledzenie jej losów w całym okresie okupacji (1945-1952) oraz zbadanie jej relacji do zimnej wojny.

Wspólnota żalu stanowiła wspólnotę intelektualistów, zatem badania nad nią mieszczą się w spektrum historii intelektualnej. Jako subdyscyplina historii odróżnia się ona od historii idei czy historii filozofii tym, że nie patrzy jedynie na formułowane poglądy, lecz bada także samych intelektualistów traktując ich jako jeden z podmiotów historii i uwzględniając przy tym społeczno-polityczne tło, w jakim funkcjonują. Fundamentalnym celem historii intelektualnej jest to samo co i innych gałęzi historii: zrozumienie badanego zagadnienia nie jako jednostkowego, partykularnego fenomenu, lecz usytuowanie go w ramach szerszej rzeczywistości historycznej oraz w odniesieniu do procesów historycznych. W przypadku powojennej Japonii takimi procesami były między innymi modernizacja, demokratyzacja, polaryzacja zimnowojenna oraz okcydentalizacja.

Praca została napisana w oparciu o oryginalne badania głównie źródeł japońskich, wspomaganych przez źródła amerykańskie. Na wykorzystane archiwalia składają się materiały z kolekcji Dokumentów administracyjnych z Japońskich Archiwów Państwowych (Kokuritsu Kōbun Shokan) w Tokio oraz zespołu Fundacji Rockefellera przechowywanego w Centralnym Archiwum Rockefellerów (Rockefeller Archive Center) w Sleepy Hollow w stanie Nowy Jork. Jeśli chodzi o dokumenty publikowane, to wykorzystane zostały tomy z serii „Dokumenty polityki zagranicznej” („Nihon gaikō bunsho”) japońskiego Ministerstwa Spraw

Zagranicznych, seria „Stosunki zagraniczne Stanów Zjednoczonych" („Foreign Relations of the United States") wydawana przez Biuro Historyczne Departamentu Stanu USA, a także wydany przez amerykańską administrację okupacyjną raport „Reorientacja polityczna Japonii" („Political Reorientation of Japan"). Inną kategorią źródeł są pamiętniki należące do wybranych postaci życia publicznego Japonii. Ostatnią i najważniejszą kategorię źródeł tworzy prasa, a konkretnie miesięczniki, których analiza stanowi rdzeń pracy badawczej niniejszego projektu doktorskiego.

Miesięczniki te określa się po japońsku mianem *sōgō zasshi* („magazyny ogólne" lub „zintegrowane"). Jest to typ magazynu powstały w Japonii na początku XX w., charakteryzujący się obszerną zawartością (sięgającą niekiedy prawie trzystu stron) oraz podziałem na dwie główne sekcje: eseje i rozrywkę. O ile eseje prezentują głównie komentarz do bieżących spraw społeczno-politycznych, teksty historyczne oraz rozważania filozoficzne, w treści pism znalazło się także miejsce na rozrywkę, np. wydawane odcinkowo powieści oraz utwory poetyckie. Wyróżniającą cechą *sōgō zasshi* jest wysoki poziom zawartych w nim tekstów, których autorami przeważnie nie są zwyczajni dziennikarze, lecz pracownicy akademiccy, pisarze i uznani krytycy. Można zatem określić je jako pismo tworzone w całości przez intelektualistów. W Japonii powojennej aż do połowy lat sześćdziesiątych magazyny te posiadały szerokie grono czytelników, a najpopularniejsze tytuły regularnie osiągały nakład na miesięcznym poziomie przekraczającym 100 tys. egzemplarzy (przy czym zakres oddziaływania uważa się za znacznie szerszy, gdyż magazyny często przechodziły z rąk do rąk). W efekcie *sōgō zasshi* w badanym okresie realizowały równocześnie dwie funkcje: 1) jako główne medium wspólnoty intelektualnej umożliwiały wymianę idei i opinii w obrębie intelektualistów japońskich; 2) z uwagi na szerokie grono wykształconych czytelników z głównych ośrodków miejskich umożliwiały tejże wspólnocie szerokie oddziaływanie na społeczeństwo i kształtowanie opinii publicznej. Z tego powodu stanowią podstawowe źródło do badania historii intelektualnej Japonii okresu powojennego.

W toku badań wykorzystano jedenaście różnych magazynów tego typu, kładąc jednak nacisk na trzy konkretne tytuły: „Sekai" („Świat"), „Tenbō" („Perspektywa") i „Chūō Kōron" („Centralny Przegląd"). Dwa pierwsze powstały na początku 1946 r., natomiast trzeci ukazuje się nieprzerwanie od końca XIX w., stanowiąc najstarszy magazyn tego typu w Japonii. Wybór tych trzech czasopism został podyktowany nie tylko ich silną pozycją na rynku (mierzoną w liczbie sprzedawanych egzemplarzy), ale także prestiżem w środowisku intelektualnym powojennej Japonii oraz centralną pozycją w ramach dyskursu medialnego. Ten ostatni czynnik

sprowadza się przede wszystkim do faktu, że trzy wyżej wymienione magazyny, mimo że każdy z nich posiadał swój własny profil ideowo-polityczny, stanowiły szeroką platformę do wymiany myśli, goszcząc na swoich łamach autorów o różnych poglądach. I tak na przykład względnie zachowawczy „Chūō Kōron" regularnie dawał przestrzeń do pisania komunistom, zaś w progresywnym „Sekai" można było znaleźć autorów konserwatywnych. Ogniskowała się też wokół nich debata publiczna.

Metodologia pracy opiera się na zastosowaniu podejścia właściwego dla historii intelektualnej i spotykanego w publikacjach wiodących historyków Japonii powojennej, takich jak J. Victor Koschmann, Oguma Eiji, Adam Bronson czy Tsuzuki Tsutomu. Podstawową metodę stanowi analiza tekstualna poszczególnych wytworów pracy umysłowej badanego podmiotu historycznego, czyli japońskich intelektualistów należących do wspólnoty żalu i poruszających się w ekosystemie opartym na opisanych wyżej magazynach. Wyniki analizy poszczególnych tekstów zostają włączone do szerszej analizy dyskursu, który uwzględnia nie tylko poglądy poszczególnych autorów, lecz szerszy kontekst kulturowo-lingwistyczny. Jako że dyskurs prowadzony jest w środowisku medialnym, analiza tekstualna, jak i analiza dyskursu są wspomagane narzędziami należącymi do warsztatu prasoznawstwa. Ponadto analizie poddane zostaje także środowisko zewnętrzne, w którym powstają źródła: zarówno profil i doświadczenie życiowe badanych intelektualistów, ale także otoczenie polityczne. Poprawne uwzględnienie tego ostatniego stanowi punkt wyjściowy wszystkich rozważań zawartych w pracy, dlatego obszernej analizie zostają poddane takie zagadnienia jak wpływ cenzury amerykańskiej, próby oddziaływania na intelektualistów japońskich przez władze okupacyjne oraz polityka wewnętrzna rządu Japonii (który nawet w okresie okupacji został utrzymany). Zrozumieniu zewnętrznych warunków kształtujących dyskurs intelektualny służy analiza źródeł dokumentowych dotyczących szerszej polityki Waszyngtonu wobec Japonii, lokalnej polityki amerykańskich władz okupacyjnych oraz polityki rządu japońskiego. Mimo wysokiej oryginalności postawionego problemu badawczego, praca pozostaje w ciągłym dialogu z literaturą przedmiotu, która obejmuje publikacje głównie w trzech językach: japońskim, angielskim i polskim.

Rozprawa złożona jest ze wstępu, czterech rozdziałów oraz zakończenia. Wstęp charakteryzuje stan badań, wprowadza główny problem badawczy, a także omawia bazę źródłową i metodologię. Zapowiada też strukturę pracy oraz zawiera podziękowania.

Rozdział pierwszy przybliża wspólnotę żalu, wychodząc od zagadnienia definicji intelektualistów w kontekście japońskim. Ukazuje dwoiste korzenie tej kategorii społecznej w

Japonii. Pierwszym z nich są rodzime dzieje uczonych konfucjańskich w epoce wczesnonowożytnej, spośród których w drugiej połowie XIX w., w dobie modernizacji, wyrośli nowocześni pracownicy umysłowi. Drugim natomiast jest ukształtowanie się europejskiego rozumienia „intelektualistów" czy „inteligencji". Modernizująca się Japonia przejmowała bowiem z Zachodu wiele idei i wzorców już powstałych na gruncie europejskim; nie inaczej było i w tym przypadku. Na lokalną japońską tradycję intelektualną nałożyła się zatem importowana tradycja zachodnia, dając początek nowej kategorii społecznej, jaką stali się japońscy intelektualiści. Uwzględniając złożony charakter tego procesu oraz to, jak sami członkowie tej grupy postrzegali swoją rolę, w rozdziale pierwszym sformułowana zostaje definicja intelektualisty w kontekście Japonii wczesnego okresu powojennego. Zgodnie z tą definicją, jest to grupa osób świadomie identyfikujących się jako intelektualiści, których wyróżnia wysokie wykształcenie oraz zainteresowanie sprawami ogólnymi, wychodzącymi poza szczegółowe zagadnienia techniczne czy naukowe. Omówiony zostaje też ekosystem, w którym funkcjonują japońscy intelektualiści, a na który składają się nie tylko magazyny *sōgō zasshi*, ale także uniwersytety, na których większość analizowanych postaci znajduje zatrudnienie.

Drugi rozdział omawia pierwszą fazę funkcjonowania japońskiej wspólnoty intelektualnej pod okupacją, obejmującą okres od zakończenia II wojny światowej do stycznia 1947 r. Jest to czas, w którym nadal nie oddziałuje jeszcze konflikt zimnowojenny, umożliwiając wykrystalizowanie się autoidentyfikacji tej wspólnoty oraz poczucia misji społecznej. Na misję tę składało się przede wszystkim wspieranie reform realizowanych przez rząd japoński pod dyktatem Amerykanów. Mimo sporów pomiędzy intelektualistami dotyczących szczegółów konkretnych reform, dominował idealizm oraz poczucie solidarności pod wpływem dopiero co zakończonego doświadczenia wojny. Najważniejsze dyskusje ogniskowały się wokół takich zagadnień jak zmiana ustroju państwa (przede wszystkim poprzez zmianę konstytucji), rola cesarza, przyszła pozycja Japonii we wspólnocie międzynarodowej, a także społeczna odpowiedzialność za wojnę. Ta ostatnia kwestia wiązała się z trwającą czystką militarystów i nacjonalistów, którą realizowały władze okupacyjne. Członkom wspólnoty żalu zdarzało się współpracować z Amerykanami w tym zakresie, na przykład poprzez publikację „czarnych list" pisarzy zaangażowanych w prowojenną propagandę w latach trzydziestych i czterdziestych. W rozdziale drugim znalazła się także analiza grup pozostających na marginesie wspólnoty żalu, to jest wchodzących w regularne interakcje z jej członkami, ale zarazem zachowujących pewien dystans. Byli to przede

wszystkim najbardziej radykalnie lewicowi intelektualiści, którzy nie akceptowali jakichkolwiek kompromisów względem ortodoksji marksizmu-leninizmu, ale także postaci kwestionujące paternalistyczną postawę większości członków wspólnoty żalu względem reszty społeczeństwa. Najlepszym przykładem tej drugiej kategorii jest Fukuda Tsuneari, liberał krytykujący „oświeceniowy" styl przekazywania opinii dominujący w *sōgō zasshi*.

Kolejny, trzeci rozdział podejmuje temat narastającego konfliktu zimnowojennego, którego wpływ na politykę wewnętrzną Japonii datuje się od lutego 1947 r., czyli decyzji MacArthura o zakazaniu strajku generalnego (wywołanej obawą o wzmocnienie ruchu komunistycznego). Jest to zarazem początek reorientacji polityki okupacyjnej, dla której odtąd naczelnymi priorytetami stał się antykomunizm oraz starania na rzecz uczynienia z Japonii przyszłego sojusznika w regionie. Do zmiany tej, nazwanej w prasie polityką „kursu zwrotnego", bardzo przychylnie odniósł się konserwatywny rząd japoński premiera Yoshidy Shigeru, który w tym czasie zaczął wyrastać na najsilniejszego japońskiego polityka. Rozdział trzeci kończy się w marcu 1949 r., zaraz przed początkiem „czerwonej czystki", stanowiącej dalsze zaostrzenie kursu zwrotnego.

Zmiana celów okupacji sprawiła, że przestała ona reprezentować cele i wartości wspólnoty żalu. Rosnąca polaryzacja w polityce wewnętrznej przełożyła się także na japońskich intelektualistów, wśród których pojawiły się pierwsze istotne konflikty. Największy z nich doprowadził do rozłamu wśród autorów piszących dla „Sekai". Redaktor naczelny magazynu, Yoshino Genzaburō, podjął próbę reorientacji w kierunku bardziej progresywnym i sceptycznym w stosunku do polityki amerykańskiej, co nie spodobało się zachowawczej części autorów, określanych mianem „starych liberałów". Założyli oni alternatywny magazyn, „Kokoro" („Serce"). Jednak mimo dość nagłego i burzliwego odejścia, oba środowiska pozostały ze sobą w dialogu. Równocześnie narodziła się też inicjatywa utworzenia w listopadzie 1948 r. organizacji mającej reprezentować wszystkich japońskich intelektualistów, nazwanej Stowarzyszeniem Dyskutowania o Problemie Pokoju (Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai) – jako że powodem jego powstania była odpowiedź na apel UNESCO w sprawie rezygnacji z prowadzenia wojen. Inicjatywa zakończyła się sukcesem: do stowarzyszenia dołączyła większość prominentnych intelektualistów, którzy mimo różnic poglądów, wypracowali wspólne stanowisko, wyrażone deklaracją z marca 1949 r., potępiającą konflikt między USA a ZSRS. Okres od lutego 1947 r. do marca 1949 r., mimo narastającej polaryzacji, wykazał zdolność przezwyciężenia zimnowojennego podziału na gruncie japońskim przez wspólnotę intelektualistów.

Rozdział czwarty dotyczy ostatniej fazy w istnieniu wspólnoty, trwającej od zaostrzenia „kursu zwrotnego" w kwietniu 1949 r. aż do zakończenia okupacji Japonii 28 kwietnia 1952 r. W okresie tym nastąpił szereg zdarzeń, które doprowadziły do jeszcze większej eskalacji napięć zimnowojennych wewnątrz Japonii. Były to kolejno: rozpoczęcie czystki komunistów w kwietniu 1949 r., zwycięstwo sił komunistycznych w Chinach w grudniu 1949 r., wybuch wojny w Korei w czerwcu 1950 r., a także konferencja w San Francisco zakończona podpisaniem traktatu pokojowego między Japonią a Aliantami (jednak bez udziału ZSRS i Chin ludowych) we wrześniu 1951 r. Japońska wspólnota intelektualistów kontynuowała starania na rzecz przeciwstawienia się wzrastającej polaryzacji, jednak okazały się one bezskuteczne. Sukces komunistów chińskich ukazał wielu lewicowym intelektualistom japońskim alternatywny model modernizacji, oparty na maoizmie, a odmienny od amerykańskiego, co doprowadziło do podziału w kwestii zasadniczej wizji rozwoju kraju. Z kolei wojna koreańska przekonała wielu bardziej umiarkowanych czy konserwatywnych intelektualistów o realności zagrożenia komunistycznego, zaburzając poczucie wspólnoty z japońską lewicą. Wielomiesięczna debata wokół traktatu pokojowego ostatecznie skonfliktowała ze sobą autorów najważniejszych magazynów, gdyż część z nich była skłonna zaakceptować „niepełny" pokój bez Sowietów i Chin, co dla pozostałych było nie do przyjęcia jako „zdrada" wartości jałtańsko-poczdamskich. Konflikt ten jest dobrze uwidoczniony choćby w korespondencji oraz publicznej polemice między Maruyamą Masao a Hayashim Kentarō, dwoma zaprzyjaźnionymi intelektualistami w tym samym wieku, o bardzo podobnych doświadczeniach i współpracujących po wojnie, którzy w latach 1949-1950 weszli w ostry konflikt w sprawie oceny polityki amerykańskiej. Rozdział przybliża też szereg innych konfliktów i dyskusji tego rodzaju.

Śledząc wyłonienie się, idee, a następnie losy wspólnoty intelektualistów japońskich podczas okupacji określanej mianem „wspólnoty żalu", wyraźne stają się zwłaszcza dwie kwestie. Po pierwsze, patrząc przez pryzmat trendów obecnych w wielu innych krajach niekomunistycznych, zachowali oni wysoką zdolność przeciwstawienia się typowemu podziałowi zimnowojennemu aż do końca lat czterdziestych, a to za sprawą powołania się na doświadczenie okresu wojny, poczucie misji jako intelektualiści oraz wspólne poparcie dla demokratyzacji Japonii. Zarazem jednak również i takie starania okazały się niewystarczające zwłaszcza wobec wybuchu wojny w Korei. W kwietniu 1952 r., kiedy dobiegła końca okupacja Japonii, nie było już żadnych pozostałości po dawnej wspólnocie, a sytuacja japońskich intelektualistów odzwierciedlała typowo zimnowojenny podział na proamerykańską prawicę i prosowiecką lewicę.

Przeprowadzona w pracy analiza reakcji środowiska japońskich intelektualistów na postępującą polaryzację zimnowojenną pozwoliła ukazać, po raz pierwszy w historiografii, jak ta reakcja wyglądała, jakie były najważniejsze czynniki i postaci opierające się dwubiegunowemu układowi polityczno-ideologicznemu oraz jak kształtowały się linie podziału między intelektualistami. Udowodniono również znaczenie magazynów *sōgō zasshi* nie tylko jako medium, w którym ogniskowały się najważniejsze wątki debaty publicznej, ale także jako narzędzia: w rękach Amerykanów (celem wykorzystania w antysowieckiej wojnie psychologicznej) oraz w rękach samych Japończyków (jako przestrzeń oraz punkt oparcia dla wspólnych, ponadpolitycznych inicjatyw mających przełamać zimnowojenną polaryzację).